

the basis of the "Short Course" and of all party historiography. After Stalin was exposed, the Soviet historical press exposed this legend as well. The

journal Questions of History wrote that "Stalin's cult led to a direct perversion of historical truth" and that Beria's work was "built on stretches and outright falsifications"<sup>317</sup>. From the same

legend followed the "leading role of Stalin", which was attributed to him: during the creation and

work of the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda (1912

G.);

during the organization and direction of the Duma faction of the Bolsheviks in the fourth State Duma

(1912). From now on, this role also passes from Stalin to Sverdlov. An old member of the party, Sverdlov's wife, K. Sverdlov-Novgorodtseva, testifies: "The

newspaper Pravda and the Duma Social Democratic faction became the advanced bastions of the party ... The Central Committee entrusted the leadership of Pravda to Sverdlov, and he was supposed to provide all possible assistance Bolshevik deputies of the State Duma"<sup>318</sup>.

In support of this, Sverdlov cites the testimony of the Bolshevik deputies. But Pravda

was closed, and the Bolshevik deputies who voted against war loans were exiled to Siberia for trial. The main figure at the trial was the de facto head of the Duma faction and the legal head of Pravda, L. Kamenev. Wanting to shield himself and the deputies, Kamenev said

at the trial that his party was against Lenin's slogan about the defeat of Russia in this war. Lenin, of course, condemned Kamenev for such a defense. But according to the "Brief Biography of I. V. Stalin" it turned out that Stalin also condemned such a position of Kamenev. It said:

313 Voprosy istorii, 1956, No 7, p. 32. 314

Ibid., p. 19. 315

Voprosy istorii, 1956, No 3, p. 11. 316 Ibid.,

p. 11. 317 Ibid., p.

4 318 "October",

1956, No 7, p. 150.

"...Stalin takes a Leninist internationalist position... speaks at meetings of exiled Bolsheviks in the village of Monastyrsky (Turukhan - 1915), where he stigmatizes the cowardly and treacherous behavior of Kamenev at the trial of the Bolshevik "five" - deputies of the Fourth State Duma"<sup>319</sup>. But this myth is also

broken by Sverdlova, who was present at these meetings. Sverdlova says that a meeting of exiles took place in the same Monastery, where members of the Central Committee Goloshchekin, Sverdlov, Spandaryan, Stalin, member of the Central Organ Kamenev, deputies Petrovsky, Muranov and others were present. The question of Kamenev's behavior was

discussed. Sverdlova writes: "Someone was not inclined to condemn Kamenev too severely. Stalin did not speak at the meeting at all. Such a position weakened the acuteness of the question. , to Kureika, and did not take part in the work on the resolution"<sup>320</sup>. Stalin's position remained anti-Leninist even after his return from exile in March 1917, even

after Lenin's April

Theses. He walked with Kamenev until the 7th Conference of the Bolsheviks (April 24, 1917). Stalin called Lenin's "April theses" a mere "scheme" and criticized them. He still stood in the position of conditional support for the Provisional Government ("in so far as"). Since this anti-Leninist position of Stalin was reflected in the minutes of the Central Committee at that time, they were kept in the strictest confidence until Stalin was exposed. Now, using these protocols, the Soviet historian Burdzhakov has also debunked the myth that Stalin was a zealous propagandist for Lenin's April Theses. Stalin betrayed Kamenev and joined Lenin only at the 7th All-Russian Conference, when Lenin's victory in the party turned out to be universal (see Questions of History, 1956, No. 4, 8). However, not only Kamenev, but also Stalin was not elected to the presidium of this conference. Lenin, Zinoviev, Sverdlov, Fedorov, Muranov were elected there. It is characteristic that the journal

"Questions

History" even ventured a certain objectivism, stating: "Zinoviev's speech 319" Brief

Biography ", p. 56. 320" October

", ibid. fell at a

conference against Kamenev's position; in a speech on the current moment, he defended Lenin's line "321. It is interesting

to note that Stalin's personal negative qualities in the party were known long not only before Khrushchev's report, but also before Lenin's "testament". Here are the facts: Sverdlov writes from Turukhan to his wife June 27, 1914: "You know, my dear,

in what vile conditions I was in Kureika. The comrade with whom we were there turned out to be in such a personal relationship that we did not talk and did not see each other "322. In

another letter, he writes:

"We did not agree with our comrade "character" and hardly see each other, we do not go to each

other "323. The editors make the following note to these

letters: "The comrade with whom Sverdlov was in Kureika and whom he mentions in this letter and document No. 13 is I. V. Stalin"

324. But if Sverdlov's letter can still be attributed to the testimony of only one of the members of the Central Committee, this cannot be said about the next official document, Stalin, as soon as he returned from exile, tried to join the Bureau of the Bolshevik Central Committee in Petrograd. However, the Bureau makes the following decision on March

12, 1917: that he was an agent of the Central Committee in 1912 and therefore would have been desirable in the Bureau of the Central Committee, but in view of certain personal traits inherent in him, the Bureau of the Central Committee spoke in the sense of inviting him with an advisory

Khrushchev's rehabilitation of Stalin's name temporarily put an end to the further exposure of historical legends about Stalin. The journal Voprosy istorii, the only press organ in the USSR that, in the spirit of Khrushchev's report at the 20th Congress, began a more or less scientific and objective development of the history of the CPSU, was subjected to purely Stalinist abuse from the top propagandists. In the journals "Party Life" (No 14, 23), "To Help Political Self-Education" (1957,

321 Voprosy istorii, 1956, No 4, p. 56. 322

Red Archive, 1956, No 5, p. 120. 323

Ibid., p. 116. 324

Ibid., p. 128.

Voprosy istorii, 1956 , No 8, p. 111.

No 3), "Communist" (1957, No 4), editorials appeared in which the exposure of historical legends about Stalin was declared "sensational", "objectivist", "anti-scientific".

#### V. DEBURNING STALIN AS A CLASSIC OF MARXISM The

second important weapon on the path of Stalin's ascension to power was his announcement as a classic of Marxism-Leninism, a successor of the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin both in theory and in practice. For success in such a dogmatic party as the Communist, this was a vital condition. Stalin himself believed least of all in any dogmas, including Marxist ones, but in order for him to be able, according to his own understanding and for his practical purposes, to "develop" Marxism-Leninism further, it was important that he be recognized as the only judge in the practical interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. This has been the case for almost a quarter of a century. Therefore, it is quite natural that the debunking of Stalin as a practice should mean the debunking of him as a sinless "classic" of Marxism. The theoretical debunking of Stalin also served another purpose. If the dead Stalin had continued to remain such an infallible authority as he was during his lifetime, or as Marx and Lenin are, then it would be impossible to experiment, to modernize the Stalinist system in terms of "theoretical innovations" or practical reforms. . The first test balloon to criticize Stalin's dogmas was launched into the hall of the 20th Congress by Mikoyan ("Economic Problems"). The psychological impact of this performance was amazing. Stalin is sinful! The test balloon was supposed to explore the reaction of the Supreme Congress of the Stalinists. But what a paradox! People who for a quarter of a century have been shouting furiously: "Stalin is a father, a teacher, a luminary, a genius!" saw Mikoyan off with "stormy, incessant applause," as Pravda noted. This was a calculated overture to the terrible tragedy of the country, drawn in the famous report of Khrushchev. Of the theoretical dogmas of Stalin, Khrushchev criticized only his concept of "enemies of the people" and

theory of class struggle in the period of socialism. Subsequently, the party press began to criticize Stalin's books in general articles and in separate notes. The journal Questions of Philosophy devoted a special editorial to Stalin's work. Works that were previously considered the "peak" of Marxism-Leninism were criticized: "On Dialectical and Historical Materialism", "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", "Marxism and Linguistics"<sup>326</sup>.

The significance of this criticism lay not in a factual analysis of Stalin's mistakes (the criticism itself was ostentatious, declarative), but in principle: did you openly start for the first time? debunk Stalin and as a classic of Marxism. Criticized:

Stalin's thesis: "on the complete correspondence in a socialist society of production relations to the nature of the productive forces" ("On Dialectical and Historical Materialism")<sup>327</sup>.

"Economic problems", which pushed philosophers and economists to the other extreme - "to see the urgent contradictions where they do not exist, began to talk about the need to merge the two forms of ownership" .

Stalin's formula about the role of the superstructure in "Marxism and linguistics", "pushing towards simplification", "displacing Marx's more precise, flexible and dialectical formula about the revolution and the "field of the

superstructure". "Stalin's formula about the aggravation of the class struggle as socialism advances. Meanwhile, Lenin did not give such a formula at all."

The debunking of Stalin as a "classic" of Marxism is a progressive phenomenon for the social sciences themselves in the USSR. science even in a purely Marxist aspect. Each new letter of Stalin was declared historical, speech - epochal, and work - the pinnacle of science, until it came to the point that philosophers, economists, historians existed in the USSR only in name, and all their "scientific" products were reduced to the creation of a new science - to "citation" from Stalin. In his first article against Stalin

the Pravda newspaper only stated the factual situation when it wrote the following: "The cult of personality in the field of ideological work caused great damage.

326 "Questions of Philosophy", 1956, No 3, editorial.

327 Ibid., p. 4. 328

Ibid., p. 4. 329 Ibid., p. 6. 330 Ibid., p. "absolutely everything."

- A. A.) represent a set of quotations from the works of Stalin and his

praise...

It was believed that only one person, Stalin, could develop, move forward a theory, express something original and new, and all the rest should popularize the thoughts expressed by him, translate the formulations given to him.

journal "Questions of History", which, in turn, wrote:

"A vicious notion was created that only Stalin could develop and move forward a theory. Every word he said was declared a scientific discovery, the pinnacle of Marxism-Leninism, an indisputable truth ... This contributed to the widespread dissemination of dogmatism, dogmatism and quotation. In science appeared indifferent and uninitiated people who are unable and unwilling to think independently. It is quite natural that under such conditions there

could be no question not only of the existence of social sciences, even Marxist ones, but also of the slightest glimpse of independent thought in the field of this or that science. If this happened sometimes, then people, the so-called scientists, began to bombard each other with quotations from Stalin, until Stalin himself explained which of his quotations he now considers to be the truth he was looking for (let us recall, for example, the discussion on philosophy before the war, the discussion on linguistics and political economy after the war). It was this, in the words of Stalin

himself, "Arakcheev's regime in science" that led to the liquidation of the social sciences in the USSR, to the complete stagnation of theoretical thought. The journal Questions of History formulated the same conclusion, but in a somewhat milder form:

"The atmosphere of the cult of personality," wrote the journal, "led to conservatism and stagnation in science. We have people who are afraid of any new word and do not want to part with their usual views"<sup>333</sup>.

The period from the 20th Congress (February 1956) to October 1956 was a period of reassessment of the Stalinist legacy in the social sciences, literature and art. This period is characterized by clearly expressed opposite tendencies: on the one hand, the collective leadership is trying to continue the course of de-Stalinization, but de-Stalinization controlled from above; on the other hand, the masses, even the masses of the party, the scientific and creative cadres, understanding the debunking of Stalin as the proclamation of scientific and creative freedom, begin to cross the "control limits" outlined from above and criticize not so much Stalin as the Stalinist system. From the very beginning (and not after the Polish and Hungarian events, as is commonly believed), the Kremlin understood that the second trend was deadly for the regime, and therefore Khrushchev pointed out in his "closed report" the need to carefully debunk Stalin within the system. Literally a week after its first article against Stalin, Pravda published a second article (April 5, 1956). It already emphasized the struggle against "demagogues" and "rotten elements" who "under the guise of a struggle against Stalin's personality cult criticize the party line."

The magazines *Kommunist* and *Party Life*. The latter wrote as early as March 1956:

"At some meetings there were cases of demagogic speeches ... it would be political blindness not to see that individual rotten elements, under the guise of condemning the cult of personality, are trying to cast doubt on the correctness of the party's policy, and, in fact, are rehashing the hackneyed slanderous fabrications of foreign reactionary propaganda"<sup>334</sup>. The party leadership saw that a

dialogue with the people regarding criticism of Stalin, even in the field of theory, is a dangerous thing, that it is difficult to draw some kind of demarcation line between Lenin and Stalin, between Stalin and the Stalinist system, which is difficult, and indeed impossible, indicate the exact pages and points in which Stalin can be criticized without criticizing the ideology of the regime. Therefore, Khrushchev, especially in the light of the crisis in Eastern Europe, introduced

"clarity" in the discussion around Stalin,<sup>335</sup> stating that Stalin was and remains an outstanding "Marxist-Leninist" and communist ideal. After Khrushchev's speeches on the eve of the new year, 1957, and on January 8, in defense of the name of Stalin, Pravda, No. 88, 28.3.1956, ceased to be

"fashionable." 332 Voprosy istorii,

1956, No 3, p. 4. 333 Voprosy Istorii, 1956, No

7, p. 222. 334 Party Life, 1956, No 6, p. 20. 335

Khrushchev's speech. Pravda, 19.1.1957. criticism

of Stalin's "mistakes" in the field of theory,

but this does not mean that such criticism has ceased altogether and that his mistakes have been amnestied. In this regard, it should be noted that Khrushchev, of course, did not

say anything fundamentally new in the above speeches, which would be at odds, as it is unconsciously believed, with the political assessment given by Khrushchev to Stalin in his "closed report" of February 25, 1956. Indeed, how did Khrushchev begin and end his report? Here is the beginning of his speech: "The purpose of this report

is not a thorough assessment of the life and work of Stalin. A sufficient number of books, pamphlets

and works have already been written about the merits of Stalin during his lifetime. The role of Stalin and the implementation of the Great October Socialist Revolution, in the civil war and in the struggle for the building of socialism in our

V preparing country is known all over the world"<sup>336</sup>.

And here is the

end: "However, in the past, Stalin undoubtedly had great services to the party, to the working class and to the international labor movement..."<sup>337</sup>

It's another matter, of course, that neither the beginning nor the end of Khrushchev's report fit in with the list of Stalin's monstrous crimes even against his own party, which he reported to the congress, but this beginning and end already contained Khrushchev's current assessments of Stalin. But, as mentioned above, the public rehabilitation of Stalin's name by Khrushchev did not mean, in the eyes of the collective leadership of the amnesty, Stalin's so-called "mistakes".



The magazine Kommunist returned to these "mistakes" again in February 1957, examining the question of whether the decisions of the Central Committee of 1946-1948 in the field of literature and art ("Zhdanovshchina") were correct. Writers, artists, and composers have particularly sharply criticized many of the provisions of these decrees as "consequences of the cult of personality" and naked administration in the field of artistic creativity. Of course, the Central Committee could not agree with such criticism, especially after the Polish and Hungarian experience. But the Central Committee could not fully insist on them even after these events. The pressure of the writers themselves was already too great, the Stalinist stamp on these resolutions was too bright. The article by The Communist says: "The Leninist principles of leadership in the field of literature and art are

precisely directed against any kind of "guardianship", against interference in the process of artistic creation. Of course, the consequences of the personality cult could not but affect literature and art. During the period of Stalin's personality cult, there were also elements (!) of administration, and unjustified sharp criticism, etc. ... Excesses by excesses, but the main direction ... consisted in the implementation of Marxist-Leninist principles ...

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But the editors of Kommunist are well aware that it is difficult to return to Zhdanovism - Stalinism in literature ... hence a number of reservations and deviations from the aforementioned resolutions. The magazine writes:

"But Marxism-Leninism requires a concrete historical approach to every phenomenon, including various party documents adopted in a certain historical situation. their provisions are outdated, some need to be clarified"339. Among the incorrect provisions, the magazine includes: the idealization of Ivan the Terrible in the resolution of the Central Committee on the film "Big Life"; the incorrect characterization of the Chechens and Ingush in the Central Committee's

resolution on Muradeli's opera The Great Friendship (all this was connected with the well-known phenomenon of the personality cult, writes the magazine);

incorrect and harsh characterization of prominent Soviet composers (Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Khachaturian, Shebalin and others);

"As for," the journal continues, "such administrative measures in the Central Committee's resolutions on the journals Zvezda and Leningrad as a ban on the publication of Zoshchenko, Akhmatova, and 'their kind', these measures were

lifted by life

itself"<sup>340</sup>. The new magazine of the Central Committee "To Help Political Self-Education" has already deciphered the bashful formula, widely launched after the debunking of Stalin, the formula

<sup>336</sup> N. S. Khrushchev. "Report at a closed session of the 20th Congress of the CPSU",

p. 3. <sup>337</sup> Ibid., p. 54.

<sup>338</sup> Kommunist, 1957, No. 3, p. 15., <sup>339</sup>

Ibid., p. 21. <sup>340</sup> Ibid.,

p. 22. "Marxism-

Leninism". The formula "Marxism-Leninism" from now on means:

"Our great teachers - Marx - Engels - Lenin"<sup>341</sup>. Excluded from this family, Stalin, however, was "dedicated to Marxism-Leninism", fought for the theory and practice of communism, but the magazine stipulates:

"We also know those serious mistakes that he made in the last period of his life, and which our party is successfully overcoming"<sup>342</sup>. The same issue of the journal

contains a critical article on Stalin's work "Marxism and Linguistics"<sup>343</sup>. Stalin's "military genius" is subjected to the same criticism. "Red Star" March 6, 1957 in an article devoted to "Lenin's military genius" not only did not find any merit in Stalin, but criticized the so-called Stalinist doctrine of "constantly acting military factors"<sup>344</sup>. In the general assessment of Stalin's "merits" and "mistakes" in the field of theory, there is still no single line, there is a disparity unusual for the

"general line", which obviously reflects the disparity of opinion on this issue in the collective leadership itself.

The general result of criticism of Stalin's "theoretical works" boils down to the following: Stalin is no longer a classic of Marxism-Leninism, but only a Marxist-Leninist, outstanding, but also mistaken.

#### VI. RETURN TO STALIN The

cardinal internal contradiction in exposing the cult and crimes of Stalin was that 1) in the field of practice, Stalin's methods of terrorist rule were declared illegal, anti-Party, while without them it is impossible to manage the dictatorship regime and to them, only to them, communism owes its existence and in the USSR and in satellites; 2) in the field of theory - Stalin's theoretical legacy, especially his theory of the class struggle in the period of socialism and his concept of "enemies of the people", was declared war as an anti-Leninist and anti-party theory, while in this part of the

341 "To help political self-education", 1957, No 1, p.  
5.

342 Ibid., p. 8. 343

Ibid., pp. 127-131. 344

"Red Star", 6.3.1957. lin was

simply indispensable in substantiating current communist practice with theoretical dogmas; 3) in the field of morality, Stalin's treachery, suspicion and duplicity were presented as the personal qualities of a dictator, while these qualities constitute the "moral code" that organically permeates the entire philosophy of the ruling system. Stalin's diadochi made the mistake of deciding to oppose the Stalinist system to Stalin

himself, appropriating, as Togliatti pointed out, all the achievements of the system, declaring Stalin responsible for its monstrous crimes. Tolyatti declared such an act of people from the Kremlin and their explanations about the cult of personality as non-Marxist. Tolyatti is undoubtedly right. After all, it was Marx who wrote in the preface to Capital: "From my point of view, less than from any other point of view, the individual can be considered responsible for the conditions of which, in

the social sense, he remains, no matter how he rises above them. subjectively"345.

The consequences of the Kremlin's mistake showed up very soon: 1) in an ideological crisis in the world communist movement; 2) in a political crisis in satellite countries; 3) in a psychological crisis in the USSR itself. The source of all crises is the same: the debunking and exposure of Stalin: Stalin - the creator of the system, Stalin - the model ruler.

However, the exposure and debunking of Stalin was not the only source of ideological crisis in the world communist movement itself.

Khrushchev announced in his open report a revision of a number of dogmatic and tactical provisions of communism in relation to the new conditions in international life. It was, however, a revision of Lenin, not Stalin. It is not difficult to see this if we compare what Khrushchev said with what constitutes the foundations of Leninism. Khrushchev declared at the 20th Congress: 1. In

free countries, communists can come to power and parliamentary way.

The parliament itself, with its communist majority, will turn "from an organ of bourgeois democracy into an instrument of the real people's will." That which we supposedly

recognize in the only way 345 K. Marks. Capital.

Moscow, 1949, vol. I, p. 8. transformation of

society, violence and civil war - not

corresponds to reality. 4. There

is no fatal inevitability of war<sup>346</sup>. The

tactical goal of these new "discoveries" in Leninism was clear: 1) to enter into a "united front" with the socialists in order to more easily take over the world working-class movement from within; 2) reassure the satellite countries; 3) theoretically substantiate "coexistence" for penetration into the rear of the free world (politically, economically and ideologically).

However, these "discoveries" in the field of "further development of Marxism-Leninism", without giving the Kremlin any benefits, exacerbated the crisis in world communism caused by the exposure of Stalin. It was aggravated because the Kremlin's new tactics were in glaring contradiction with Lenin's old strategic guidelines. Let us recall Lenin's starting points on this score:

### 1. Lenin on the tactics of

Bolshevism: "This tactic was justified by a huge success, because Bolshevism became world Bolshevism ... Bolshevism popularized the idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" throughout the world, first translated these words from Latin into Russian, and then into all languages of the world .. It becomes clearer every day to the masses of the proletarians of all countries ... that Bolshevism is suitable as a model of tactics for all. 2.

Lenin on different forms of socialism: "In Russia, the dictatorship of the proletariat must inevitably differ in certain features ... But the main forces are the same in Russia as in any capitalist country, so these features can only concern not the most important thing"348.

### 3. Lenin on parliamentarism:

"Communism denies parliamentarism as a form of future society ... it denies the possibility of a long-term conquest of parliaments: it sets as its goal the destruction of parliamentarism. Therefore, we can only talk about using bourgeois state institutions with the aim of destroying them. This is it is only in this sense that the question can be posed... The Communist Parties go to these institutions not to carry on organic work

there, but in order to help the masses from the parliament by means of action to blow up the state machine of the bourgeoisie and the parliament itself from within. 4. Lenin on "coexistence": "We live not only in a state,

but also in a system of states,

and the existence of a Soviet republic alongside imperialist states is unthinkable for a long time. In the end, either one or the other will win. In the meantime, this end comes, a series of the most terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable. 5. Lenin on the form of power: "The Republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies

is not only a form of a

higher type of democratic institutions, but also the only form"351.

The crisis of communism took on a downright catastrophic character when the Kremlin recognized Tito's "national communism"

legitimate form of international communism on a national scale. In its legal system, Tito's communism is no different from the Leninist system, but Tito introduced an entirely new element into it - national dynamism. Lenin's internationalism was reborn in the hands of Stalin into the

most naked and undisguised domination of Soviet chauvinism over its satellites. Tito's national communism was a reaction to this chauvinism. And Tito defeated Stalin not as a communist, but as a nationalist. The national idea turned out to be stronger than the communist doctrine, even in the hands of a communist. This was a serious warning for the communist empire led by the USSR. Stalin correctly saw this as a fatal precedent for the fate of all communism. Refraining for the time being from the armed elimination of Titoism, Stalin, however, hastened to declare Tito's regime a "fascist regime" in order to consider the precedent non-existent. In the meantime, the liquidation of potential Titoists in other countries of "people's democracy" began. But death prevented him from bringing this matter to an end, and his unlucky heirs in two

346N. S. X r u s e v. Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XX Congress parties.

Moscow, 1956, pp. 40, 41, 42, 43, 44.

347Lenin. Collected Works, 3rd ed., vol. XXIII, pp. 385-386

(everywhere underlined by Lenin. - A.

A.). 348 Lenin, vol. XXIV, p.

508. 349 "Resolution of the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920, written Lenin. Lenin, vol. XXV, pp. 581-582. 350 Lenin, vol. XXII, p. 122. Lenin, vol. XXII, p. 131. Declarations

- Belgrade 1955 and Moscow 1956 - legitimized national communism as a legitimate form of communism in general. It was then that Tito's precedent gave birth to a school: fermentation for the "own path" of socialism began in almost all satellite countries, in China and even in the communist parties of the free world. A movement began for the decentralization of communist absolutism, which clearly aimed at the creation of three centers of communism: Moscow - Belgrade - Beijing. The strength of Soviet communism until now was that the Soviet path of the communist revolution was recognized as the only correct one, the Soviet formula of "dictatorship

of the proletariat" - universal, "the tactics of Bolshevism - a model for all", and Moscow - a single supreme center. as many "paths" to socialism as there are in the world of communist parties. If for the Kremlin the "theory of different paths" was supposed to serve as the most flexible tactical means of maintaining their own dominance, then some communist parties abroad saw in it the desired formula of "self-determination". Even the orthodox-Stalinist

Communist Party in Italy began to speak of an "Italian" path to socialism. China went even further, developing not only its own path, but also its own doctrine of his methods, precisely after Stalin's exposure. So far, Gomułka's successful attempt and the tragic experience of Imre Nagy were also acts of the same process. When the development of the process had gone far in this direction, Stalin's heirs woke up and went for something that even Stalin did not go for: the communist government of Bulganin declared war on the communist government of Nagy. Poland was saved (temporarily) by the exceptional dexterity of Gomułka, the rare unanimity of the Polish people, and the probable disagreements in the Kremlin. The conclusion from these events turned out to be very meaningful in a historical perspective: wars are also possible between communist states, as imperialist wars on the part of the great powers (USSR) and wars of national liberation on the part of small powers (Hungary, potentially Poland and Yugoslavia). The Polish-Hungarian events, which sharply increased the oppositional ferment in the USSR itself, led to  
the

a significant strengthening of the position of the Stalinist wing in the leadership of the party. The neo-Leninists, who were no less frightened by this event than the orthodox Stalinists, and moreover betrayed by Tito's careless statement about the presence of Stalinists and non-Stalinists in the collective leadership (Marshal Tito's speech in Pula, November 11, 1956), and most importantly, in order to preserve their the current situation, agreed to a compromise: o

a revision of the directives of the 20th Congress on foreign policy issues, to the rehabilitation of Stalin's name, to the deterioration of relations with Tito, to an accentuated courtship of the satellite countries with an edge against Tito, to a new tension in international relations. One of Khrushchev's main "discoveries" that foreign communists could come to power by peaceful parliamentary means was revised even before the Polish-Hungarian events. One of the editors of *Kommunist*, Sobolev, in September 1956 gave the following explanation on this issue:

"What does peaceful mean? Some have understood the word "peaceful" as a renunciation of all struggle, of all violence, as a purely evolutionary development without a revolutionary breaking of the old foundations of life... This is

a deep delusion"<sup>352</sup>. After the Polish-Hungarian events, Khrushchev's other three main "discoveries" were reviewed (albeit silently and without reference to the 20th Congress) at

that congress: about the class struggle in

the period of socialism, about

different paths to socialism, about the

nature of peaceful coexistence. As is known, the "Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the cult of personality" dated June 30, 1956 considered Stalin's theory of the class struggle in the period of socialism to be Stalin's m

this ruling says:

"... great harm was done to the cause of socialist construction, to the development of democracy within the party and the state, by Stalin's erroneous formula that as the Soviet Union advances towards socialism, the class struggle will become more and more aggravated ... In practice, this erroneous formula served to substantiate gross violations of socialist legality and mass repressions"<sup>353</sup>.

Now the journal of the Central Committee of the CPSU "*Partynaya Zhizn*" puts forward the

opposite thesis: <sup>352</sup> *Kommunist*, 1956,

No. 14, p. 28. <sup>353</sup> *Pravda*, No.

184, 2.7.1956. "The events in Hungary have shown that the building of socialism is impossible without the class struggle, without the merciless suppression of



of the overthrown exploiting classes... In this way, the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism are confirmed again and again"354.

This is the same statement of the editorial article of the journal "Communist". Communist writes:

"Life has shown that socialism is born out of reality, out of the sharpest class struggle"355. Of course, the Bolsheviks are great "dialectics" (they say not what they think and do not think what they say), but all the same, the Hungarian revolution was needed for the Kremlin to openly rehabilitate not only Stalin's "erroneous formula", but also Lenin's theory of "dictatorship of the proletariat". As for the different paths to socialism, here the Kremlin, without any philosophizing, restored Lenin in his rights as a teacher of a single path. In an article against Marshal Tito, the Pravda newspaper stated bluntly:

"Creative diversity along the single path of socialist development is determined in different countries by specific, objective conditions"356.

If we talk about "coexistence", then Shepilov gave him such a new interpretation, which fits perfectly into the framework of classical Leninism. It reads: "Peaceful coexistence is a struggle - a struggle is an ideological struggle"357. Such an interpretation is something more than a cold war: the political struggle includes the class struggle up to its highest forms - to uprisings and civil wars; the economic struggle is an open course towards economic expansion outward; the ideological struggle is a bet on the internal decay of free peoples and on the triumph of communist ideology throughout the world.

But does all of the above mean that there is no "Stalinism" at all as a specific phenomenon and a new head of communism? Of course not. True, it does not exist as a sociological or philosophical stage in communism, but it exists as a practical interpretation of the theory of communism. In this sense, Stalinism is the most comprehensive and the most comprehensive. 355 Kommunist, 1956, No 16, p. 5. 356 Pravda, No 328, 11/23/1956. 357 Pravda, No 44, 13.2.1957.

more consistent application of Lenin's theoretical principles of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the field of public administration, economic policy and ideological life. Stalinism is an ideological system and practical guide to the preservation and expansion of absolute power. To seize power is a relatively easy matter, but to preserve and retain it is a much more difficult matter, said Lenin. The first and easy task was solved by Lenin, the second and difficult by Stalin. Therefore, everything that Stalin introduced from himself into communism proceeds not from speculative generalizations in the field of abstract theory, but from the practical needs of the dictatorial regime. This is precisely the seemingly

theoretical, but essentially practical "innovation" of Stalin:

The theory of building socialism in one country. The theory of complete collectivization and liquidation of the kulaks (the completion of the usurpation of the political freedom of the peasantry by the usurpation of its economic freedom).

The theory of the predominant development of heavy industry (for the development of the military-strategic industry).

The theory of the intensification of the class struggle under conditions socialist society (to justify mass terror).

The theory of the preservation and strengthening of the state under socialism and communism (to justify the absolutization of state power, the growth and strengthening of the police, the centralized bureaucracy, the army, concentration camps,

etc.). 6. The theory of revolutionary vigilance and capitalist encirclement (to justify KGB espionage inside and outside the country, for permanent purges).

7. The theory of "socialist" and "bourgeois" nations (for cultivation of hatred against free nations), etc., etc.

This enumeration could be continued, but these "theories" of Stalin are enough to see that the specifics of Stalinism are purely utilitarian: all of his theoretical constructions are addressed not to the future "kingdom of communism", but to the present. They are not looking for ways to communism as a harmonious community of people, but are looking for ways, methods and forms to perpetuate the "status quo": the dictatorship regime.

If now the collective leadership claims that although Stalin is no longer listed among the founders of Marxism, but that he was and remains an "outstanding Marxist-Leninist",

then it itself extends Stalin's criminal practice to its own worldview, and thereby recognizes that criminal offenses Stalin took place within the framework and on the soil of Marxism-Leninism. Although such a formulation of the question is not devoid of its own internal logic, it is difficult to see political expediency in this on the part of such purposeful people. True, the Kremlin's calculation was clear - attacks on Stalin objectively turn into attacks on the regime. To warn them, the Kremlin goes to the other extreme - trying to rehabilitate the name of Stalin. But this was and remains a naive calculation: Khrushchev's report will go down in history as a cruel verdict on an entire era, and Khrushchev's remark in the Chinese embassy about Stalin - as evidence of the political unluckiness of Stalin's heirs. However, was Stalin rehabilitated by Khrushchev's remark, at least in the eyes of the communists, and did the Kremlin thereby achieve its goal? Not in any way. Just

communism does not recognize half-hearted, sinful prophets, with flaws and errors. Since the Khrushchevs still go along with Stalin's rehabilitation with reservations about Stalin's mistakes, Stalin irrevocably perished for communism as a banner, symbol and authority. Does the rehabilitation of Stalin mean a return to Stalinism in the USSR? This question is not as easy to answer as it seems at first glance. All external, superficial phenomena should not lead us away from the

essence of the matter. Moreover, if we talk about the return, then we must clearly imagine what the departure from Stalin then consisted of. It has already been pointed out above that in the field of dogma the 20th Congress proclaimed not a departure from Stalin, but a departure on certain points from Lenin. Therefore, the return to the old theses on the tactics and strategy of the revolution was, in fact, a return not to Stalin, but to Lenin. What then was the departure from Stalin? In that: 1. Stalin's personality cult was condemned and the cult was restored

personality of Lenin (in principle, the cult, as such, was not condemned).

2. The principle of collective dictatorship was declared in the party and state instead of an individual (in principle, the dictatorship remained).

3. Stalin's terrorist practice against the party oligarchy was condemned (in principle, terror against the people was not condemned).

The transfer of power by Stalin from the party apparatus to the police apparatus was condemned (in principle, the police system was not condemned).

Excessive centralization of the bureaucratic apparatus of state administration.

Stalin's national policy of extermination was condemned small nations.

War was declared on the Stalinist theoretical legacy certain questions.

Stalin's gross interference in the internal affairs of the communist parties in the countries of the "people's democracies" (Yugoslavia) was condemned. From here, the task was set of correcting or eliminating these consequences of the so-called "personality cult. The fulfillment of this task was conceived as a controlled de-Stalinization. Of all

these listed points, only on the last two points can we talk about a partial revision of the course of the XX Congress. And on all the rest, about the ongoing de-Stalinization at Forced by circumstances to rehabilitate

Stalin, the collective leadership has not retreated and is not retreating from its intended course to eliminate the "consequences of the personality cult."

#### VII. "ENLIGHTENED STALINISM" The

events that followed Stalin's exposure were a threatening warning that calculated de-Stalinization was beginning to get out of the Kremlin's control. Optimistic calculations - to defuse the internal and external atmosphere by exposing Stalin - turned out to be erroneous.

From here, the Kremlin found itself, as it were, in a vicious circle: a complete return to Stalin was already psychologically impossible, and the continuation of the course towards de-Stalinization threatened with serious shocks to the system itself. In

the West, the term "de-Stalinization" was given a meaning that was never given to it by people in the Kremlin. in the West under

de-Stalinization meant a gradual departure from the existing system in the USSR. Did the leaders of

the CPSU under de-Stalinization (they, of course, do not use this term, but speak of "liquidating the consequences of Stalin's personality cult") meant:

1..Debunking the glory and name of Stalin as a classic of Marxism, to have freedom of action both in dogma and in practice.

2. Revision of the practice of Stalin's rule in order to put the party above the police. 3.

Creation of psychological and political prerequisites to start carrying out absolutely inevitable and forced reforms from above, both in economic and administrative departments.

If the Kremlin had plans for serious changes within the existing system, then it was necessary to debunk Stalin as a classic of Marxism, which only created the necessary prerequisite for substantiating new measures.

That political, economic and ideological impasse, to which Stalin brought the country on the eve of his death and from which he was going to get out with the help of a new "Great Purge" and external adventures, the Kremlin called "the consequences of the personality cult" and focused on their elimination.

Indeed, how was this question posed in the decision of the 20th

Congress? According to Khrushchev's "closed report" known to us, the 20th Congress adopted the following short

resolution: "Having heard the report of Comrade N.S. alien to Marxism-Leninism, the cult of personality, the elimination of its consequences in all areas of party, state and ideological work (italics mine. - A. A.), strict adherence to the norms of party life and the principles of collectivity of party leadership developed by the great Lenin "358.

Such was the understanding of de-Stalinization in the eyes of the Kremlin. That's just in the sense of such an understanding, we cannot say what is happening

restalinization. Of course, there are facts that seem to speak in favor of re-Stalinization (armed intervention in Hungary, a new deterioration in relations with

the West and with Tito, resumption of spiritual pressure in the USSR,

Stalin's rehabilitation). However, upon closer examination of the general and specific causes of these events, it turns out that they disappear as facts of re-Stalinization. The tragedy of unfortunate Hungary must not be seen in Stalin alone; it was a foregone conclusion in the wartime agreements of the allies and in the peace treaty in Paris after the war. The Kremlin can and should be accused of interpreting these documents in its own way, but that the military intervention of the Soviet army in Hungary, according to these documents, took place in the sphere of Soviet influence, this cannot be argued. Moreover, the Soviet intervention in Hungary is not a specific Stalinist action, it is the most brutal manifestation of a purely imperialist policy, or what the Germans call "machtpolitik", which Soviet Russia resorted to with more justification than Tsarist Russia in 1849 in the same Hungary. But even if we consider this action purely Stalinist, it was not carried out in Poland. Here a clearly anti-Stalinist compromise took place in spirit, since the Polish revolution was not directed against the Soviet military strategy and against communism in general, as it was in Hungary. The relative and temporary end of the "thaw" in the USSR itself was marked even before the start of these events, and precisely

when the Kremlin saw that the campaign to expose the personality cult clearly went beyond the limits provided by the party apparatus. The Kremlin was concerned not so much with criticism of Stalin as with criticism of the regime, which is why the anti-Stalinist campaign had to be put on hold. But all this did not mean that the Kremlin abandoned the practical de-Stalinization exactly within the limits and framework in which it was going to carry it out. The widespread idea that de-Stalinization generally began only with the 20th Congress does not correspond to reality. It

began immediately after Stalin's death. Let's remember the facts:

Amnesty for prisoners up to 5 years (Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 27, 1953).

Release of the Kremlin doctors (April 1953). Liquidation of Beria and his group (July 1953). The abolition of the military tribunals of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of September 11, 1953). Abolition of the Special Meeting of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (September 1953). 6. Cancellation of the Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of December 1, 1934 - on the procedure for conducting business "on the preparation and commission of terrorist acts" and the Decrees of December 1, 1934

year and September 14, 1937 on changes in the criminal procedure codes, according to which cassation complaints in cases of sabotage, terror and sabotage were not allowed (Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council in September 1953). Amnesty for Soviet citizens who

collaborated with the Germans during the war (Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of September 17, 1955). The abolition of the sole leadership of the bodies state security both in the center and in the field.

Publication of the "Regulations on Prosecutorial Supervision in the USSR" (Decree Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of May 24, 1955).

Creation of the Commission of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU to investigate the crimes of Stalin during the Great Purge (1954, see Khrushchev's "closed report").

11. Review of the cases of all political prisoners<sup>359</sup>. All these legal acts hit one point: put

party over the police with a clear trend towards regime liberalization. Of course, they did not

change the nature of the Soviet punitive system, but they reduced or are called upon to minimize the arbitrariness of the Stalinist system. In this sense, they represent de-

Stalinization in practice even before Stalin was debunked at the 20th Party Congress. The initial course of the Central Committee of the CPSU, apparently, was to carry out de-Stalinization or "liquidation of the consequences of the cult of personality", however, without touching the name of Stalin himself or even referring to Stalin. (For example, the newspaper Pravda wrote about the dangers of the "cult of personality" for the first time on June 10, 1953, but wrote referring to

"fundamental" instructions of Stalin himself, and the Leninist principle of "collective leadership" was discussed immediately after Stalin's death - in Malenkov's speech of March 14, 1953). But the consistent

implementation of de-Stalinization, of course, could not rely on the name of Stalin himself for a long time. If Stalin would continue to remain an unshakable authority and classic of Marxism-Leninism, then the practice of collective leadership could be interpreted as anti-Mark

359 Source for all the indicated acts - Party Life, 1956, No 4, pp. 67-70. sist practice. In

addition to all other reasons, and for the implementation of de-Stalinization, it was necessary to turn off Stalin from the "great four" (Marx Engels - Lenin - Stalin), passing off de-Stalinization as the restoration of the so-called Leninist principles of leadership.

A long struggle took place around this fateful decision. For, as it turns out now, the question of Stalin's cult, it turns out, was discussed as early as the July plenum of 1953, in connection with the liquidation of Beria<sup>360</sup>. But it was not finally

resolved, since back in January 1956, on the eve of the XX Congress, a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU Kirichenko, in his report at the Ukrainian Congress (January 21, 1956), still speaks of "the great teachings of Marx - Engels - Lenin and Stalin"<sup>361</sup>.

Only just before the beginning of the work of the 20th Congress is the final decision taken - to debunk and expose Stalin. From now on, de-Stalinization takes place with the open shifting of all the sins of the Soviet regime onto Stalin alone. During this period

and before the inhibition of the fight against the cult of personality, there were the following activities have been carried out:

1. The decision of the congress itself on the need to continue the struggle for the further elimination of the consequences of the personality cult in all areas of party, state and ideological life.
2. Decree of

the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the abolition of judicial liability of workers and employees for unauthorized departure from enterprises and institutions and absenteeism without a good reason"<sup>362</sup>.

Liquidation of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR and its transfer functions to the union republics<sup>363</sup>.



A series of acts of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU from May to November 1956 on the expansion of the rights of the union republics in terms of decentralization and budgetary

competencies. Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 6, 1956 on the abolition of tuition fees in secondary and higher schools. A

series of acts of the Council of Ministers, the Central Committee of the CPSU and Decrees 360 "Questions of History", 1957, No 1, p. 215. 361 "Pravda",

No 23, 23.1.1956. 362 "Vedomosti of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR", No. 15, 25.4.1956, p. 322.

363 Decree of the Supreme Council of May 30, 1956, Party Life, 1956, No. 24, p. 43. Presidium of the

Supreme Council in the area of social policy from March to November 1956. (On the reduction of the working day, the law on state pensions, raising the wages of low-paid workers, monthly advance payments to collective farmers, increasing maternity and post-natal leave, etc.)<sup>364</sup> These acts and decrees, especially in the area of social policy, were also aimed at eliminating heavy legacy of Stalin in

relation to the elementary vital interests of the people. After all, Stalin always pursued a purposeful policy of "an iron maximum of the standard of living," as if following Engels' remark that primitive man began to engage in "philosophy" when he could eat his fill and stock up for tomorrow.

Let us now clarify the question of how and to what extent the Polish-Hungarian events influenced the development of domestic policy in the USSR. What happens next: de-Stalinization or re-Stalinization?

It has already been pointed out above that in the field of ideology, in connection with these events, the leadership of the CPSU, in fact, returned not to Stalin, but to Lenin, which partly justified the rehabilitation of Stalin's name.

This return to Leninism in ideology and the rehabilitation of Stalin's name slowed down de-Stalinization in the USSR, but did not stop it in practice. What I call "practical de-Stalinization" continued and continues after the events in Eastern Europe. What facts support this? Here they are:

1. In the autumn of 1956, two very important decrees of the USSR government on the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and concentration camps were adopted. They were not published in the press, but the magazine "Party Life" briefly outlines their content as follows: a) "The

Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Police Department in the region reorganized into unified departments of internal affairs of the Executive Committees";

b) "the further existence of Correctional Labor Camps (i.e. concentration camps - A. A.) was recognized as inexpedient, and in this regard it was decided to reorganize them into Correctional Labor Colonies ... to strengthen control over the activities of corrective labor institutions Supervisory committees have been set up under the executive committees of local soviets.

Komsomol organizations<sup>365</sup>.

Decisions of the December Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1956 on decentralization of government in industry.

Adoption by the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR - in February 1957 - a number of laws on the decentralization of administrative management and legal legislation:

a) placing under the jurisdiction of the union republics the legislation on the organization of the courts of the union republics and the adoption of criminal, civil and procedural codes by the union republics themselves; b) assignment to the jurisdiction

of the union republics of regional, regional, administrative-territorial device;

c) limiting the supervisory functions of the Supreme Court of the USSR in favor of the Supreme Courts of the Union republics.

4. Return to the homeland of the deported Caucasian peoples and restoration of their national autonomies.

5. Decision of the February Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1957 on further decentralization in industry. 6.

Resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers on the abolition of annual forced

loans. Adoption of the law "on the further improvement of the management of construction and industry" by the May session of the Supreme Council of 1957 (ie, on further decentralization).

Publication instead of Stalin's books of new works on Marxism  
Leninism and the history of the  
party: a) the publication of the "Popular textbook on the history of the  
CPSU" (a group of authors led by Ponomarev, head of the foreign department of  
the Central Committee  
of the CPSU); b) the publication of the textbook "Fundamentals of Marxist  
Philosophy" (a group of authors led by Konstantinov, head of the agitation and  
propaganda department of the Central Committee);  
c) publication of the textbook "Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism" (a group  
of authors led by a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR  
Kuusinen); d) 3rd  
revised edition of the textbook "Political Economy"  
(group of authors - Shepilov, Ostrovityanov, Yudin, etc.)<sup>366</sup>.  
<sup>365</sup>Ibid., 1957, No 4, p. 67. <sup>366</sup>  
"To Help Political Self-Education", 1957, No 1, p.  
143

These are the facts about the ongoing practical de-Stalinization. However,  
this is recognized by the leaders of the CPSU themselves. So, Khrushchev, in his  
conversation with the editor-in-chief of the New York Times, Turner Ketlich, on  
May 10, 1957, stated: "Stalin had great

shortcomings, which we talked about and will talk about. And we do not  
regret that we did this, but he was devoted revolutionary and devoted follower of  
Marx and Lenin. He made many mistakes, but he also did a lot of useful  
things"<sup>367</sup>. However, it is quite characteristic that in the Soviet official text about  
this conversation, the words "Stalin had great shortcomings, which we have  
spoken about and will continue to speak about, and we do not regret that we did  
so," were omitted<sup>368</sup>. The second censorship carried out on the Soviet text of  
this conversation is also characteristic. According to Turner Ketlich, to his question  
"what place will Stalin take in the history of the USSR", Khrushchev replied: "very  
big", and the Pravda newspaper said: "Stalin will take his due place." So, what  
are the general conclusions, what is the general trend of the further development  
of the Soviet

regime? The relativity and conditionality of the internal stabilization of the  
collective leadership make all answers to the  
above questions relative and conditional. Besides,

considering the development of the internal policy of the USSR, one cannot abstract from its international position. Any deterioration in the international position of the USSR will automatically mean the strengthening of the Stalinist wing and Stalinist methods in the collective leadership, while a general detente in international relations can negate the influence of this wing in domestic politics as well.

With these underlined reservations, one can come to the following conclusions regarding the fate of Stalinism in the

USSR: 1. De-Stalinization in the USSR continues, and continues as de-Stalinization, strictly controlled from above and carried out within certain limits. The relapses of Stalinism or the trend towards re-Stalinization after the events in Eastern Europe have affected domestic politics, mainly in the area of dogmatic issues, and not in the current practice of government. Upon closer examination of the nature and such a conditional resta

367 New York Times, 5/11/1957, p. 3, international edition. 368 "Pravda", 13.5.1957.

Linization, it turns out that we are talking here not at all about a return to Stalin, but about a return to the ideology of Leninism, which was subjected to a significant revision at the 20th

Congress. The strength and essence of Stalinism is not in the field of theory, but in the practical system of government. This government was based on two principles: the primary principle is preventive terror, the secondary principle is targeted propaganda. Now these two principles have shifted - targeted propaganda is in the first place, and terror is not of a preventive nature.

The system of government now taking shape in the USSR cannot be called purely Stalinist. It is clearly deformed before our eyes. Dramatically, sometimes radically, if not the essence, then the form of methods of government is changing. The system, of course, does not cease to be a police one, but the police itself has ceased to be omnipotent. The systems of forced labor are beginning to move towards a system of forced voluntariness. The centralized bureaucracy is decentralized. The standard of living has a tendency to step over Stalin's "iron maximum". Propaganda flirts with the people more than

orders him. The

Kremlin is entering an era of experimentation and reform from above in order to modernize the regime, get it out of the Stalinist impasse and forestall a possible explosion from below. If an analogy is acceptable for social phenomena of the same type, then the regime that emerged in the USSR can conditionally be called the regime of "enlightened Stalinism", by analogy with "enlightened absolutism" in European countries in the second half of the 18th century. But "enlightened absolutism" was a transitional stage - in Western Europe it prepared the conditions for the destruction of absolutism in general, and in Russia, on the contrary, "enlightened absolutism" (Catherine II) was replaced by military bureaucratic rule (Pavel, Arakcheevshchina, Nicholas I).

"Enlightened Stalinism" is also a transitional stage: either back - to classical Stalinism, or forward - along the path of the destruction of Stalinism in general. This dilemma is not only formidable, but also difficult to resolve. In order to return to classical Stalinism in the current new conditions of the USSR, a new dictator is needed, but of a higher class than Stalin, which is difficult to imagine even theoretically. In order for development to take the path of destroying Stalinism in general, it is necessary to allow a certain minimum of spiritual freedoms in the country.

From now on, the USSR is embarking on the path of struggle to resolve this fateful dilemma. Both theoretical calculations and historical experience suggest that the outcome of such a struggle will depend not only on the subjective will of the collective leadership.

#### VIII. SILHOUETTES OF PORTRAITS OF THE "COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP"

"Many articles and biographical notes placed in the TSB do not give a correct idea of the actual role of certain party leaders." Voprosy istorii, 1956, No. 5, p. 145.

So far I have been writing about those processes within the party that logically should have led to the "Great Purge" of 1936-1939 and culminate in the final triumph of Stalin's one-man dictatorship. I dwelled in particular detail on the history of the emergence, development and death of the last organized

opposition within the party - on the "right opposition", because its history is the least covered in the literature. In

addition, the "right opposition" was also the last attempt to preserve the "collective leadership" and prevent Stalin's personal dictatorship.

Today's "collective

leadership", ultimately, reduces all the sins of Stalin to this dictatorship, but what kind of Stalinist, that is, pharisaic, consistency among his students: accusing Stalin of destroying Lenin's "collective leadership" and establishing a regime of personal arbitrariness over the party and the country, they declare both the Trotskyists and the Bukharinites the "worst enemies" of Leninism! People who paid with their lives for trying to

prevent both Stalin and Stalin's crimes are declared criminals, and Stalin's struggle against them is recognized as his "indisputable merit." Where is the logic here? That's just the point, that here there is a logic. But it consists in only

one thing: the current "collective leaders" were precisely the force without whose help Stalin would not have become Stalin, and she -

"collective leaders".

A cursory glance at their career is enough to understand this logic. As can be seen from the previous presentation, Stalin's path to the "Great Purge" and, therefore, to the one-man dictatorship went through three stages:

liquidation of the  
Trotskyists; the liquidation  
of the Zinovievites;

liquidation of the Bukharinites. The fourth stage - the Yezhovsky stage - was the final one. Who stood next to Stalin at all stages and "at what stage made a career? Let's not talk about the dead or about those who at one stage were next to Stalin, at the second they broke down, or even at all three stages they went along with Stalin, but on Yezhovsky

was liquidated himself. We will only talk about those who turned out to be tested "student and comrade-in-arms", and now curses his teacher.

1) Vyacheslav Molotov (born in 1890, in the party since 1906). He was secretary of the Central Committee of the party even before Stalin (1921), but was not

member of the Politburo. In order for him to become one, Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev had to be expelled from the Politburo. In the struggle for their elimination, he gave Stalin not only his personal abilities,

but his whole soul. "Molotov is not a person, but Stalin's robot," they said about him in the party. "Robot" was rewarded and appointed a member of the Politburo in 1926. I don't even think that Molotov is a careerist by nature. But he has one amazing ability that makes him related to the "robot" - the insensitivity of the machine and the automatism of the performer. Stalin used these qualities to the end. While preparing the ground in the Politburo against the Bukharinites, Stalin did not even need to "agitate" or persuade Molotov beforehand - who is "agitating" and "persuading" the machine? It was only necessary to "lubricate the robot" and put it in its place. Stalin did just that.

In the fight against the Rights, Molotov showed an even higher class than in the fight against the Trotskyists and Zinovievists. True, he did not contribute anything of his own to this "class", but on the other hand he perfectly carried out the will of the driver. That's when Stalin saw in him a long-sought screen for veiling personal dictatorship and an equally reliable tool in its implementation. "Shirma" was appointed nominal chairman of the Soviet government instead of Rykov (1930), and he used it until all sorts of screens were needed at all.

Even before the war (May 1941), Stalin took away the post of head of government from Molotov. And this despite Molotov's leading role in purging his own office. Look at the list of Molotov's colleagues - members of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers) of 1937, who were eliminated with the personal participation of Molotov.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars - Molotov. Deputy chairmen: 1. Rudzutak (liquidated). 2. Chubar (liquidated). 3. Mezhlauk (liquidated). 4. Antipov (liquidated). People's Commissars: Defense - Voroshilov.

Foreign

Affairs - Litvinov

(removed). Foreign trade - Rosengolts

(liquidated). Ways of communication -

Kaganovich. Communications

- Yagoda (liquidated).

Heavy industry - Ordzhonikidze (liquidated). Defense industry - Rukhimovich (liquidated). Food industry - Mikoyan. Light industry - Lyubimov (liquidated). Timber industry - Lobov (liquidated). Agriculture - Chernov, then Eikhe (both liquidated). Grain and livestock state farms - Kalmanovich (liquidated). Finance - Grinko (liquidated). Domestic trade - Weitzer (liquidated). Internal Affairs - Yezhov (liquidated). Justice - Krylenko (liquidated). 21.

Health - Kaminsky (liquidated). Of the 21 ministers of the USSR, only accomplices of Molotov and Stalin survived: Kaganovich, Mikoyan and Voroshilov. All the others, who had never been either Trotskyists or Bukharinites, turned out to be "spies" of German fascism. To arrest any of them, the signatures of the head of government - Molotov, the head of

the Central Executive Committee of the USSR (Supreme Council) - Kalinin, and the Prosecutor General Vyshinsky were needed. Stalin's signature was not required at all, since it had no legal significance (Stalin was the Secretary of the Central Committee and only a member of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR).

Even the all-powerful Yezhov could not arrest members of the government without these signatures. Perhaps, in time, Molotov will say that he signed the arrest of almost the entire composition of his government under Stalin's dictation, just as in Nuremberg Hitler's aides shifted all the blame on the "Führer". But Hitler's associates were legally right: the "Führer" was not just a "Führer", he was also the Chancellor of the Empire. And Stalin? Stalin was only a "Führer", and Molotov himself was the "Chancellor" of the USSR. But this is not enough. In order to fully and fully see Molotov's

role in the "Great Purge" of 1933-1939, it is not enough to establish external phenomena. It is necessary to know, if not his behind-the-scenes role, then at least the role of Molotov at the plenums of the Central Committee of the Party in 1935-1936 and 1937-1938. At all the plenums of the Central Committee of these years, invariably,

although in different formulations, there is one and the same question - purge of the Party.



Not only the people, but the party itself knew about these plenums only what the stingy and essentially meaningless communiqués of the Central

Committee reported: candidates for the Politburo<sup>369</sup>. June plenum of the Central Committee of 1936 ("Exchange of party documents"). February-March

plenum of the Central Committee of 1937 (expulsion from the party of Bukharin and Rykov). March plenum of the Central Committee of 1938

(completion of the purge under the pretext of purge of the party from "left-wing benders", introduction by N. Khrushchev as a candidate member of the Politburo and L. Mehlis as a member of the Orgburo). the legal

chairman (opening the plenum, directing the conduct of the debate, resolute proposals, closing the plenum) was played not by Stalin, but by Molotov. will establish: 1. The general director

of the purges - Stalin - is always in a prompter booth. He is almost invisible. If he enters the stage (sometimes with remarks, sometimes with a speech), then he either looks like a "conciliator" and "peace lover", or keeps a speech on

any topic, but not on the topic of

purge (until the arrest of Bukharin Rykov in February 1937).

2. But Molotov, Kaganovich, Andreev, Shkiryatov, Mekhlis and, of course, Yezhov are acting. But Molotov gives the political tone to the plenums just as zealously and talentedly as Kaganovich gives the ideological substantiation, and Yezhov gives the police conclusion.

Yezhov's purge of 1936-1938 was to the same extent, and legally to an even greater extent, a purge of the official head of the Soviet government, Molotov, for whom Yezhov was one of the ministers.

I have already spoken about the role of Molotov in the destruction of the peasantry of the USSR, in forced collectivization and predatory industrialization. And here his role can be compared with the role

Stalin. The all-Union "plan for the liquidation of the kulaks as a class" was adopted in January 1930 by the Politburo on the basis of a report from the so-called "Village Commission of the Politburo", chaired by the same Molotov.

All the pre-war five-year plans, in which the beggarly standard of life of Soviet workers was perpetuated, were adopted at plenums and congresses of the party according to the reports of the same Molotov. Molotov himself was also legally the legal father of the "Stalinist Constitution" (December Plenum of the Central Committee of 1935)<sup>370</sup>. Only a year later, Stalin "fell in love" with the child and adapted it at the Congress of Soviets (December 1936).

But in 1939 the purge ended. Some of its participants were rewarded (Malenkov, Khrushchev, Suslov, Bulganin, Vyshinsky and others), others were liquidated (Yagoda, Yezhov, Zakovsky and others), Molotov was given the opportunity to form a new government. This time, among the ministers were not only his personal friends, but even his wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina. However, the "family idyll" did not last long: in less than two years, Malenkov removed Molotov's wife, and Stalin removed Molotov himself. He remained Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Steel <sup>370</sup> "CPSU in resolutions ...", Part II. on the. In this

field, he erected only one monument  
to himself -

"Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact".

The same Molotov received at 5 o'clock in the morning on June 22, 1941, the German ambassador von Schulenburg, who handed him a note about the German offensive against the USSR that had begun. At this tragic moment, he uttered a phrase in which panicky confusion betrays all the inner emptiness of his "state" figure: "Tell me, Mr. Ambassador, what did we do to deserve this?" That's right, they didn't deserve anything! By morning, Molotov

came to his senses and spoke at the microphone (Stalin himself took two whole weeks): "Our cause is just, the enemy will be defeated, victory will be ours," - that's all Molotov could say to the citizens of the USSR in justification of his pro-Hitler policy, leading to war against the USSR itself. In this war, Stalin once again used Molotov as a  
front for "Russian patriotism" as deputy chairman

State Defense Committee. At the same time, he remembered the Anglophile Litvinov, who was removed from the Central Committee in 1939, as "not justifying the confidence of the party", but in fact as a Jew with whom Hitler did not

want to deal. Now he was needed to be sent to America as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. And Litvinov justified the trust: lend-lease assistance moved to the USSR in a wide stream, reaching eleven billion dollars by the end of the war! Molotov participates in all military conferences with the allies (Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam). And here all the extreme demands of the Soviets are substantiated by Molotov, and all the "concessions" are made by Stalin. But Stalin also persists in decisive issues for the Kremlin, referring to the Politburo, which he allegedly is not able to "persuade", or to the Russian ... tsars, about whom he and Molotov will be told that they better defended the interests of Russia, so Molotov and Stalin. One of the American participants in these conferences wrote in his memoirs that in a discussion with Roosevelt, Stalin, speaking of the great human sacrifices from the USSR, even shed a tear. Yes, Comrade Stalin was truly a great artist!

After this, how can one blame Roosevelt, who, according to the former American ambassador to Moscow, Davis, seriously thought that he would easily re-educate "such a tearful" dictator "in a democratic and Christian spirit."

The persistent and very far-sighted warnings of Davis's predecessor (it is now clear that "My Mission in Moscow" was disinformation not only of the president, but also of the American public) V. Bullitt about the true plans of the Kremlin in Europe and Asia were not successful. The voices of American

connoisseurs of the USSR - Eastman, Isaac Don Levin, Eugene Lyons and others were not popular. The warnings of the Russian leaders themselves of various trends about the true nature of the policies of Stalin and Molotov - A. Kerensky, R. Abramovich, B. Nikolaevsky, D. Dalin, S. Melgunov, P. Struve, P. Milyukov, A. Denikin and others - were accepted for the voices of the "offended".

This, too, was the result of the well-organized work of Molotov and Litvinov in America. But now the war is over. The cold war has begun. In this war, Stalin needed a sharpened

an intellectual but morally even less discerning tool. And Stalin finds him: Molotov is removed, and his deputy Vyshinsky is appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Molotov enrolled in Stalin's "deputy institute" without a portfolio (early 1949). On the eve of the fatal illness, Stalin manages to thank Molotov again - he arrests his wife. Truly, it was difficult

to please Stalin! Despite all the insults that Stalin inflicted on him and his family, Molotov himself remained his devoted student to the end. This he was proud of before. Proud, no doubt, in

the depths of his soul today. Back in 1930, having accepted the post of head of the Council of People's Commissars from the deposed Rykov, Molotov addressed the participants in the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (in December 1930) with the following "government declaration"<sup>371</sup>. "Now, in connection with my appointment, I cannot but speak about myself and about my work. In recent years, as secretary of the Central Committee, I had to go through a school of Bolshevik work under the direct

guidance of Lenin's best student, under the direct guidance of Comrade Stalin. I am proud of this ".

Such, in the briefest outline, are Molotov's services to the late dictator. His removal from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR is connected with this. He is inconvenient for the "Young-Nints" from the "collective leadership" in the foreground, not because of his Stalinist crimes, but as a living symbol of the era of the dead Stalin.

371 V. M o l o t o v. "In the struggle for socialism", 1935, 2nd ed., p. 76.

The appointment of Molotov as Minister of State Control, paying tribute to his personal qualities - the insensitivity of a bureaucrat and the pedantry of an executor - transfers him to the category of mere mortals on the middle plane. If a complete restoration of Stalinism turns out to be possible, then the new triumph of Molotov will be its logical consequence.

2. Lazar Kaganovich (born in 1893, in the party since 1911). He enjoys the fame of a "talented organizer" in the CPSU. In all his official biographies, this glory is always present. Many foreign writers only repeat, speaking of Kaganovich,

this Soviet assessment. There is no dispute that Kaganovich is an "organizer" and a "talented" organizer. But "organizer" of what, "organizer" where and "organizer" how? - that's the whole question.

For example, another, the same old Bolshevik as he, the same member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the "first deputy", like Kaganovich - Mikoyan - cannot equal Kaganovich, not in conviction, of course, but in his mindset and narrow-mindedness "creative" scope in the organizational technique of

Bolshevism. In this technique, Kaganovich is unique, almost like Stalin himself. In Stalinist Bolshevism, he is the closest copy to the original - to Stalin himself. Sometimes you can't tell it from the original. If there were a biological law in politics, then one could say that all members of the Politburo are brothers, but Kaganovich and Stalin are twin brothers.

But this relationship is not physical, but psychological. True, Kaganovich tried to resemble Stalin physically as well. Under Lenin, he put on a European suit and let go of his beard "a la Ilyich", and under Stalin he changed his suit to a Stalinist jacket, removed his beard and grew a mustache "a la

Stalin". It cannot be said about Kaganovich that he was at least talented, but still just a tool, a "robot" in the hands of Stalin.

Official biographers, falsifying facts and events, made him a very impressive biography of one of the leaders of the October Revolution, the Civil War, and even one of the organizers of the Red Army. All these are inventions, just as Stalin's biography is full of such inventions, which his former students themselves admit. Kaganovich's career, in fact, began in 1920,

from Turkestan. As a member of the "Muslim" Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) for Central Asia (as it was called: "Muslim Bureau") from 1920 to 1922, Kaganovich was Stalin's personal informant for Central Asia and Kazakhstan. All the most important measures for the Sovietization and Bolshevization of Central Asia, through the head of the local leadership, Kaganovich personally suggested to Stalin. In Turkestan, Kaganovich held the same post as Stalin in Moscow. He was People's Commissar of the RKI (at that time, Stalin was both a People's Commissar for Nationalities and People's Commissar of the RKI). From Stalin, Kaganovich received instructions on how

act, but Kaganovich acted by the same methods as his immediate boss - terror and conspiracy. Then for the first time Stalin

saw in him. one of those whom he was already beginning to gather around himself - a like-minded person in methods and a master of conspiracy. It is not surprising that when in 1922 Stalin was appointed general secretary of the Central Committee, he attracted Kaganovich to the Central Committee apparatus as his first personnel assistant to defeat the Trotskyites (head of the organizational instructor, then organizational and distribution department of the Central Committee). At the XI Party Congress (1922), Stalin introduced him as a candidate, and after Lenin's death, as a member of the Central Committee for the successful organization of the struggle against Trotsky (XIII Congress, 1924). During the two years of joint work, Stalin was convinced of the correctness of his choice and, with the support of Zinoviev and Kamenev, even appointed Kaganovich in 1924 as one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the party. But the first stage of the struggle ended with a victory over Trotsky. The second stage of the struggle against the "Zinovievites" and the "bourgeois nationalists" began. After Moscow and Leningrad, the decisive role in this struggle was assigned to Ukraine. In May 1925, that is, six months before the start of the struggle against Zinoviev-Kamenev, and then the Trotsky-Zinoviev-Kamenev bloc, Stalin sent Kaganovich to Ukraine as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party. With the help of the same Stalinist methods and with the same talent as Stalin in Moscow, Kaganovich smashes in Ukraine not only the Trotskyites and Zinovievists,

but also the Ukrainian communist intelligentsia (Shumsky). By 1928, the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc and the "bourgeois nationalists" were finally crushed. Stalin was preparing for a new conspiracy, for the third stage of the struggle - for the liquidation

of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy. The main base of the right was in Moscow. The right-wing leaders enjoyed great prestige and occupied leading positions in the government, the press, the Comintern, and the trade unions. The troika "Bukharin - Rykov - Tomsy" had to be opposed by the troika of secretaries of the Central Committee of the party. In addition to Stalin himself and Molotov, only Kaganovich could be included in this trio. And in 1928, a few months before the start of the struggle against the right, Kaganovich recalled to Moscow and was appointed third secretary of

In 1928, when an open campaign against the right was already being prepared, Kaganovich was appointed "political commissar" of the Central Committee in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions with the title of member of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (against Tomsy). In 1930, the struggle against the Rights ended in their complete defeat and

removal from the Politburo. Now, finally, he got to the cherished goal and became a member of the Politburo. Since then, Kaganovich settled in Moscow, except for his short-term appointment in 1947 to Ukraine to replace the then removed

Khrushchev (Khrushchev was appointed chairman of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine). But all these merits of Kaganovich pale in comparison to the practice that he developed from the beginning of the thirties. Now only he enters his real "organizer" area. Throughout this time, the biography of Kaganovich reminds us of the biography of Stalin himself under Lenin. Where it is necessary to "liquidate", "destroy", "destroy" - in a word, where an iron "organizer of defeat" is needed, Kaganovich is appointed there.

Wherever a leader can suggest new forms of violence - physical and spiritual - there is Kaganovich.

Where it is necessary to substantiate ideologically and justify morally the most serious crimes not only against the people, but also against one's own party, Kaganovich is there. Stalin

works 24 hours a day, they said at that time in Moscow.

To the bewildered question: "How is this physically possible?" - answered:

It's very simple - for eight hours he works under his real name, and for sixteen hours - under the pseudonyms "Kaganovich" and "Molotov". In the winter of

1930, almost the entire Soviet Union was engulfed in peasant unrest against the forced collectivization of Stalin. In some areas, the unrest turned into open armed uprisings. These anti-collective-farm unrest took on especially dangerous forms in the main peasant regions - in the Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Voronezh region and Western Siberia. From 1930 to 1934, Kaganovich constantly moved from one of these regions to another, as "Extraordinary authorized representative of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for collectivization and grain procurement." It is necessary to imagine well what this title meant in practice.

The "Extraordinary Plenipotentiaries of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars" had mandates in their pockets signed by Stalin and Molotov, certifying that all supreme power was transferred to this commissioner locally - in the territories, regions and republics, and he enjoyed the extraordinary right to make any decisions and carry out any activities from named after the Central Committee and the Soviet government. At the same time, his actions are peremptory and not subject to appeal to Moscow. As such an authorized representative and relying on special Chekist detachments, Kaganovich, under the slogan "to crush kulak sabotage to the end," began mass evictions of children, women and the elderly from Voronezh, Ukraine and the North Caucasus to Siberia, and from Siberia to the northern tundra. He carried out the same practice of mass eviction in the Moscow region itself, where from April 1930 he was the first secretary of the regional committee. However, the theory of "kulak sabotage" was

overturned by life. The leading part of the rural population - the middle peasantry - after the kulaks had already been liquidated, responded to the policy of forced collectivization and grain procurements with a kind of "Italian strike": they entered the collective farm so as not to go to Siberia, but not to work for the party. Collective farms were created, among other reasons, so that the state could more easily and more take grain from organized peasants, and the peasants began to consider the collective farm grain as their own, and accordingly keep it. In January 1933, Stalin said<sup>372</sup>: "What is the main shortcoming of our work in the countryside during the last 1932? the state of the harvest is in no

way possible, because our harvest this year

was not worse, but better than the previous year ... " <sup>372</sup>I. Stalin.

"Questions of Leninism", pp. 398, 406 After establishing this fact, Stalin asked: what

the reason of that? The answer was:

"The enemy understood the changed situation and, realizing this, reorganized, changed his tactics, went from a direct attack against the collective farms to work on the sly ... They are looking for a class enemy outside



collective farms, they are looking for him in the form of people with a brutal physiognomy, with huge teeth, with a thick neck, with a sawn-off shotgun in their hands ... But such fists have not been on the surface for a long time. The current kulaks and sub-kulakists, the anti-Soviet elements in the countryside, are for the most part "quiet," "sweet," almost "saints." You don't need to look for them far from the collective farm, they sit on the collective

farm itself..." Thus, after the first purge in the peasantry - after the liquidation of the so-called kulaks - a new purge was now coming - a purge against the middle peasantry, whose representatives are acting "on the sly" in image of "sweet" and "holy" people.

How and with what means to start this new reprisal against the peasants? Stalin replied<sup>373</sup>: "I think that the political departments of the MTS and state farms are one of these decisive means..." Who, then, should be put in charge of this matter? Here Stalin did not have a wide choice - it could only be one Kaganovich.

First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee, First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee, Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party (after Molotov was transferred to the Council of People's Commissars), Kaganovich was appointed All-Union Chief of Political Departments as Head of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. 25,000 "best sons of the party" were placed at his disposal as an army of emergency commissioners in agriculture (heads of political departments and their deputies). They were appointed directly by the Central Committee and reported directly to Kaganovich. Each head of the political department had his deputy for the GPU with a whole staff of open and secret collaborators. In the MTS districts, 3,368 political departments (17 thousand people) were created, in state farms - 2021 (8

thousand people). Thus began, under the leadership of Kaganovich, the second reprisal against the peasantry. It

continued until November 1934. New millions of peasants were exiled from Central Russia, Ukraine, the Caucasus to Turkestan, from Turkestan to Siberia, and from Siberia to Kolyma. In the resolution adopted by the November 1934 plenum of the

Central Committee of the CPSU, this work was appreciated. It said<sup>374</sup>:

"The Party, with the help of the political departments, exposed and expelled mainly from the collective farms and state farms anti-Soviet, anti-collective farm, sabotage and wrecking elements, kulaks and sub-kulakists..." Simultaneously, the main goal was achieved: understanding of the priority (*italics mine*. - A. A.) of fulfilling one's obligations to the state.

Already by this reprisal against the peasantry, Kaganovich forever connected his name with the name of Stalin. But his main and decisive service to Stalin was in something else - in preparing the conditions for the liquidation of the old, Leninist party, on the one hand, and the creation of a new, Stalinist party, on the other. Only under these conditions could Stalin's one-man dictatorship be established.

For both purposes, it was necessary to carry out a new "general purge of the party", since the previous purges (1925, 1926, 1929-30) did not give the desired results. In November 1932, the Politburo decides on this. The January Plenum of the Central Committee of 1933 approves this decision. A Central Commission for the Purification of the Party is being created. Who should be put at the head of this commission, especially since Kaganovich was busy "cleansing" the peasantry?

Stalin did not have a wide choice this time either - the same Kaganovich was placed at the head of the Central Commission. In this purge Kaganovich used the same methods as in the purge of the peasantry - terror and provocation. In the fresh wake of Kaganovich's merits in both regions, the party press

wrote<sup>376</sup>: "As secretary of the Central Committee and head of the agricultural department of the Central Committee | in 1929-1934, Kaganovich directly (*italics mine*) led the struggle against sabotage of state obligations organized by the kulaks. As chairman of the Central Commission for the Purge of the Party, he led the purge of party ranks that took place in 1933-1934.

In 1933 alone, Kaganovich managed to expel 362,429 people from the party<sup>377</sup>. This merit of Kaganovich was

<sup>374</sup> "CPSU in resolutions...", 1953, part II, p. 804.

<sup>375</sup> Ibid., p. 805. <sup>376</sup>

ITU, 1937, v. V, p. Abramov,

ITU, 2nd ed., vol. II, pp. 523-524.

recognized at the XVII Congress of 1934 by his election as chairman of the Party Control

Commission under the Central Committee. But only now the purge was to enter its last stage, the stage of the physical liquidation of the "enemies of the people" inside and outside the party. With all his "organizational talent," Kaganovich could hardly have coped with it alone. It was necessary to find a good and equally "talented" assistant. At his suggestion, he was given as deputy chairman of the Party Control Commission under the Central

Committee - Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov. Kaganovich worked with his assistant until 1935, and in 1935 Stalin was convinced that the assistant had learned well from his boss - Yezhov was appointed chairman of the CPC under the Central Committee and one of the secretaries of the Central Committee. In September 1936, Yezhov also became People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. But Kaganovich remained the second secretary of the Central Committee until the XVIII Congress (1939), taking a leading part in the purge of Yezhov. In 1935,

Kaganovich transferred the post of first secretary of the Moscow Party Committee to another of his assistants, N. Khrushchev. Since then, it has been constantly thrown from one "bottleneck" to another. He was at the head of almost all economic ministries - communications, heavy industry, fuel industry, oil industry, building materials. And everywhere he went, things went uphill. How did he achieve success in the most complex issues of economic management, without even having an initial school education (he is self-taught)? True, in his youth he got acquainted with the affairs of production. But what was this acquaintance? His official biographies indicate that Kaganovich went through a large labor school from the age of 14 - he was a shoe maker, cutter, packer, loader, "military" (he served the entire first war as a private in a reserve regiment in Saratov and Gomel). Having only

this experience, Kaganovich undertakes to lead the industry and successfully eliminates the "bottlenecks" in it. How? By the same methods by which he achieved success in collectivization and grain procurement. In other words, not with economic management, but with a police stick. This is directly indicated in his biography<sup>378</sup>.

"From March 1935 to 1937 - the People's Commissar of Railways, smashed the wrecking "theories" (*italics mine*).

378 Political Dictionary. M., 1940, p. 236. A.

A.) that railway transport is working "at the limit" ... In the shortest possible time, in a few months, under the leadership of Kaganovich, the daily loading rose from 56 thousand cars to 73 thousand wagons".

Wherever Kaganovich appeared, he found "saboteurs" everywhere, and the elimination of "bottlenecks" began with the elimination of people. During Kaganovich's part-time administration of two people's commissariats - communications and heavy industry (1935-1939), not a single member of the Council of People's Commissariats, not a single head of the central office, not a single director of a trust, not a single railway manager, not a single chief political department of roads, not a single director of a large enterprise.

Before the newly appointed official, Kaganovich, both as people's commissar and as secretary of the Central Committee of the party, set the same condition: either fulfill the plan, or get out of the party! "Get out of the party" meant under the conditions of that time to be arrested, if not as a "saboteur", then as a "saboteur". Faced with such a choice chi-; The novniks in the localities acted in the same way as Kaganovich in Moscow: repressions. If the repressions did not help, then they resorted to a newly found means - to "fraud". Its essence lay in the fact that local officials - officials of the party and economy wrote to Kaganovich and Stalin "victory reports" with falsified data on "fulfillment and overfulfillment of plans." "Swindle", as a means of self-defense, gradually became second nature to the economic and party leadership. Even the very term "fraud" acquired full citizenship in the Soviet lexicon. It was Kaganovich who cultivated it.

Now Stalin's disciples are not averse to talking about Stalin's anti-Semitism. Indeed, if we bear in mind the number of intelligentsia destroyed,

especially the party intelligentsia, then the Jewish intelligentsia suffered relatively the most. Of all the old Bolsheviks of Jewish origin, only one remained

Kaganovich. What role did Kaganovich himself play in this massacre?  
Always the

meanest. When a close relative of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M. Kalinin, secretary of the Kalinin Regional Party Committee Mikhailov, was arrested, even the weak-willed "president of the USSR" presented an ultimatum: either Stalin would release Mikhailov, or from now on he would refuse to sign decrees of the Supreme Soviet, Stalin offered to immediately release Mikhailov, so how he needed Kalinin's signature more than Mikhailov's head. Kaganovich acted in a completely different way when his brothers, the director of a Kiev department store, the Gorky secretary of the regional party committee and the Moscow people's commissar of the aviation industry, fell under the purge. They said that when their wives and children began to besiege Kaganovich, so that he would stand up for his brothers, Kaganovich always answered with the same phrase: I have only one brother and his name is Stalin! That Stalin

was an anti-Semite was pointed out by Trotsky. The case of a group of Kremlin doctors, among other things, also smacked of the most blatant anti-Semitism.

But Kaganovich would not have suffered in this case either - by his mere physical presence in the Politburo, he provided Stalin with an alibi against the accusation of anti-Semitism.

From communist sources, information penetrated into the free world that Stalin was going, in connection with the doctors' case, to create in the USSR something like a ghetto or a new "Pale of Settlement". If Stalin was really going to hold such an event, then he would have carried it through the hands of the same Kaganovich.

Many served Stalin for fear, but Kaganovich for conscience.  
The Great Soviet Encyclopedia was right when it wrote:

"Kaganovich developed as a politician, as one of the leaders of the party under the direct leadership of Comrade Stalin, and is one of his most devoted students and assistants"<sup>379</sup>.

In the biographies of "Stalin's students and comrades-in-arms", published in 9 Soviet encyclopedias and reference books, not one of them is called a devotee in a superlative degree (the most devoted) - only one Kaganovich deserved such an assessment of his merits.

After the war, Stalin again remembered the "organizing" talent: Kaganovich for repressions and purges. In the liberated Ukraine, Khrushchev was clearly unable to cope with this task. Stalin removed Khrushchev and appointed Kaganovich General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party (March 1947). And Kaganovich proved that he had not forgotten how to clean: 579 TSB, 1937, 1st ed., vol. XXX, p. 517.

hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were deported to Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Siberia as "fascists" and "enemies of the people". After Stalin's death, the collective leadership decided that the fate of all his economic plans would ultimately be decided by the "productivity of labor", that is, the degree and rate of exploitation of the working class. To do this, a "State Committee of Labor and Wages" is being created. Kaganovich devoted his "organizing" abilities to this committee, but quickly failed: scolding Stalin for terror, it was no longer possible to manage terrorists. The laws of 1940 on criminal penalties for being "late", for "arbitrarily leaving" work, etc., had to be repealed long ago by the workers themselves on a "private basis", etc. The main elements of Kaganovich's "organizing talent" disappeared for a while - Kaganovich himself also disappeared: in June 1956 he was removed from this

positions.

3. Klim Voroshilov (born in 1881, in the party since 1903). "A man of outstanding courage, exceptional energy, quickly orienting himself in the situation, firm in his decisions and ready to strictly implement them," a Soviet biographer described Voroshilov in 1929<sup>380</sup>. In subsequent biographies of Voroshilov, this characterization was no longer repeated. And this was quite reasonable: out of all this characteristic, Voroshilov eventually strengthened only one quality - a person who "quickly orients himself in the situation." For the first time, Voroshilov became closely acquainted with Stalin in Tsaritsyn in 1918 (before the revolution, they met at the IV and V congresses of the RSDLP) and quickly "orientated" in relation to his future friend and "father". He saw in Stalin that force on which he must bet in his personal career. History has brilliantly confirmed the infallibility of such an "orientation." Voroshilov belonged to those old Bolshevik workers who joined the party and participated in the revolution as extras,

"mass", but did not have personal data for any great career after the victorious revolution. And Voroshilov joined the party not because of some ideological impulses that had taken shape, but as a rebel against social injustices in life. The life of Voroshilov himself was rather bitter. His biographers indicate that from the age of seven he entered the mine (according to the sample 380 Ibid., vol.

XIII, p. 176. pyrite), from the

age of ten, together with his father, she grazed the landlord's cattle, after that he tried many different professions, until, finally, did not study the profession of a locksmith in Lugansk. Until the age of twelve, he grew up illiterate. Then he entered a rural school, but studied only two winters. This was his entire school education by the time of the October Revolution.

But Voroshilov's political outlook was much broader than that of his friends in Lugansk - this probably explains the fact that after the coup Voroshilov became one of the leaders of the Bolshevik City Duma of Lugansk. However, until the beginning of 1918, Voroshilov's existence was known only in his own city. When the Germans, after the failure of separate negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, resume their offensive in the Ukraine, Voroshilov telegraphs Lenin and Trotsky that he, at the head of a "detachment of six hundred men," is coming out against the German army in order to defeat these "executioners of the proletarian revolution." Voroshilov's idea - to

create a "partisan movement" (in addition to the regular Red Army) - is supported by the center. Having no military training (he was not even a soldier), Voroshilov quickly expands his detachment and seeks recognition from both sides: from the side of the white generals with his bold raids, and from the side of the red command - the very idea of organizing the partisan movement. Soon his detachment was reorganized into the Fifth Ukrainian Army, which made a campaign to Tsaritsyn. In Tsaritsyn, she receives a new name of the Tenth Army. This is where the political baptism of Voroshilov as a "friend and ally" of Stalin took place precisely on negative grounds: on joint intrigues against Trotsky, who then commanded the Red Army. Thus arose the well-known "military opposition" of Voroshilov,

Yegorov, Minkin and others at the Eighth Congress (1919) against Trotsky.

It was the "Tsaritsyn group of proletarian commanders" against Trotsky's course to use "bourgeois" and "tsarist" specialists in the Red Army in leadership positions, especially staff positions (Trotsky's arguments were very simple and logical: firstly, "the proletariat does not yet have its own general staff officers" , secondly, "with the hands and knowledge of some bourgeois we beat other bourgeois"). The soul and organizer of the "military opposition" was Stalin himself, but Stalin deliberately kept a low profile, acting only behind the scenes, waiting for Lenin's reaction. But as

soon as it became clear that Lenin, like Trotsky, sharply condemned partisan commanders and fully supported Trotsky's military policy, Stalin stepped on the scene: he equally strongly condemned Voroshilov and his friends. But even then Voroshilov showed himself to be a man "quickly orienting himself in the situation." He realized that Stalin was maneuvering in mutual interests - both in his own interests and in the interests of Voroshilov himself. The "better days" came after the end of the civil war - on the recommendation of Stalin, the partisan Voroshilov was appointed in 1921 the commander of the North Caucasian military district. At the X Congress

(1921), on the recommendation of the same Stalin, Voroshilov was elected to the Central Committee. Preparing for a decisive struggle against Trotsky, in 1924 Stalin succeeded in appointing Voroshilov commander of the Moscow Military District instead of the Trotskyist Muralov. In January 1925, Trotsky was removed from the post of chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. Of course, even then Stalin wanted to nominate Voroshilov instead of Trotsky, but the unshakable and generally recognized candidate for this post after Trotsky was his deputy,

Mikhail Frunze. Knowing too well the indisputability of this candidacy and wishing to transfer Frunze to his camp, Stalin at the January plenum of the Central Committee of 1925 puts forward him. The plenum accepted this proposal, and Frunze took Trotsky's place. Voroshilov had to wait for new "better days". It was not long to wait: in the summer of that year, under the experienced hand of a "Stalinist surgeon," Frunze died during an operation that was performed on him by decision of the Politburo aga



Now Voroshilov became the head of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Grateful Voroshilov further participates in all the atrocities of Stalin on behalf of the Red Army. After the defeat of the "left opposition" of Trotsky and the "new opposition" of Zinoviev-Kamenev, Voroshilov, together with Molotov, was introduced into the Politburo (1926), in which he remains permanently to this day. The significance of Voroshilov as a political

leader was never noticeable, but he became the head of the Red Army not because of his "military" qualities, but as a politician of the Stalinist school. Voroshilov found himself in this school itself, again, not by conviction, but by calculation - for the sake of a career. Stalin was well aware of the weaknesses of his students and knew

how to use them for his own purposes. The weaknesses of Voroshilov himself included - predilection for the weaker sex, love for vodka and a thirst for orders. Trotsky said that Stalin was able to satisfy these passions of his students in the early years of his ascent to

authorities.

True, Stalin practiced this policy of "bread and circuses" in moderation, not abusing himself and not allowing his friends to abuse it. It was precisely the interests of the still unknown outcome of the struggle for power that demanded the observance of external asceticism. Stalin tried to give the people the impression that "almost saints" were sitting in the Kremlin, who, in the name of a communist tomorrow, renounced their personal lives today. Least of all, Voroshilov, greedy for life, approached this role. Therefore, Stalin made him his personal drinking companion. Characteristically, Voroshilov is the only member of the Politburo whom the official press called "Stalin's comrade-in-arms and personal friend." As for the orders, here Stalin was even more generous. Voroshilov

ended the Civil War with only two orders of the Red Banner (whereas Blucher, Fetsko, Fabricius had five orders each). By the time of the Second World War, Stalin brought the number of Voroshilov orders to four, and when during Yezhov's purge the named holders of five orders were destroyed with the help of the same Voroshilov (Fabritius allegedly died earlier in an air crash), Voroshilov became both the "first cavaliers" and the "first marshal " THE USSR.

Stalin needed Voroshilov not as a politician, but as an instrument of his own policy. He was the only member of the Politburo of that time who could say about himself: "Among all of you - former bourgeois and petty bourgeois - I am the only proletarian from the machine." Among these same members of the Politburo, he was the only "red commander" during the civil war. From the beginning of the twenties, Stalin, trying to emphasize his own role in the civil war, popularized Tsaritsyn, Voroshilov's army, until, finally, at the suggestion of Voroshilov and his friends, Tsaritsyn was renamed Stalingrad (1925). Stalin, for his part, reciprocated: Lugansk was renamed Voroshilovgrad.

But Voroshilov's reputation as the first "red officer" (there was even such a song), as an old Bolshevik and "Lugansk locksmith", Stalin needed not at all for mutual compliments, but to achieve the goal of seizing sole power.

Here Voroshilov rendered Stalin a service that can only be compared with the services of Molotov and

Kaganovich. Creating glory for Voroshilov as a hero of the civil war and a "proletarian commander," Stalin knew what he was doing. He created glory for the witness, who had to publicly confess his insignificance in order to testify to the greatness of his patron. The too gray biography of Stalin before the revolution, during the revolution and the civil war, did not fit in with the reputation he is now creating as "Lenin's first student and first assistant." It was necessary to compose a new biography of Stalin. As far as the history of the party is

concerned, civilians Molotov and especially Kaganovich worked successfully in this field. As part of military history, an "expert" in the matter was needed. Voroshilov was now considered such a recognized "expert". Voroshilov's task was to use Stalin's personal archives to prove a thing that until 1929 seemed absolutely unprovable to put Stalin in Trotsky's place in leading the civil war.

If the skillful falsification of history, especially one whose leading participants are still alive, is a difficult art, then Voroshilov's falsification of the history of the civil war in Russia has surpassed the limits of everything possible.

In the "research" essay "Stalin and the Red Army" (December 21, 1929), Voroshilov wrote<sup>381</sup>: "In recent years, not

rivers, but oceans of water have flowed away ... Over the past five or six years, Comrade Stalin has been in the focus of the unfolding .. struggle for the party, for socialism. Only this circumstance can explain that the significance of Comrade Stalin, as one of the most outstanding organizers of the victories of the civil war, was to some extent obscured by these events and has not yet received due appreciation. Today, on the fiftieth birthday of our friend, I want at least partly fill this gap.

What was this "significance of Stalin"? Voroshilov reported sensational news<sup>382</sup>: "In the period 1918-1920, Comrade Stalin was, perhaps, the only person whom the Central Committee threw from one battle front to another, choosing the most dangerous, most threatening for the revolution places.

Where it was relatively calm, where we had successes, Stalin was not visible there. <sup>381</sup>K.

Voroshilov. "Stalin and the Armed Forces of the USSR". <sup>382</sup>T and m. But

where ... the Red armies crackled, where counter-revolutionary forces threatened the very existence of Soviet power, Comrade Stalin appeared there. "After such an entry,

Voroshilov, boldly falsifying not only historical events, but also historical documents, proved the following: the supreme command The Red Army led by Trotsky and his staff on all fronts of the civil war sabotaged the victory of the Red Army, and Stalin, fighting on two fronts - both against the leaders of the Red Army and against the white generals - saved the Soviet power... I am not exaggerating, but reducing Voroshilov's withdrawal. Ten years later, in 1939, it seemed to Voroshilov that even he "underestimated" Stalin in his article of 1929.

He called Stalin in that article only "one of the organizers of the victories in the civil war," although omnipresent. as Stalin's own appetite grew along the lines of the "cult of personality"), that Stalin was not at all "one of the organizers" He was the sole organizer of the victories of the Red Army and even its creator.

It turned out further that Stalin was, it turns out, the author of the laws of strategy and tactics of the proletarian revolution in October 1917.

Here is Voroshilov's testimony<sup>383</sup>:

"Many volumes will be written about Stalin, the creator of the Red Army, its inspirer and organizer of victories, the author of the laws of strategy and tactics of the proletarian revolution." It seemed

to Voroshilov (that is, Stalin) that even this was not enough. Stalin had long since taken Trotsky's place in the civil war. He even took the place of Lenin as "the author of the strategy and tactics of the proletarian revolution." But now it was necessary to take the place of Lenin in leading the "proletarian revolution", and turn Stalin himself from "disciples" into Lenin's "comrade-in-arms" in the Central Committee of the party. Voroshilov also testified to this "fact":

"Only he, Stalin - the closest associate of Lenin - the direct organizer and leader of the proletarian revolution and its armed forces." That not Trotsky, but Stalin is

the "leader" and "organizer" of the Red Army. Voroshilov "proved" in 1929, but that it was not Lenin, but Stalin "the direct organizer and leader of the proletarian revolution," he proved only in 1939. (In the interests of historical truth, it is necessary

deputy

383 Ibid., p. 66. Note

that already a year before, in 1938, in the "Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" there appeared a never-existing mythical "Party Center" for leading the October Revolution, which was allegedly headed by Stalin.)

Ten years later - in 1949 - Voroshilov, having long ago exhausted his entire supply of adjectives and nouns to exalt Stalin, began to appeal to the "planetary" categories. Voroshilov wrote:

"... the Soviet people, together with all progressive mankind, is celebrating the seventieth anniversary of the greatest man on our planet, Joseph Stalin, the victor of the Patriotic War, the Great Patriotic War, the Great Patriotic War. The Great Patriotic War ... as a triumph of the military-strategic and military genius of the great Stalin."

So for decades, Voroshilov created the "cult of Stalin", not only falsifying history, but also discriminating against the one named

whom the heirs of Stalin today rule the country - Lenin.

The role of Voroshilov, of course, was not limited to this. He was a leading member of the Stalinist Politburo for twenty-six years, that is, during the entire period in which, according to the admission of Stalin's own disciples, all the main atrocities of the latter took place. History will someday prove that Stalin did not commit any of these atrocities without the signatures of Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan and others. As for the purge of 1936-1939, the role of Voroshilov was especially

repulsive. All the leading cadres of the Red Army, long-term personal friends of Voroshilov, his former chiefs in the civil war, his subordinates after it, were handed over by Voroshilov to Yezhov to be torn to pieces. Although the initiative for reprisals did not come from Voroshilov, Voroshilov never once raised his voice of protest against this wholesale reprisal against honored generals and army commanders. Even when members and candidates of the Politburo (Rudzutak, Ordzhonikidze, Kosior, Chubar, Postyshev) categorically proposed to Stalin to stop the unreasonable and senseless destruction of army and economy personnel, Voroshilov, together with Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, voted not only for the continuation of the purge, but also for liquidation of the named members of the Politburo as "Bukharin conciliators". According to verified data, Voroshilov's "contribution" 184 Ibid., pp. 89, 129

the highest cadres of the army was expressed as follows.

Were liquidated: Out of 5 marshals - 3. Out of 15 army commanders - 13. Out of 85 commanders - 57. Out of 195 commanders - 110. Out of 406 commanders - 220.

It was the top command. Khrushchev specified the total number of senior commanders killed, citing a figure of five thousand people. The death of these military leaders (as well as the suffering of their exiled families) lies on the conscience of Voroshilov (there was an order in the army: none of the senior and top commanders can be arrested without the consent of the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov). Otherwise, Voroshilov

could not act. He was connected with Stalin by mutual responsibility for crimes and an oath in the matter of their commission. Here is the last testimony of Voroshilov himself<sup>385</sup>:

"Personally, as a candidate for the Stalinist bloc of communists and non-Party people, I assure you always and in everything to be guided by the instructions of our great leader Comrade Stalin."

Voroshilov kept this oath until the end of Stalin's days. If, with all this, according to Khrushchev, Stalin did not allow him lately to the meetings of the Politburo, as an "English spy", then this proved not Voroshilov's "treason", but the dictator's determination to do away with political waste. It was all the easier for Stalin because just the Second World War dispelled the legend of the "proletarian commander" and the "first marshal" of the USSR. Having been appointed commander-in-chief of the northwestern front at the beginning of the war, Voroshilov failed brilliantly, and in 1944 Stalin removed him from the USSR State Defense Committee. It was only then that he was given his real job. Voroshilov was appointed commander of the "partisan movement" headquarters. When, after the death of Stalin, Voroshilov was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, this was already in the order of things. 4. Anastas Mikoyan (born in 1895, in the party since 1915). During his stay in

America, at a reception at the 385BSE, 2nd ed., vol. IX, p. 130. at the Soviet embassy in Washington, Mikoyan

declared that the secret dream

of his youth was the profession of a dancer ... These dreams did not come true, and Mikoyan became a Bolshevik "politician" instead of a dancer.

Nevertheless, Mikoyan managed to introduce certain elements of "ballet art", especially the Caucasian "Naur Lezginka", into politics.

Dizzying

lightness, dexterity, strictly and precisely calculated rhythm and virtuoso "pas" at the most difficult turns - characteristic of Caucasians performing their amazing national dance, Mikoyan very skillfully used in maneuvering between the Kremlin's "Scylla and Charybdis" - which is the main the secret is why he survived not only under Stalin, but also under Khrushchev. Fate did not intend him for the first roles, but even in the second roles,

Mikoyan does not need a director, but rather the opposite - the director needs him.

Mikoyan was born in Georgia, in the family of an Armenian small trader (whom the official biographers have long ago transferred to the category of "workers"). Preparing to become a priest of the Armenian-Gregorian Church, Mikoyan graduated from the Armenian Theological Seminary in Tiflis. Even in the seminary, he became interested in politics and enrolled in a circle of cadet youth. Under the influence of the Georgian socialists (Mikoyan speaks good Georgian), he moved to the circle of social democrats (1915) and hesitated for a long time between the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Dashnaks, until the Bolsheviks won in the center of Russia.

In the revolutionary biography of Mikoyan there was one dark place, because of which Stalin blackmailed him later all his life. It was connected with the history of the famous "26 Baku commissars" (Shaumyan, Dzhaparidze, Fioletov, Azizbekov, etc.), who were shot by the British in September 1918 in Turkmenistan. It consisted of the follow

The revolution found Mikoyan in Baku, and he was there during both the Turkish and the British occupation. Although a later biography depicts him as the most prominent Bolshevik figure and attributes to him editing the Baku newspapers Sotsial-Democrat and Izvestia of the Baku Soviet (which, by the way, was dominated by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), but being arrested along with 26 commissars, Mikoyan, however, was not shot, while among the shot "26 commissars" were simply non-party technical employees of the Baku Soviet. Mikoyan not only survived, but after some time he was released from prison altogether and freely returned from beyond the Caspian Sea (Krasnovodsk, where the arrested commissars were brought) back to English Baku. How could it happen that the British

and the then anti-Bolshevik Trans-Caspian government, by shooting even non-party employees of the Baku Soviet, Mikoyan, a Bolshevik since 1915, released? The official biographer, in the words of Mikoyan himself, gives us such

an unconvincing answer<sup>386</sup>: "Mikoyan was not on the lists of those arrested published in the

Baku newspapers, he was not on the lists for allowances, which saved him from death, although several non-party people - three employees of the Baku Soviet "Mishne and others were shot."

After the execution of "26" Mikoyan spent some time in prison. But again, the incomprehensible "generosity" of the British, even "weakness", at least in the image of the biographer Mikoyan<sup>387</sup>:

"Mikoyan," writes the biographer, "was eager to get to Baku as soon as possible and was preparing an escape from prison, which did not take place and was not needed, since At the demand of the Baku workers, the British occupiers were forced to deport Mikoyan with a group of arrested Baku residents from across the Caspian Sea to Baku.

Thus, in March 1919, Mikoyan, one might say, under the mandate of the British, returned to occupied Baku and "became the head of the Bolshevik organization of Baku." True, in Baku itself, the British arrested Mikoyan twice, but both times they quickly released him, as if by "identification." Soon Mikoyan moves to Social Democratic Georgia, where he is also arrested, but, as the biographer reports, Mikoyan manages to "pay off with a bribe" (which means that Mikoyan had enough money).

From Georgia, Mikoyan went to Moscow to "receive directives from Lenin and Stalin" and "returned to Baku on April 28, 1920 on the first armored train of the Red Army." If we

study this biography with the help of Stalin's criminal lens, then Vyshinsky could have composed another biography of Mikoyan during the Moscow trials, much more than 386BSE, 1938, vol.

XXXIX, p. 345-346. plausible than

the biographies that

Stalin and he wrote for

other old Bolsheviks. It's not hard to guess what it would look like:

Mikoyan was a member of the counter-revolutionary Kadet party and came from a bourgeois family;

Mikoyan was a Turkish and German spy recruited during the Turkish occupation of Azerbaijan; Mikoyan was

recruited by the British during the British occupation of Baku; Mikoyan turned out to be

a provocateur of British intelligence and gave the British "26 Baku commissars" (moreover, the arrest of Mikoyan himself served to disguise his agent by the British).



Such was the dark place in Mikoyan's biography, because of which Stalin blackmailed him. It was in Stalin's style to pick around him people with vulnerabilities and "flaws" so that, fearing responsibility for their imaginary or real misdeeds, they would recklessly commit Stalinist crimes (for example, the former Mensheviks Menzhinsky, Yaroslavsky, Kuibyshev, Vyshinsky and others. ). And Mikoyan was one of them.

Mikoyan, not being a Stalinist by nature, fell into Stalin's network from the very beginning of his career as general secretary. He served him not out of conscience, but out of fear. The eternal threat of being accused of espionage and provocateurism forced him to subscribe to any of Stalin's crimes, which he probably would not have signed under normal conditions. For the same reason, in praising Stalin, he always beat the "records" of other members of the Politburo. Refined oriental flattery towards the dictator, he knew how to mint out in formulas that do not allow the internal falseness of their author. And yet Stalin never trusted him completely. It is no coincidence that of all the former and present members of the Politburo, only Mikoyan was a candidate for the Politburo for nine consecutive years (1926-1935), while others immediately got into the Politburo, bypassing Mikoyan (Andreev, Kosior, Ordzhonikidze, etc.). Initially, Stalin made the same bet on Mikoyan, which he then made on

Kaganovich. As soon as Stalin received the post of general secretary of the Central Committee, Mikoyan was appointed secretary of the South-Eastern Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) (later the North Caucasian Regional Committee) in Rostov-on-Don (1922), and at the XI Party Congress he was elected a member of the Central Committee (before Kaganovich). In 1926, Stalin appointed Mikoyan instead of the removed Kamenev as People's Commissar of Trade of the USSR and

immediately introduced him to the list of candidates for membership of the then all-powerful Politburo.

About thirty years old, Mikoyan was the youngest minister of the USSR. In the appointment of Mikoyan by Stalin, among other things, other common features in their biography probably played a role - both were Caucasians, both spoke Georgian, both studied at the theological seminary, and both knew mutual "failures" and "flaws" in the past. In this respect, Mikoyan seemed to be a much more ideal instrument in Stalin's policy than Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov.

But now the time has come to test Mikoyan's personal qualities in Moscow. The fight against the right began. The last decisive and final stage of Stalin's struggle for a one-man dictatorship. The last and decisive chance for talented demagogues and conspirators to be transferred from "active" to members of the Central Committee, from members of the Central Committee to candidates for the Politburo, and from candidates to members of the Politburo. In this struggle, completely unknown people, who under Lenin were not allowed even on the threshold of the Central Committee, make a dizzying career, some of them directly find themselves in the Politburo, and Mikoyan, even after the final defeat of the right, remains as a candidate for another five years. What's the matter?

Of course, one cannot think that Mikoyan resisted the defeat of the Rights or the "Great Purge" that was being prepared (such tales can only be told in the Kremlin now in hindsight). The thing was different: the Georgian Chekists, headed by Beria, annoyed Stalin for years with denunciations of Mikoyan, dug out of old archives. Stalin carefully accepted these denunciations, frightened Mikoyan with them, and for the time being kept him in a black body. But the stage of physical elimination of both real and

potential opposition has come. As if at meat-packing, a "plan for the elimination of the remnants of hostile classes" was outlined in percentages for the territories, regions and republics of the USSR. Almost the entire composition of the members of the Central Committee

and half of the Politburo itself are scheduled for liquidation. The purge in the party itself was to be carried out, as indicated in the official documents cited by me elsewhere, not on the basis of who was who yesterday, but on the basis of "business" - who could be who today under Stalin. Even more: the idealist Bolsheviks, old revolutionaries by conviction, heroes of the civil war by personal courage, were considered potentially the most dangerous enemies of the future Stalin regime. They should have been dealt with more radically. Mikoyan's happiness lay precisely in the fact that he did not belong to them. When Stalin revealed his cards and openly headed for everything that was the most criminal in Bolshevism itself, Mikoyan's long-faded star also rose - he was transferred to the Politburo along with Zhdanov (1935), and Yezhov was appointed secretary of the Central Committee and chairman of the Party Control Commission (1935). A year later, Yezhov was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and transferred to the

Politburo. Thus, starting the purge, Stalin stocked up with three new and most reliable votes in the Politburo. The opposition in the Politburo itself against the purge Rudzutak, Kosior, Ordzhonikidze, Chubar, Postyshev, Petrovsky, Eikhe (the last three are candidates) turned out to be in a clear minority. Now Stalin legally, on the basis of the decision of the majority of the Politburo (Stalin himself, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Andreev, Zhdanov, Kalinin, Yezhov) and relying on his first-class "Inner Cabinet" headed by Yezhov, Poskrebyshev and Malenkov, proceeded to physical elimination of "enemies of the people". At the XX Congress of the

CPSU, the cunning Mikoyan tried to create a political and historical alibi not only for himself, but also for the accomplices of this inquisition. He stated that "we have not had a collective leadership for about twenty years." In other words, Stalin single-handedly ruled and single-handedly committed crimes from 1933-1934, including the Great Purge.

In connection with this truly historic speech by Mikoyan, many, especially in the American press, wrote that Mikoyan initiated the exposure of Stalin at the 20th Congress and that he forced the "wavering" Khrushchev and other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee to launch a campaign against the "cult of Stalin" and Stalin's crimes. It was even said that Mikoyan was Khrushchev's "rival" in leadership of the party. How sincerely the Presidium of the Central Committee must have laughed at such and

similar assumptions! One does not have to be particularly insightful in the Kremlin's party affairs, it is enough to know the character of Mikoyan himself more or less closely to be sure that Mikoyan was only reading a speech written according to guidelines and finally edited by the majority of the Politburo, primarily Khrushchev himself.

Why did Mikoyan get this role? Here, of course, there may be different guesses. Only one thing is certain: one of the old members of the Politburo and, if possible, the one who was physically the least involved in the crimes of the NKVD and Stalin, should have come out with Stalin's revelations. Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov clearly fell away. Only Mikoyan remained. The one who served not for conscience, but for fear. The one who, under any conditions, will ask:

- What do you

want? I will not dwell on the characterization of Mikoyan as a business minister. His qualities in this area are little known to me. Apparently, his official fame as a talented "red merchant" is true, although the scale and range of his trading turnovers have never been enviable. There was even such an anecdote. A group of workers and peasants submitted a proposal to the Academy of Sciences of the USSR to remove the letter "m" from the Russian alphabet as superfluous.

Reason:

No flour, no milk, no butter, no margarine, no pasta, no meat, no soap, no manufactory, but only Mikoyan. But because of one Mikoyan, there is no need to have a separate letter in the alphabet. 5.

Georgy Malenkov (born in 1902, in the party since 1920).

The current CPSU is the brainchild of two people: Stalin and Malenkov. If Stalin was its chief designer, then Malenkov is its talented architect. In the Central Committee of the Party, Malenkov came to technical work in 1925 from the fourth year of the Moscow Higher Technical School. Until 1930, he was subordinate to Poskrebyshev, first in the "Special" sector, and then in the "Secretariat of Comrade Stalin." Being an employee of the "Secretariat of Comrade Stalin" meant something more than being an ordinary member of the Central Committee.

Not all members of the Central Committee knew what was going on in the Politburo, and Malenkov was its protocol secretary. Not all members of the Politburo knew what was going on in Comrade Stalin's Secretariat, and Malenkov was in charge of the personnel sector there. Kaganovich opened it. He also helped him enter the "legal arena". Without this, one could not become a member of the Central Committee, much less a member of the Politburo. The entry into the legal arena took place in 1930, when Kaganovich was appointed first secretary of the Moscow Committee, and Malenkov - head of its personnel department (organizational department). Here,

under the direct supervision of Kaganovich, Malenkov showed in practice

what "Stalin's technique, which has mastered the cadres," is capable of. The Moscow party organization - the largest and leading - for a long time was under the influence and leadership of the right (Uglov, Kotov, Ukhov, Ryutin, etc.). After the defeat of the Bukharin group and the Uglov Moscow

tops. The lower and middle links of the apparatus of power still remained untouched. Malenkov took them on. But Malenkov's power extended not only to the apparatus, to the cadres of Moscow and the Moscow region, but also to the party organizations of the People's Commissariats of the USSR in Moscow. During his four years of work in the Moscow Committee, Malenkov radically purged the party apparatus of all these links, not only from former rightists and "conciliators", but also from all those who showed insufficient understanding of the

spirit of the times. Malenkov's work was regarded as a model of "Stalin's organizational leadership." The 17th Party Congress (1934) was held - the last congress of the "collective leadership". In his report at the congress, Stalin devoted the entire last section to "questions of organizational leadership." In this regard, for the first time, a new theory was voiced - about the role and significance of "organizational politics". Stalin

declared<sup>389</sup>: "Good resolutions and declarations for a general line are only the beginning of the matter, for they signify only the desire to win, but not the victory itself. the life of the party line, from the right selection of people...

Moreover, after a correct political line is given, organizational work decides everything, including the fate of the political line itself—its fulfillment or failure. 9. Strengthening the verification

of execution ... 11. Exposure and expulsion of incorrigible bureaucrats from the administrative apparatus. 12. Removal from office of violators of party decisions. 13. Purge of agricultural organizations. 14. Finally, purge the party of unreliable and degenerate people."

Who in the CPSU could have coped with such decisive tasks of the new "organizational policy" ("resolving the very fate of the political line")? Who could most consistently and most effectively prepare the organizational apparatus of the party for the

the above theses of Stalin's future "Great purge" in the party and the country? Stalin did not find

such a person in the composition of the Central Committee, elected at the 17th Congress. But such a person had already been available for a long time: Stalin appointed Malenkov to lead the new "organizational policy" as head of the department of leading party organs of the Central Committee.

Henceforth, the fate of members of the Central Committee depended on non-members of the Central Committee of the party. Thus, the internal "triangle" of the predetermined purge closed: Kaganovich (secretary of the Central Committee and chairman of the party control), his deputy Yezhov and Malenkov (head of the ORPO Central Committee). Stalin gave only the "correct political line." "Triangle" decides her fate. The organizational apparatus of the Central Committee plunged into the

deepest conspiracy against its own party. The so-called "inspection of party documents" in 1935, carried out under the direct supervision of Yezhov and Malenkov, was only a preliminary, but very thoroughly prepared intelligence of the inner content of each communist. Previously, the Central Committee had only registration cards for party members. Now they have filed personal files for each communist. In these cases, there were not only lengthy questionnaires filled out by the communists themselves, but also questionnaires for the same communists, filled out by special sectors of the party apparatus and secret political departments of the NKVD. "Specialists" from special sectors "and" psychologists "from the NKVD determined at their own discretion who a given communist was in the past and who he might be in the future - an obedient tool of the apparatus or a potential "enemy of the people."

In the spring of 1935, Yezhov was already chairman of the Party Control Commission and secretary of the Central Committee. In September 1935, a meeting of Malenkov's department and its grassroots bodies (a meeting of the heads of the ORPO) was convened to sum up the preliminary results of the "verification of party documents." The meeting is chaired by Malenkov. The main speaker is Yezhov. Yezhov criticizes the shortcomings of the work carried out and outlines new tasks for the party apparatus in the matter of deepening further intelligence in the "party economy". Malenkov fully subscribes to Yezhov's report: "Comrade Yezhov is absolutely right... Comrade Yezhov fully explained all the questions," states Malenkov<sup>391</sup>.

But this gigantic, not so much "technical" as intelligence work of the apparatus in preparation for the purge was not completed in one year. It continues into 1936. Yezhov already by this time begins to set the tone, even to teach Malenkov himself. In May 1936, Malenkov, already in his capacity as editor-in-chief of Party Construction, as if forgetting about the existence of Stalin, writes things about Yezhov that until now it was allowed to write only about Stalin<sup>392</sup>: "Comrade Yezhov," writes Malenkov's organ, "teaches us (emphasis mine. - A. A.) how to restructure party work, how to raise organizational work to the highest level ... we must fulfill these instructions ... "This was not the creation of a "cult of Yezhov" (this role was successfully

performed by newspaper "Pravda") - it was a bitter recognition of a competitor in his grievous defeat. In the "triangle" Stalin headed for the sharpest corner of Yezhov. Malenkov and Kaganovich had to be content with the roles of Yezhov's assistants.

Shortly after the appointment of Yezhov as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (September 1936), Malenkov moved from bitter confessions to fiery praises of Yezhov (such was the will of the main "owner"). In the midst of the purge in December 1937, Malenkov's organ wrote <sup>393</sup>:

"Under the leadership of Stalin's people's commissar comrade Yezhov, Soviet intelligence is mercilessly liquidating fascist bandits,,. The faithful guard of socialism, the NKVD, under the leadership of its Stalinist people's commissar, comrade Yezhov, will continue to smash and uproot the enemies of the people ... The punishing hand of the Soviet people - the NKVD until will exterminate them! Our ardent greetings to Comrade Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov, Commissar for Internal Affairs of Stalin's!"

In these praises, Malenkov, of course, was sincere, "Organizational policy", which was developed by the "triangle" even before the appointment of Yezhov, was now transferred to the NKVD "for implementation." Ezhov's personal merit was that in this realization he showed such a virtuoso class, before which all the horrors of the medieval Inquisition simply pale. And yet it was the class of the performer, not the organizer - the organizers

<sup>391</sup> "Party Building", February 1935, op. based on the book of Ebon "Malenkov", p. 35. <sup>392</sup> Ibid.

393 Ibid., p.

Kaganovich, Molotov, Yezhov, Vyshinsky, Andreev and Malenkov.

Of these seven people, only Malenkov and Vyshinsky were not only members of the Politburo, but even candidates for the Central Committee, but they, together with the named members of the Politburo, directly directed the actions of "Stalin's People's Commissariat Comrade Yezhov." It is completely unknown what role Malenkov played in the death of Yezhov himself, but under all conditions it could only be the role of a competitor, not an enemy. No matter how much Stalin's disciples disavowed Yezhovism and Stalin himself today, at that time he pursued a really "collective policy" of those who survived the Politburo and those who came there as a result of the purge (Khrushchev, Zhdanov, Beria, Malenkov). None of them would have had a chance to get into the Politburo if the old party and the old pre-revolutionary party cadres had not

been liquidated. Despite the exceptionally high opinion that Stalin had of Malenkov, despite the decisive role that he intended for him in the new Central Committee, even Stalin did not dare to recommend him to the 17th Congress even as a candidate member of the Central Committee, while Khrushchev and Beria were elected members, and Bulganin a candidate of the Central Committee. In order for Malenkov to receive the legal status of his actual position as the architect of the party, it was precisely the liquidation of the old Leninist party that was needed. Only after that, at the XVIII Congress (1939), Malenkov was elected a member of the

Central Committee, a member of the Orgburo and Secretary of the Central Committee for Personnel. The merits of Malenkov to Stalin in the "Great Purge" can only be compared with the merits of Yezhov himself and Vyshinsky. I have already calculated elsewhere in this work the results of the purge of 1933-1939 along the lines of the party. I proved there, on the basis of official sources, that from February 1934 (from the 17th Congress) to March 1939 (through the 18th Congress) 1,200,000 Communists were expelled from the Party - out of a total of 2,809,786 (that is, about 43%) . Excluded were mostly old Bolsheviks and those who had joined the party before the start of collectivization. Being expelled from the party in



Communists also took place without formal exclusion from the party, so as not to warn them of the impending arrest. These

arrests along the lines of the party were mainly and primarily the work of the head of the new "organizational policy" of the Central Committee - G. Malenkov. However, Malenkov

was busy not only destroying the old Leninist party, but also creating a new Stalinist party. In six months - from April to October 1939 - 800,000 new communists were accepted into the party to replace the destroyed ones, while under normal conditions and with truly voluntary entry into the party, its growth never exceeded one hundred thousand in a whole year. Malenkov proved that his "organizational policy" is capable of miracles in this area as well. He recruited more than 130,000 people to the party every month. The recruitment itself (precisely "recruitment", not "entry") did not present any difficulties after Yezhovshchina - the person to whom the secretary of the local party committee approached with an offer to join the party rarely dared to refuse this high "honor". Yezhov was gone, but Beria was. There was also Malenkov. The intimidated and terrorized Soviet citizen preferred the

party card to the denunciation of the secretary in the NKVD. Of course, volunteers also joined the party, but not because of any ideological motives, but simply for a personal career. But both were now convinced that the Central Committee did not exist for them, but that they existed for the Central Committee. Accordingly, a new idea of the party was developed, which still dominates the CPSU: the party means the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Secretariat of the Central Committee means the party. This, too, was a brilliant victory for Malenkov's "organizational policy." The cells of such a party were much easier to manage than the collective farms - without reports, without congresses, without elections. For

exactly thirteen years, Malenkov was secretary of the Central Committee of such a party, occupying exactly the same position under Stalin as Bormann had under Hitler, and during these thirteen years only one party congress took place. This was also the merit of Malenkov - Malenkov created a "monolith" party for Stalin without pretensions. Stalin highly valued this truly gigantic work by Malenkov. For the destruction of the old party, he made him secretary of the Central Committee. For the creation of a new party, he decided to include him among the candidates of the Politburo.

The war has begun. The State Defense Committee was created (on June 30, 1941), to which all the power of the Politburo and the government was transferred. The committee of the first composition is organized from five members: Stalin (chairman), Molotov (deputy) and members: Voroshilov, Beria and Malenkov. The old members of the Politburo, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Kalinin, Andreev, Zhdanov, Khrushchev, remain outside the Committee, and Stalin introduces the young Politburo candidate Malenkov to its membership. When, after the war, in 1946,

Malenkov became a member of the Politburo, this was a matter of course.

The son of a former tsarist official, "volunteer" for one year as a clerk of the political department of the Red Army regiment in the conditions of the almost ended war in Turkestan (1919-1920), a half-educated student of a technical school, an ordinary protocol clerk of the Central Committee apparatus - Malenkov becomes the second most influential person in the great "proletarian" state! Moreover, such a second one, who among the current members of the "collective leadership" was the only one who dared to openly object to Stalin. Already by the death of Stalin, the party and its apparatus were actually in the hands of Malenkov. And the appeal to

Lenin, unlike others, Malenkov also began during Stalin's lifetime - in the greeting of the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR Malenkov in connection with his fiftieth birthday, they spoke of him as "a student of Lenin and a comrade-in-arms of Stalin"!394

A student of Stalin to the marrow of his bones, having never seen Lenin in his life, he did not want to be publicly called "Stalin's student." It was such impudence for which the dictator sent people to the next world. But nothing happened to Malenkov. On the contrary, in the same 1952, at the 19th Congress, he delivered a political report to the Central Committee of the Party, which, in fact, was supposed to be done by Stalin himself. After that, it was clear to everyone - either Stalin endlessly

trusts him and is preparing his successor in his person, or Malenkov has become such a force for Stalin to be reckoned with. In the light of the events that followed Stalin's death, I believe the latter assumption to be correct.

There is reason to believe that already before Stalin's death, at the first plenum of the Central Committee after the 19th Congress, Malenkov took over the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee (see the previous section of this work). Because excluded

the possibility that Stalin voluntarily cede his party post to Malenkov, then the struggle for revenge on Stalin's part was a settled matter. The case of the Kremlin doctors was the beginning. Doctors were just accused of killing Malenkov's rivals - former secretaries of the Central Committee and members of the Politburo Zhdanov and Shcherbakov.

Experienced in Stalin's affairs, Malenkov could not but  
394 "Pravda", 8.4.1952.

know where Stalin is aiming. Stalin managed to arrest the doctors, but it was not possible to judge: he died, the doctors were released. After Stalin's death, Malenkov, naturally, found himself at the head of government and until March 14, 1953 he was also the secretary of the Central Committee.

The "old guard" of the Politburo, however, was not at all disposed towards the appearance of a second Stalin. Malenkov himself, apparently, well understood that even he was not up to this task. He conceded the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee to N. Khrushchev without a fight. Then his fall began. Breaking away from the party apparatus, being in the Presidium of the Central Committee, from which almost all "Malenkovites" were expelled after Stalin's death, he was forced to recognize the "Leninist principles of collective leadership" (Malenkov's speech on March 14, 1953).

In February 1955, he was removed from his post as head of government. And this time he surrendered without a fight, in the deep conviction that the time for his "second edition"

would come. Great internal composure, rare patience, lack of talkativeness, dry realism in practical matters, a gigantic experience of political intrigue and the elastic conscience of the communist hypocrite make him a dangerous competitor for any member of the "collective leadership."

6. Nikolai Bulganin (born in 1896, in the party since 1917).

Bulganin's career until the mid-thirties was rather unsuccessful, although he participated in the civil war and joined the party during the revolution (1917), worked for a number of years in the organs of the Cheka in Nizhny Novgorod and Turkestan. Despite the exceptional role that Bulganin played in Stalin's conspiratorial technique in defeating the Ugolov leadership in Moscow and destroying the right opposition in general, his career was given to him with great difficulty. There were serious reasons for this, which in those years still had to be reckoned with: he came, in the terminology of the time, from the "socially

alien environment". Simply put, he came from the family of a big businessman - "bourgeois", from a typical Russian merchant city - Nizhny Novgorod (now Gorky). True, from the very beginning of the Bolshevik coup, he actively participated in all the KGB atrocities in Nizhny emphasize their hostility to their own class - the bourgeoisie For many random people in the Bolshevik / Party, such as Bulganin, the path to social rehabilitation lay through personal crimes against "their own class".

The only body of Soviet power with "legalized crimes" was the Cheka or the Cheka. Two types of people gathered in the same body: fanatics of Bolshevism - for leading roles (Dzerzhinsky, Menzhinsky, Yagoda, Yezhov), and all sorts of "renegades" and former "bourgeois" - for auxiliary roles (agents, informers, investigators). Bulganin probably belonged to this last category of Chekists. Under the conditions of the general cult of the "proletarian dictatorship" (the period of Lenin - Trotsky - Bukharin), this category had no hope of advancing to the front ranks of the ruling layer of the regime. The eternal stigma lay on them their social origin. Not one of them would have been able to break through the door to the top floor if he had not proved his ability to fulfill any orders of power (until the thirties, not only the composition of the Soviet apparatus, but also the party itself was regulated according to "social characteristics"). Bulganin was one of those who proved, both in the civil war and after it, that he was ready to do anything if only the regime would recognize him as their man.

In these efforts, fate brought him up against the Bolshevik of 1911, Lazar Kaganovich. This was in 1918-1919. Kaganovich then worked in the provincial party committee in Bulganin's hometown - in Nizhny Novgorod. When in 1920 Kaganovich was appointed one of the leaders of Turkestan and at the same time a member of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Turkestan Front, Bulganin found himself in the role of an employee of the Special Department and the Political Directorate of the Red Army

in Turkestan. In 1922, leaving Turkestan for Moscow, Kaganovich took Bulganin with him. Probably, Kaganovich had in mind to use "Chekist and political worker Bulganin in the apparatus of the Central Committee, but this is not

managed. The only obstacle could only be the ill-fated "bourgeois origin" of Bulganin. Kaganovich after some time

left for Ukraine as secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Ukraine. When he returned to Moscow as the third secretary of the Central Committee, he found Bulganin here, although not at a big job (director of an electrical plant), but with a solid reputation and strong patrons. He was patronized by Kuibyshev and Molotov. But Bulganin fought at the same point as Kaganovich - against Bukharin in order to make room in the Politburo for Kaganovich, against

Rykov - to make way for Molotov as head of government, and against Uglanov in order to take his place himself. True, all this did not quite go according to Bulganin's plan. Molotov and Kaganovich took their cherished positions "in a planned manner", but Bulganin had to be content with Ukhanov's post; he became chairman of the Moscow Soviet, and then only when Molotov firmly took Rykov's place. Soon Molotov brought him even closer to himself. Bulganin became chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. Here he was already noticed at close range by a strict connoisseur of the talents of the "second generation" - "the master himself": Bulganin became Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Ministers) of the USSR. A seat in the Politburo was guaranteed. The war gave both this well-deserved place and the completely undeserved

rank of "marshal" of the USSR. With the coming to power, a new biography is being created. For those for whom it was "bourgeois" in the past, it is now becoming "proletarian". Those who had unforgivable failures or far from "orthodox" pauses on the path of life, in the biography appear the features of the most "orthodox communist". Those who, before coming to power, had only a "collective biography" without any "heroic episodes" - bright individual traits also appear. Accordingly, they have now composed an orthodox biography of Bulganin: it turns out that, beginning with the February Revolution of 1917, he played an "outstanding role" everywhere and everywhere. Not a single word about his "bourgeois origin". Still, one very revealing "incident" turns out: in the "Small Soviet Encyclopedia" of 1934 it is said that "Bulganin is the son of a factory employee"<sup>395</sup>, and in the "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" of 1951 Bulganin was born a second time - this time already in "worker's family".

For his active participation in the defeat of the Bukharin opposition, Bulganin was first introduced to the list of candidates for membership in the Central Committee at the 17th Party Congress. After the final establishment of his personal dictatorship, Stalin made

him a member of the

Central Committee at

the 18th Congress (1939). 395ITU, vol. II, p. 140. 396BSE, vol. VI, p. Council ("member of the Military Council" it was an extraordinary authorized representative of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defense Committee under each commander). Of all Stalin's political generals, only Bulganin earned the highest recognition of Stalin during the war - in 1944, Stalin withdrew his personal friend, Politburo member and "First Marshal of the USSR" Voroshilov from the State Defense Committee (narrow "Military Cabinet") and instead of him introduced N. Bulganin into its composition, who was not even a candidate of the Politburo. At the same time, Stalin appointed Bulganin as his first deputy in the Ministry of Defense. At the end of the war, while continuing to work as Stalin's deputy in the USSR Ministry of Defense, Bulganin very consistently and with his usual

diligence carried out all Stalin's tasks: belittling the importance of the true commanders of the Soviet army in the war with Germany, falsifying the history of the war itself in order to exalt the role of Stalin, attributing all the victories to him personally, the creation of a myth about the military genius of Stalin and some kind of Stalinist military science, the purge of the highest military personnel of the Soviet army, whom Stalin considered as his possible enemies in the future. Stalin, as usual, highly appreciated this work of Bulganin - in March 1947 he was appointed Minister of Defense of the USSR and Deputy Chairman of the

Council of Ministers. Therefore, the characterization given to him by the "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" during the life of Stalin<sup>397</sup> was absolutely correct: "Bulganin belongs to the number of party and state leaders of the USSR, brought up by I.V.

hardened under his direct leadership in the harsh struggle of the party of Lenin-Stalin with the enemies of the Soviet people.

In 1948, Bulganin was made a full member of the Politburo. At the beginning of 1949, he, like other ministers - members of the Politburo - was released from the work of the minister and enrolled in the "institute of deputies" of Stalin by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. After Stalin's death, he was again appointed Minister of Defense of the USSR until he took over from Malenkov in February 1955. Recommending Bulganin for the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N. Khrushchev, on behalf of the Central Committee, called him "Lenin's faithful

disciple and Stalin's comrade-

in-arms." 397BSE. 1951, vol. VI, p. 260. Bulganin has extensive and versatile experience as a very consistent Stalinist bureaucrat: he was a Chekist, a business executive (factory director), a communal worker (chairman of the Moscow Council), a state apparatchik (chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR), a financier (chairman of the State Bank of the USSR ), military (marshal and minister of defense) and three times deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Wherever Stalin appointed him, Bulganin remained true to his master: a bureaucrat, a himself and highly disciplined performer. Punctual to the point of pedantry in carrying out the will of the dictator, he never even thought of "teaching" the dictator himself. Probably Stalin valued this quality in him most of all. Except for the period of the struggle with the right, which opened the way for him to the highest spheres of the state bureaucracy, then in the future he moved up, from floor to floor, by virtue of his Chekist bureaucratic, and not political and organizational qualities. Even when Stalin ceased to reckon with social origin and past merits or "failures" of the communists, Bulganin himself was always "oppressed" by his origin. Wasn't this the reason why his biography was defiantly corrected from "the son of an employee", that is, an official, to "the son of a worker"? From this feeling - a feeling of

alienness - he probably did not get rid of even today. After all, just after the death of Stalin, the "proletarians" headed by Khrushchev again, as in Lenin's time, begin to set the tone. No wonder Khrushchev, at every opportunity (in conversations with

Komsomol members) and inconvenient (in a conversation with the American ambassador in Belgrade) cases he emphasized his "proletarian origin".

There is good reason to assume that the post of head of government went to him not because of his state talent and personal ambition, but as a result of a compromise between groups in the Central Committee. Of all the members of the Politburo (Presidium), except for Pervukhin and Saburov, he was the youngest in terms of seniority and the most "above-party" in his past activities. Unlike everyone else, he was never a party apparatchik either. He began his career under Kaganovich, continued under Khrushchev, and reached the post of deputy head of government under Molotov. To which one does he owe? Probably everyone, and catered to them all to the extent that it did not contradict Stalin's frequently changing personal policy. Therefore, if the appointment of the Chairman of the Council of

Ministers of the USSR after the resignation of Malenkov was the result of a compromise in the "collective leadership" between the Molotov group and the Khrushchev group, then Bulganin's candidacy was the most ideal because of these

his personal qualities.

But the contradiction in Bulganin's position is that he is nominated by a group (of Molotov) to whom he owes his past career, but to which he hardly sympathizes today. Molotov is yesterday's chapter in the history of Stalinism, and Khrushchev is today's. Bulganin is too realist to cling to yesterday. And yet, Khrushchev does not allow him alone with his foreign minister to "travel" abroad - "a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR" prefers to be present himself. Let this be interpreted as some distrust of Bulganin and, of course, as an open disqualification of Molotov, but it will be more reliable this way.

So far, the Bulganin-Khrushchev cooperation has justified itself. The strong-willed and impulsive Khrushchev is well complemented by the undemanding and melancholy Bulganin.

7. Nikita Khrushchev (born in 1894, in the party since 1918) "One can be an exponent of the ideology of the big bourgeoisie without even being a petty shopkeeper," said Marx. Khrushchev's father, Sergei, was probably such a person. Khrushchev himself once told foreign journalists about this mindset of his father. "My father was a simple miner. But all his life he dreamed of becoming a capitalist.



It's good that he didn't succeed," Khrushchev said. But what is "good" today for the leader of the "proletarian dictatorship" was bad for the proletarian himself, who was a "big bourgeois" only ideologically.

Khrushchev grew up in the family of such a father and tended other people's cattle. If the philosophical basis of Marx is correct - "being determines consciousness", then young Nikita himself should have thought the way his father thought. Isn't this also the reason for the big defect in Khrushchev's biography, which turned out to be impossible to "eliminate" or "correct" even in the era of the unceremonious falsifications of the Stalinist historical school. We are talking about the beginning of Khrushchev's revolutionary career. Of all the members of the Politburo who had been in it before the war, Khrushchev was the only one who joined the party after the Bolshevik revolution. Of all the members of the current "collective leadership" (and perhaps even members of the Central Committee), he is the only one who joined the party so late in age - 24 years old. When the February Revolution took place, he was 23 years old. But he did not join the party, at least the Bolshevik one.

Eight months later, the October Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 took place, but Khrushchev again did not join the Bolshevik Party. Only a year later - in 1918 - at the age of twenty-four, a worker, a locksmith, Khrushchev takes a communist card, which, however, does not bring him much benefit until 1930. In 1918, Khrushchev was

taken into the Red Army, by the end of the war he was a battalion commissar in the Caucasus. But it turned out that this was enough for Khrushchev to write about him in 1938, when Khrushchev became a candidate for the Politburo: "Political enlightenment of the Red Army was carried out by such figures as Lenin, Stalin, Molotov ... Khrushchev." I do not

think that anyone in the Central Committee would have known about the existence of Khrushchev before 1929. An exception, perhaps, is Kaganovich, who until 1928 worked as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party. Khrushchev also worked as secretary of the Maryinsky District Party Committee in Ukraine. But then it is completely incomprehensible why Khrushchev did not make any career with Kaganovich in Ukraine, where

Kaganovich ruled almost uncontrollably. A year after the departure of Kaganovich from Ukraine, Khrushchev decided to arrange his own career himself,

He enters the Industrial Academy. Stalin in Moscow. To enter this "academy" did not require a special "academic qualification". It was enough to be simply literate (subsequently, the almost illiterate, but famous Stakhanov studied there) and the presence of a party card. In high school, Khrushchev studied under Soviet rule (workers' faculty). For a party and state career, even on a medium scale, this was not enough. I had to finish some high school. Such a school was the Industrial Academy.

At the academy, Khrushchev listened, in addition to general education disciplines (mathematics, physics, chemistry, Russian), two more cycles - a general cycle on Marxism-Leninism, which was read by the current secretaries of the Central Committee Suslov and Pospelov, and a special cycle on the organization of industry. Subsequently, the requirements for entering the academy were increased (it was necessary to have a complete secondary education). Accordingly, the academy was supposed to produce people with a higher level of technical knowledge. In addition to the Academy, a

number of provincial academies were created. But even after the reorganization of the academy, not "politicians", but "organizers of technology" were trained. After graduating from these academies, students went to production: to mines, mines, factories, factories - as heads of workshops, departments, sections, and the best of the students - as "red directors". The highest dream in Khrushchev's forthcoming career could only be this last career - the career of a "red director" at some southern factory.

But fate decided otherwise. Khrushchev himself becomes the "leader of the Moscow Bolsheviks" in a year or a year and a half right from school, and after another five or six years he ends up in the Politburo. It was a dizzying, mysterious and unprecedented career for a completely unknown person in the party. At the same time, it seemed inexplicable from the point of view of Khrushchev's own personal qualities.

In Ukraine, Khrushchev could not even make an average career, his personal acquaintance with Kaganovich was, as it was said, very problematic at that time, he stayed at the Academy for only one year. True, he was elected in the very first days as the secretary of the party cell of the Ac

then because, firstly, he was a "proletarian from the machine tool", and secondly, the oldest in age and party experience among her listeners. And as a speaker, he did not differ from others by any advantages, if temperament and activity at all kinds of meetings are not considered an advantage. Being a speaker "on all topics", Khrushchev, however, did not just chatter, as it seemed to many. He was the his first founder of that new school of oratory in Bolshevism, which replaced the old schools: the brilliant Trotsky and the academic Bukharin. Trotsky's speeches, printed without the indication of the speaker, can be recognized without the slightest difficulty precisely as his speeches, as well as Bukharin's writings - as Bukharin's. The styles of other leaders of Bolshevism - Lenin, Lunacharsky, Kamenev, etc. - were just as clearly individual. The new school did not recognize and does not recognize an individual style - the speeches of Molotov, Kaganovich, Khrushchev, Malenkov, Bulganin differ from each other only by the names of their speakers. Bulganin's speech can be attributed with the same justification to Khrushchev as Khrushchev's speech to Malenkov and vice versa. It was a modern new, impersonal, "collective" style with the same vocabulary and the same standard sentences, with an absolute absence of special oratorical devices, ringing phrases, lyrical digressions, and even a personal pronoun. They, in fact, did not speak for themselves or for themselves. These new orators spoke on behalf of the party in general and on behalf of Stalin in particular. Only Stalin retained his individual style, but without much abuse of "lyricism" and without frequent address from his own face. This style of oratory of the Khrushchev school was completely transferred to general journalism. If you take the editorials of various Soviet newspapers - from Pravda and Izvestia to the most provincial leaflets - and analyze them from the point of view of language and style, it will seem to you that they were written by the same person. But this impersonal style is distinguished by one common advantage: for all external verbosity, it is strictly purposeful and hits one point. For all the seeming "general" it is very specific, meaningful, objective. This "publicism" says everything that needs to be said today, and nothing more is said. About the same event inside or outside the country, hundreds

"leaders" of newspapers in Leningrad, Moscow, Vladivostok, Tashkent, Tiflis, etc. will be written at the same time, without saying a word among themselves, hundreds of leading ones, strikingly similar to each other not only in content and language, but even in nuances of thought. Stalinism achieved such a unification of the thoughts of people, different, after all, in their character and individual abilities, precisely through the Khrushchev

school. But Khrushchev was successful as the founder of this new school only after he got to power, and he got to it not by virtue of his oratory. Then what is the reason for his so rapid and mysterious career? A similar question was asked by many of Khrushchev's outflanked competitors and secret envious people in Moscow in the thirties. Asked, but could not find a satisfactory answer to it. Competitors saw in Khrushchev "an accidental upstart", envious people spoke of "accidental happiness." The arguments of the competitors boiled down to a simple formula: "Khrushchev is a man without a face and without a personal 'I.'" But he proved that language can bring not only to Kiev, but also from Kiev to Moscow. The arguments of envious people about "accidental happiness" were less figurative, but hardly more convincing. They revolved mainly around Stalin's wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva. She also studied at the same academy with Khrushchev. Stalin

sometimes made informal visits to the academy or sometimes (during graduations, holidays) received groups of students. He did this not only because his wife studied there, but because of his duties - the academy bore his name and Stalin took personal "patronage" over her. In addition, the academy was considered the first experimental educational institution of this kind and was created by a special decision of the Central Committee on the initiative of the same Stalin. Accordingly, she enjoyed many privileges: the category of "personal registration" of students in the Central Committee ("the nomenclature of the Central Committee"), supply from a special distributor, maintenance of the Kremlin Medical and Sanitary Department, personal vacation vouchers and cash subsidies during vacations through the medical commission of the Central Committee, separate apartments (or rooms), monthly maintenance - the so-called "party maximum" (in the party there was then, without distinction of rank, a "maximum" determined by geographical zones

salary, beyond which no one had the right). In addition, the academy was directly supervised by the country's only "super capitalist" - the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh), who made additional material concessions to his future "red directors". The leaders of the Supreme Council of National Economy, while pleasing the academy, knew that by doing so they were also pleasing the Stalinist family.

Happy was the school where the wife of the "master" himself studied. Not only with the authorities of this school (and Khrushchev, as the secretary of the party cell, was also the "chief"), but also with its ordinary students, all sorts of party sycophants and careerists from higher spheres were considered: after all, this unknown student sits every day on the same training bench with his wife the "owner" himself! What then to say about Khrushchev, who was the direct party "master" of the wife of the supreme "master"! As such, Khrushchev, of course, had access to Stalin's house as well. He was also invited to family holidays in the Kremlin. He introduced into this stuffy official environment, which had become bureaucratic and had long since become detached from the people, a certain fresh "breeze" from the bottom. He brought in his external uncouthness, primacy, "nationality" and a bright practical mind. He was neither a "salon cavalier" nor a court jester - there was no shortage of both in the Kremlin. He was someone who had not been here until now - the first classic representative of the second generation of Bolshevism, aggressively striving for power. This generation did not take part in the October Revolution: some - because of their youth (Malenkov),

others - due to the lack of sufficient political scent at that time (Khrushchev), but on the other hand, it participated in Stalin's party battles against the October generation with the same zeal and without looking back, like that a generation fought on the barricades of October and on the fronts of the civil war against the whites. It acted against Trotsky out of conviction ("live yourself - let others live!"), against Bukharin out of calculation ("you give power").

As a result of the Stalinist victory, the October generation went into circulation; "vacancies" formed at the top, in the Kremlin and around the Kremlin - that's where the second generation of the Khrushchevs climbed. They literally climbed, pushing each other with their elbows, stepping on calluses that were too sensitive, exposing their legs to those who were rushing forward, competing in loud cries in praise of Stalin and not for a single minute

not forgetting the main thing - they are crawling not to Stalin, but to the Stalinist legacy. Here the first representative of this second generation from the "deep bottom" was Khrushchev. His "accidental happiness" boiled down to the fact that Stalin had the opportunity to observe him directly and, studying his personal qualities, discover in him "an outstanding talent as a party organizer."

Khrushchev is not legally responsible for the decision of Stalin's apparatus and the Stalinist Politburo to carry out the "Great Purge" with the physical destruction of "enemies of the people", but he cannot be blamed for "liberalism" in carrying it out. The old Moscow party organization was almost completely destroyed when Khrushchev was its secretary. For this successful operation alone, Stalin appointed Khrushchev as a candidate member of the Politburo three years earlier than even Malenkov, in January 1938. It was in the same January 1938 that Khrushchev was sent to Ukraine as the first secretary of the Party Central Committee to complete the Ukrainian purge. Khrushchev finished it: not only the entire communist, but also the nationally minded intelligentsia of Ukraine was completely destroyed. Stalin did not remain in debt: a year later, in 1939, Khrushchev was transferred from candidate to member of the Politburo, that is, seven years earlier than Malenkov, or almost ten years earlier than Bulganin. Such was Khrushchev's quick, even in Stalin's entourage unprecedented, career. For the first time at the XVII Congress, he got into the Central Committee, and five years later, at the next, XVIII, Congress, he was already appointed a member of the Politburo! Khrushchev's friend of convenience, Mikoyan, was made a member of the Politburo to vote for the purge, and Khrushchev to vote for it. Only this is the difference in the legal responsibility of both for the Stalinist purge of the thirties.

Now Khrushchev, along with the same Mikoyan, is refusing this responsibility. He allegedly said that he was even against the physical destruction of "deviators". Through the mouth of Mikoyan, he rehabilitated right at the XX Congress of his predecessor in Ukraine - a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the VPKB (b) S. Kosior, and through the mouth of Ulbricht - his other predecessor - a candidate member of the Politburo P. Post

The purge, which Khrushchev carried out equally mercilessly in both Moscow and Ukraine, he declares Stalin's arbitrariness. But it seems that Khrushchev's official biographer was right when he wrote<sup>399</sup>: "Khrushchev -

a loyal disciple and ally of Stalin ... He waged a merciless struggle against the Trotskyist-Bukharin gang of enemies

of the people. has not yet refused. A new biographer (or autobiographer) writes<sup>400</sup>: "Khrushchev is Lenin's faithful disciple and one of Stalin's closest comrades-in-arms." write in the Soviet encyclopedia - "the encyclopedia of lies in alphabetical order," as the Voice of America radio aptly called it. Khrushchev's military and post-war career was uneven. - still was not included in the State Defense Committee, not only at the first stage of the war, but throughout the war, although it included non-members of the Politburo Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Voznesensky and members of the Politburo

Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Mikoyan. He was also not promoted in the military rank. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1942 and remained with him until the end of the war, although the same political lieutenant generals like him - Zhdanov, Mekhlis, Shcherbakov - were promoted to colonel general, and Bulganin even to marshals . ITU 399, vol. XI, pp. 493-494. 400Encyclopedic Dictionary. 1955, vol. III, p. 567. After the war, Stalin gave him a surprise - he was removed from the leading post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine and appointed to the subordinate post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine (March - December 1947) - General Secretary over him was appointed Kaganovich. Khrushchev

returned to the starting

position of his initial career - he began it under the

leadership of Kaganovich and now had to either end it or start it again under the same Kaganovich. But Khrushchev, as always, was lucky; Stalin changed his anger to mercy: Khrushchev was reinstated in his old position, and Kaganovich was removed back to Moscow. In December 1949, Khrushchev was also taken to Moscow as secretary of the MK and the Central Committee of the CPSU. He held this post until Stalin's death. The events that took place around the death of Stalin and the destruction of Beria put forward

him to the fore. His leading participation in these events is beyond doubt. In the destruction of the "Inner Cabinet" of Stalin, headed by Poskrebyshev, and the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, headed by Beria, Khrushchev played a major role, if only because at that time he was actually the first secretary of the Central Committee (legally since September 1953) and held the entire apparatus in his hands Central Committee, and therefore, the reorganized internal protection of the Kremlin. In addition to all this, Khrushchev was truly the "lucky one" who opened Stalin's secret archive and is now holding it in his hands - denunciations of Stalin's spies against Politburo members, denunciations of Politburo members against each other, Stalin's characteristics of these same members, plans for purges and "physical liquidation", etc. Khrushchev has something to expose. In this regard, the fate of any member of the Presidium of the Central Committee is in his hands. Let them try

to be brave! It can be assumed that this "personal archive of Stalin" also played a role in exposing the "father of peoples." Khrushchev is a psychologically extremely complex type with apparent outward simplicity. Stalin's death was necessary for him to unfold in all his contradictory diversity. Its potential, held back by the iron grip of Stalinism and the wayward will of the dictator, is only now showing itself. Khrushchev is the only person even in the "collective leadership" who has acquired inner freedom of thought and action. In doing so, he dealt a painful blow to the golden rule of Stalinist diplomacy - "don't say what you think, and don't think what you say." Vyshinsky's Pharisaic formulas and Molotov's standard chewing gum in the Kremlin's international diplomacy he countered to the point of nakedness with the naked style of a practical cynic - "of course, we are enemies to each other, but let's trade - trade in politics, trade in economics, trade even in conscience." And after Stalin's diplomacy immediately broke the deadlock: Korea, Indochina, Yugoslavia, Austria, Geneva, India, Burma; Afghanistan, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, this is only the first stage of Khrushchev's promising "trade". Khrushchev, of

course, does not trade in principles, but trades in Molotov's stupidity and Stalin's adventurism. Trades in the negative capital of Stalinist diplomacy. Trades time for space. At the same time, he knows well not only himself, his strengths and capabilities,



but also those with whom he trades - he trades in the fear of war of foreign peoples in exchange for concessions of foreign governments. This is where Stalin's negative capital comes

in handy. Many people abroad are very skeptical about Khrushchev as a "diplomat". Of course, Khrushchev is not Talleyrand and not even Litvinov. He is yesterday's shepherd, who now stands at the head of the greatest of states. The etiquette of diplomatic protocol is as alien to him as the exquisite formulas of verbal tightrope walking, say, of the same Vyshinsky are alien. To the cynical age, he offers a cynical formula: "You don't like communism, we don't like capitalism, but why fight, we'll bury you without war, and now let's trade!" This, of course, cuts the ear and does not honor classical diplomacy, but why should this cause surprise or even indignation at Khrushchev's "undiplomacy"? A politician who betrays his true (albeit terrible) intentions to you deserves not outrage, but recognition. The commander of the Red Army, who announced his strategic plans in advance, would have been hanged by the same Khrushchev, but Khrushchev, who, even after the death of Stalin, repeats the old unchanging truth - our goal was, is and will be world communism - deserves recognition. Of course, the world needs another illusion - "the era of Stalin is over and the Kremlin's goals may change." Khrushchev was able to take advantage of this illusion to his own advantage. Stalin in his best years would have used (and used) such an illusion classically, but Khrushchev acted this time in his own way - he saved the world from an illusion dangerous for him, many promise Khrushchev a failure - he is too "active", self-confident, maybe , even

aspires to new Stalins. But it has already lasted more than three years, and without these qualities, it probably

would not have lasted even three days. Khrushchev's self-confidence and inner freedom are far from

being based on his personal qualities alone, but on quantities that defy our calculation. Whatever happened to him next, but in one he immortalized his name in history: in just three hours, he buried the one who had been created the authority of a communist demigod for three decades. There can be no doubt for a moment that it was not only his initiative, but

and purely his, Khrushchev's, style of reprisals: impudent and autocratic, defiant and self-confident, revolutionary and demagogic. It seemed (it seems even now) that this was the greatest risk for communism itself, without any apparent "state reason". The risk was not that Stalin might have supporters in the Stalinist party, not to mention the anti-Stalinist peoples of the USSR, the risk was different - how can one anathematize Stalin, being forced to follow the Stalinist path? The Molotov group understood this well and therefore resisted the debunking of Stalin for

a long time, but Khrushchev did not take this into account either. The advantages were too obvious: "I am not Stalin. I am looking for "coexistence" not only and perhaps not so much with the outside world, but with the peoples of the country.

The main thing is that I know the burning hatred of the peoples for the Stalinist regime, by exposing Stalin, I am saving this same regime. " Of course, Khrushchev knew that the natural question would follow immediately: "What did you, disciples and comrades of Stalin, do?" That such a question would be asked from the outside world, he was extremely indifferent, and to his people and party he answered with inimitable sincerity and with the same persuasiveness: "We, just like you, were afraid of him!"

Khrushchev will gain complete freedom of action if he succeeds in remove the Molotovites from the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Strong-willed, temperamental, internally free from the dogmatic shackles of his own ideology, he is inclined to experiment in politics in order to outwit history.

The first experiment of world-historical significance was carried out by Khrushchev on the "cult of Stalin." Khrushchev's goal was the de-Stalinization of methods and forms, but not the essence of the system, the debunking of the individual, but not the elimination of practice, the burning of the symbol, but not the revision of the doctrine. In a word, cursing Stalin as a person, follow the Stalinist

way as a teacher- This is the cardinal contradiction in exposing Stalin. This contradiction cannot

be resolved by Khrushchev's hands and within the framework of the existing system, because Khrushchev's rule itself - the rule of "enlightened Stalinism" - is transitional: either back to

classical Stalinism, and then the rehabilitation of all methods in politics, economics and ideology is inevitable; or forward against Stalinism, but then it is necessary to allow minimum spiritual freedoms in a country of solid literacy, multi-million intelligentsia and a high level of science and technology. There is no third way. Two extremes coexist freely in Khrushchev's character: he is a great opportunist and an unlucky extremist. A clear imprint of this duality lies on the whole of Soviet policy. The difficulty in understanding this policy lies precisely in the fact that you do not know with whom you will be dealing tomorrow - with Khrushchev the opportunist or with Khrushchev the extremist.

Foreigners who meet him in the Kremlin certify him as a great statesman. The high society ladies who saw him are directly in awe of him - Eleanor Roosevelt, for example, thinks that if Khrushchev lived in America, he would be a very rich man, and Elizabeth Taylor from Hollywood even expressed confidence that if Russia declared free elections, then the first secretary would be elected the first president. I think Ms. Taylor is a big optimist.

#### epilogue

### REVOLUTION IN THE

KREMLIN This work was already ready, when a new event took place in the Kremlin, the June plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1957 expelled Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov from the Presidium and from the Central Committee.

Khrushchev's "June coup" will play a crucial role in the further development of the regime. From everything that I have told throughout this book, even an uninformed reader could easily see that without Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov, Stalin would never have reached the pinnacle of power to which the dictator had risen in the pre-war years. By exposing the dead Stalin, Khrushchev was just exposing these still living creators of Stalin. Therefore, it is quite natural that the first secretary met with both hidden and open rebuff on their part when he went too far. They say: didn't Khrushchev, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Shvernik, Kuusinen, Suslov and others themselves take part in the creation of Stalin and in Stalin's crimes?

Such a seemingly concrete formulation of the question is, after all, historically abstract and politically pointless. Of course, there is not a single person in the current Presidium of the Central Committee who would not take part either physically or morally in Stalin's crimes. Not the degree, but the nature and scale of this participation were different. At the time when Stalin, relying on Molotov and Kaganovich, created the CPSU, Khrushchev was a student, Suslov was a teacher, and 80 percent of the current members of the Central Committee were not yet members of the party. This first

period of Stalin's ascension to power ended in 1930 (XVI Congress) with the complete political liquidation of Lenin's old guard. Now only Stalin received official recognition as the sole

leader of the party, Molotov became the head of government, and Kaganovich became the second secretary of the Central Committee after Stalin. From leadership to dictator, it was still necessary to go through the second stage (1930-1934), when the "troika" began preparations for the liquidation of Lenin's party itself as a political force over its own apparatus. There is no need to repeat here what has been described in detail on this subject in the previous presentation. Let us only note that even in this most crucial period of preparation for a one-man dictatorship, Molotov remains Stalin's right hand, and Kaganovich's left hand. However, during this period it often happened that Stalin worked much better with his "left" hand than with his "right" one. The ossified, as if hereditarily bureaucratic, brain of Molotov (Molotov is the son of an official) was always devoid of "creative imagination". As a "screen", a tool and a scrupulous executor of someone else's will, he, of course, was simply irreplaceable and Stalin did not replace him.

Only in the third period (1934-1939), at the 17th Party Congress (1934), called the "Congress of Victors" by Stalinist historians, Khrushchev and Bulganin were among the "winners" for the first time: the first - as a member of the Central Committee, and the second - as a candidate. Of these winners, the "troika", which by that time had become the "four" (Stalin - Molotov - Kaganovich - Malenkov) arrested and shot about sixty percent of the congress delegates and 70 percent of the members and candidates of the Central Committee. Among the few left were Khrushchev and Bulganin. That is why the Khrushchevs and Bulganins, and even more so the Suslovs and Belyaevs, counted on their alibis and, if necessary, were able to prove

the famous "Yezhov lists" for the purge and extrajudicial execution of party, state and military figures were signed not only by Stalin alone (as Khrushchev reported at the 20th Congress), but also by Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov. Of course, Khrushchev was

also not idle in his areas. That is why Khrushchev does not renounce all of Stalin. From here he had to invent the theory of "two Stalins". "Stalin is anti-Leninist" - that Stalin, in whose crimes Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Beria participated; "Stalin Lenin" - that Stalin, in whose crimes we participated Khrushchev, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Shvernik and Mikoyan. Therefore, giving a general assessment of Stalin, after the liquidation of the Molotov group, Khrushchev says:

"We were sincere in our respect for Stalin when we cried standing at his coffin. We are sincere even now in assessing his positive role ... Each of us believed Stalin, this faith was based on the conviction that the work that we did together with Stalin, was committed in the interests of the revolution... We all resolutely condemn Stalin for those gross mistakes and perversions that inflicted serious damage on the cause of the Party, the cause of the people. We have lost many honest and devoted people, workers of our Party and the Soviet state, slandered and innocently victims"<sup>401</sup>. Elsewhere: "In order to correctly understand the essence of party criticism of the cult of personality, one must deeply realize that we see two sides in the activities of Comrade Stalin: a positive one, which we support and highly appreciate, and a negative one, which we criticize, condemn and reject"<sup>402</sup>. This "positive side" of "Leninist Stalin" includes, according to Khrushchev, the struggle of Stalin and the Stalinists against "Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites and bourgeois nationalists." But even here Khrushchev puts forward a new meaningful formulation:

"It was a political struggle. The Party did the right thing by exposing them as opponents of Leninism, opponents of socialist construction in our country. Politically they have been condemned, and condemned correctly."

But the question arises: were they condemned only "politically" as "opponents of Leninism"? Were they not condemned as "enemies

people" as "saboteurs", "saboteurs", "spies" and "murderers"? Was this judicial and criminal conviction correct?

Further. Who is responsible for the terror that has existed in the party and the country since Khrushchev himself became a member of the Politburo? After all, only then were Kosior, Chubar, Eikhe, Rudzutak (1939-1940) or Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov (1949) shot dead? And here

Khrushchev has a ready answer: "Stalin's personal shortcomings were used to the detriment of our cause by the sworn enemy of the party and the people, the provocateur Beria. Much of the blame in this matter lies with Comrade

Malenkov, who fell under the full influence of Beria, was his shadow, was his tool in

the hands of Beria"<sup>403</sup>. In vain we will ask Khrushchev why it is Beria, who became a member of the Politburo seven years later than Khrushchev, or Malenkov, who became a member of the Politburo nine years later, should be more responsible for the crimes of the Stalinist Politburo and Stalin than Khrushchev? Much more convincing is Khrushchev's old answer to such questions: "We were afraid of him!" Or Bulganin's sighs: "Oh, you're going to see Stalin as a friend, but you don't know where you'll get from him - home or to prison!" Or more obsequious phone calls to Stalin's Secretariat by Politburo member Voroshilov: "Please, ask Comrade Stalin if I can attend a meeting of the Politburo?" After all, Khrushchev himself told the delegates of the

XX century about all this.  
congress.

Let us now turn to the accusations that Khrushchev made against Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov in the resolution of the June plenum of the Central Committee of 1957. Before starting a concrete analysis of the accusations themselves, the following should be noted: 1) we are completely unaware of the counter-accusations and counter-arguments of the Molotov group against Khrushchev; 2) some of Khrushchev's accusations against the Molotov group say not so much what Khrushchev himself is going to do, but Khrushchev wants to formulate and propagandize the mood of the party and popular masses, dissatisfied with Stalin's methods of government; 3) while still under the shock of those cruel personal accusations that his opponents openly laid out against

him at the plenum of the Central Committee and who were probably not without internal persuasiveness from the point of view of the interests of the regime, Khrushchev will have to be careful in his further "experiments" for a long time to come; 4) the presence in the Presidium of the Central Committee of Voroshilov, an old friend of Stalin and one of the creators of the "cult of Stalin", as well as the presence of the Stalinists Shvernik, Kuusinen, Suslov, Pospelov and Mikoyan there will act for the time being "restraining" on a more consistent destruction of the "cult of Stalin"

"Khrushchev. If we approach the resolution of the June plenum of the Central Committee from a formally legal point of view, then we have to state: 1) despite the verbosity,

the document bears , p. 20. general  
abstract character,  
and severe

accusations are completely unreasoned; 2) there is a clear imprint of improvisation, haste when compiling a document, when the document has neither a logical sequence, nor even a single style sustained to the end (jumping from one point to another, frequent repetitions of the same accusations in different places; 3) unlike the previous practice of "exposing anti-party groups", the resolution says what the members of the group did not agree with, but does not say anything about what positive measures they proposed; 4) the resolution states that all of its members voted for the exclusion from the Central Committee of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Shepilov, "with one abstention - in the person of Comrade Molotov", that is, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov voted for their exclusion from the Central Committee. (Although under Stalin all the defendants eventually confessed their guilt to him, they never voted for a political death sentence against themselves, but under Khrushchev they are already voting); 5) with the exception of members of the Central Committee and members of the Presidium of the Central Committee under Khrushchev, not only the members of the Central Committee vote, but, it turns out, the candidates of the Central Committee, who, according to the charter of the party, have only an advisory vote, and even members of the Central Audit Commission, who, according to the same charter, do not have and advisory vote at the plenum of the Central Committee<sup>404</sup>.

Let's move on to the substance of the accusations. Main charges boil down to the

following: In domestic

policy: 1. The members of the group "over the course of 3-4 years", that is, from the day of Stalin's death, "provided direct and indirect opposition to the course approved by the 20th Congress", in particular against "correcting mistakes and shortcomings, born of the cult of personality. 2. "They were against the expansion of the rights of the union republics..." 3. "The anti-party group resisted the party's measures to combat bureaucracy... This group stubbornly resisted and tried to disrupt such an important event as the reorganization of industrial management, the creation of economic councils in economic regions ..." 4. "They did not recognize the need to strengthen the material interest of the collective farm peasantry in expanding the production of agricultural products ... They objected to

the abolition of the old, bureaucratic planning procedure in collective farms and the introduction of a new planning procedure ... The members of the anti-party group opposed the abolition of the mandatory delivery of agricultural products from the yards of collective farmers ... 5. "They fought against the call of the party - to catch up with the United States in the coming years in the production of milk, butter and meat per capita In this way, the members of the anti-party group demonstrated a lordly disdain for the vital vital interests of the broad masses of the people." 6. "comrade Molotov, showing conservatism and inertia, resisted the cause of raising 35 million hectares of virgin land..." personality cult..."

In foreign policy: 1. "In the field of foreign policy, this group, especially Comrade Molotov, showed inertia and interfered in every possible way with the implementation of urgent new measures designed to ease international tension..." 2. "comrade. Molotov repeatedly spoke out against the

measures taken by the Presidium of the Central Committee to improve relations with Yugoslavia. 3. "Comrade Molotov hampered the conclusion of a state treaty with



Austria ... He was also against the normalization of relations with Japan ... "4. "He opposed the fundamental provisions developed by the party on the possibility of preventing wars in modern conditions, on the possibility of various paths to socialism in different countries, on the need to strengthen contacts between leading leaders of the USSR and statesmen of other countries, which is necessary in the interests of achieving mutual understanding and improving international relations. "5. "On many of these issues, Comrade Molotov's opinion was supported by Comrade Kaganovich, and in a number of cases by Comrade Malenkov."

The resolution sees the origin, the source of such a position of the Molotov group in the fact that "comrades Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov were and are captive to old ideas and methods, they do not see new conditions, a new situation,

they show conservatism, stubbornly cling to obsolete ones. ... forms and methods of work, rejecting what is born in life and stems from the interests of the development of Soviet society ... Both in matters of internal and in matters of foreign policy, they are sectarians and dogmatists "... (quoted everywhere from the "Decree of the Plenum Central Committee of the CPSU on the anti-party group of G. M. Malenkov, L. M. Kaganovich, V. M. Molotov, journal "Questions of the History of the CPSU", No 1, 1957, pp. 4-7). The resolution notes that Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov not only waged a struggle within the Presidium of the Central Committee for their line, but "they resorted to intriguing methods and arranged a secret conspiracy against the Central Committee" (ibid., p. 7). They were joined by the former short-term foreign minister and secretary of the Central Committee for ideology Shepilov.

What this "secret conspiracy" consists of, how wide was its circle, except for the named persons, and what forces they were guided by, the resolution does not say. But the "plenum of the Central Committee" solemnly praises itself: "The plenum of the Central Committee notes with great satisfaction the monolithic unity and solidarity of all members and candidate members of the Central Committee, members of the Central Auditing Commission, who unanimously condemned the anti-party group. There was not a single person in the plenum of the Central Committee who would support this group" (ibid., p. 7). The resolution does not say a word about the speeches at the plenum itself by the members of the Molotov group, as if they did not

case, it is not even clear why the plenum lasted for seven days! However, the resolution alludes to one of their speeches, namely, at the end of the plenum. The resolution notes: "Faced with a unanimous condemnation by the plenum of the Central Committee of the anti-Party activities of the group, when the members of the Central Committee unanimously demanded the withdrawal of the members of the group from the Central Committee and expulsion from the Party, they recognized the existence of conspiracy, the harmfulness of their anti-Party activities, pledged to obey the decisions of the Party" (ibid., p. 7-8). And yet, Khrushchev removed them not only from the Presidium of the Central Committee, but also expelled them from the composition of the Central Committee in general. Moreover, Khrushchev considers it important to emphasize that this decision was "adopted unanimously" and the word "unanimously" or "unanimously" is repeated seven times in the final three paragraphs of the resolution.

Let's believe Khrushchev that Molotov and the Molotovites recognized "the harmfulness of their anti-party activities and pledged to obey the decisions of the party", but then how can the act of the head of the group,

Molotov, who "abstains from voting", breaking such a unanimous idyll at such a "monolithic" meeting, be reconciled with this? ? It's clearly not making ends meet. Stalin was a more skillful director in such cases! The Khrushchevs may say that we condemn Stalin's methods and do not force people to engage in "humiliating self-flagellation". But "self-flagellation" of dogmatists and "schismatics" would be a more convincing argument than Khrushchev's repeated "unanimity" with himself ... However, if we talk about "Stalin's methods" of reprisals against their opponents, they still look more "democratic" than Khrushchev's modernized Stalinism. The Trotskyists had the opportunity to

speak openly with their counter-theses against Stalin in the pages of Pravda. Zinoviev delivered a counter-report against Stalin at the Fourteenth Party Congress. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky openly expressed their views both in the "Platforms" and in speeches at the plenums and for a long time had the right to be in the Central Committee and in the party, not agreeing with Stalin. Meanwhile, the party had been discussing their programs for months, even years, until the next congress (and not the plenum of the Central Committee!) did not decide "on the incompatibility of propaganda of their views with belonging to the party", but Khrushchev, in a narrow circle

of his apparatchiks, without asking for the so-called party, in seven days he decides the fate of the people who created Khrushchev himself and this "wise and great party."

Let us dwell on the three main points of accusations against the Molotov group: 1) the group opposed the easing of international tension; 2) the group opposed the debunking of Stalin and for Stalin's methods of government; 3) the group opposed raising the living standard of the population.

If the group opposed all this, and Khrushchev's leadership condemns such a policy, then this should automatically mean that Khrushchev: 1) stands for the normalization of international relations; 2) intensifies the course towards the further debunking of Stalin and abandons the Stalinist methods of government; 3) reconsider the Stalinist economic policy of "predominant development of heavy industry" as the foundation of the Soviet economy, and restore the normal proportion in the financing of heavy, light and food industries. Is all this happening? Has anything changed

anything in the foreign and domestic policy of the Kremlin since the Molotovites were expelled from there? In foreign policy, Molotov's course remains absolutely intact for the time being. Even more, certain factors speak for the fact that this course tends to return Soviet foreign policy to its original position - to the "pure methods" of the Stalin era. The new leadership of the Kremlin continues Molotov's policy more consistently than Molotov himself. Even more blatant, perhaps, is the fact that the Kremlin's foreign policy is still symbolized in the face of that gloomy man who happily combines the three qualities of the three founders of Moscow's current foreign policy - the stubbornness of Molotov, the hypocrisy of Vyshinsky, and the absolute immorality of Stalin - in Gromyko. Even the phonetic sound of this name leads to sad reflections: "Gromyko" means "thunder", "smash"! Of course, he is not a minister in the usual sense of the word, but only Khrushchev's "diplomatic courier", but a courier of "thunderous news" ... But what about the "Stalinist methods" or, as the resolution puts it, with "outdated methods and forms"?

Like us

we saw that the "outdated methods" were first of all applied to the Molotovites themselves. Then came the turn of the potentially most dangerous part of the intelligentsia population, especially the artistic intelligentsia. "Exposing" Molotov's group and "Shepilov, who joined it," Khrushchev's life organ, the Kommunist magazine, wrote that Shepilov, speaking as secretary of the Central Committee at congresses of artists and composers of the USSR and at a solemn meeting in Moscow on the day of the 86th anniversary Lenin's birth, preached a line that contradicted the decisions of the 20th Congress and the policy of the Central Committee.

What was Shepilov's "special" line? We will answer with the words of the magazine itself: "Being in charge of the ideological field, Shepilov deceived the confidence of the Central Committee. embarked on the path of flirting with demagogues, tried to promote a platform "wider" than the party one... The general tone of his speeches is sustained in a liberal spirit"<sup>405</sup>! The editorial of Kommunist is especially indignant at <sup>405</sup> Kommunist, 1957, No 10, editorial. by the fact that Shepilov, in order to substantiate his "liberal policy",

resorts to Lenin, "pulling out of the context (of Lenin) the necessary quotation". One of these quotations, which Shepilov "pulled" from Lenin, reads: "It is absolutely necessary to provide a large scope for personal initiative, individual inclinations, scope for thought and fantasy, form and content"<sup>406</sup>. After quoting this Leninist quotation from Shepilov, Kommunist exclaims: "And further, not a word. Shepilov did not reproduce a single thought of Lenin on questions of literature and art." It turns out that Shepilov should have cited not this quotation, but another, which speaks of "party spirit in literature." In other words, to reproduce the full text of the Stalinist-Zhdanov decrees on literature and art of 1946-1948, when the "Zhdanov purge" against "cosmopolitans" and "low worshipers" began. The magazine writes:

"In a speech at the congress of composers, Shepilov mentioned these resolutions. But how? Only in passing, only in the order of enumeration, did he name some of the problems posed in these documents.

even here he did not mention the Leninist principle of party membership, which permeates all these documents "407.

Any sane person will agree that here the organ of the Central Committee accuses its former leader of the fact and only that he opposed the Zhdanov-Stalinist methods in literary criticism and practice, which were condemned not only by the 20th Congress, but also by the same "Kommunist" in his post-Congress articles (see above the chapter "The Fate of Stalinism in the USSR"). members of the Presidium of the Central Committee passes first through the censorship of the Secretariat and the Presidium of the Central Committee! So what's the matter, why did the Central Committee (Khrushchev) not throw out anti-Stalinist, "liberal" heresies from Shepilov's reports? In general, how could Shepilov find himself in the Molotov group if he was a "liberal"?

As for the accusation against the Molotovites that they held on to the "cult of Stalin's personality", here the situation is more than strange. Stalin, who was scolded at the 20th Congress, Stalin, whom Lenin proposed to remove from the Central Committee, has not yet been removed from

Lenin's mausoleum. Countless 406 Levin, vol. 10, p. 28; see

Kommunist, *ibid.*, p. 17. 407 Kommunist,

*ibid.*, pp. 16-17. towns and villages, factories and factories, collective farms and schools are still "famous" for the name of Stalin. Even the "Stalin Prizes", renamed "Lenin Prizes" under the Molotovites, were rehabilitated just after the elimination of the admirers of the Stalinist cult. In a speech published in Kommunist and later reprinted in Pravda, Khrushchev, with his characteristic frankness,

declares:

"I think that it is necessary ... to proudly wear the badge of honor of the laureate of the Stalin Prize. If I had the Stalin Prize, then I would wear the badge of honor of the laureate"408.

Of the internal tasks of the regime, agriculture still remains the most difficult problem. Here Khrushchev gave the people such far-reaching promises, fixed in the specific obligations of all the union republics, that their fulfillment for him becomes not only a matter of personal prestige, but also a general test of the correctness of his own policy against the newly isolated, but far from liquidated group.

Therefore, Khrushchev again returned to this issue after the June plenum of the Central Committee and promised to radically put an end to the old Stalinist practice in agriculture, giving scope to the peasants' intra-collective farm initiative. Moreover, Khrushchev's memories of the old practice were so depressing that it is worth listening to them. Khrushchev says:

"Why, then, did our agriculture seriously lag behind for a long time? This happened because no one in the center really wanted to deal with the situation on the ground. Stalin, as you know, did not go anywhere, did not consult with agricultural workers, to the voice of local workers did not listen ... The principle of the material interest of collective farmers was grossly violated ... Let me give at least such examples. Shortly after the end of the war, I went to the village where I was born, there I went to my cousin. She had a garden. I said to her: You have wonderful apple trees." She replied: "I'll cut them down in the fall. Why?" I asked. "You have to pay big taxes," she said.

have a garden.

I told JV Stalin about this conversation, soob 408  
Kommunist, 1957, No 12, p. 21. I told  
him that the collective farmers were cutting gardens. And he later told me that I was a Narodnik, that I had a Narodnik approach, that I was losing my proletarian class instinct. Another example... We sent thousands of people from the cities to harvest potatoes on collective farms, at a time when the collective farmers themselves did not participate in the harvest. Why didn't the collective farmers want to work in the potato harvest? Because when harvesting potatoes, they were paid extremely low prices. One delivery of potatoes to the procurement point cost the collective farm more than what he received for it"409.

The June coup also sheds some light on the balance of power at the top of the Kremlin after the war and after Stalin's death. Let's dwell on this side of the issue. After the war, apparently, Zhdanov had the greatest chance of being among the members of the Politburo to become Stalin's heirs. But since Malenkov was introduced to the Politburo (1946), the place of the heir has become controversial, especially since

Zhdanov was only in charge of propaganda, and Malenkov was still in charge of the party cadres. The dull struggle that began between the two applicants went on with varying degrees of success. Stalin needed both of them, and precisely as rivals. After all, they competed not with Stalin, but among themselves because of the same Stalin - who and how is most consistently able to understand and implement the will of the dictator. But at that moment, when it seemed that Stalin had finally chosen Zhdanov, an unexpected denouement came: Zhdanov died. True, Stalin later thought that this denouement was foreseen and prepared ("The Doctors' Case"). But after the death of Zhdanov, Stalin himself, if not organizing, then authorizes the liquidation of the Zhdanovites ("Leningr

Why did Stalin go for it? The answer given by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress reads: "The rise of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov alarmed Beria. As we have now proved, it was Beria who" suggested "to Stalin that he, Beria, would fabricate materials with his accomplices ... Stalin personally watched" Leningrad case "... When Stalin received materials from Beria and Abakumov, he, without reviewing these slanderous materials, ordered to stop further investigation of the" case "of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov. This sealed their fate"410. 409Ibid. 410N.

S. Khrushchev. "Report  
at a closed

meeting of the XX Congress of the CPSU", pp. 41-42. After  
the June plenum

of the Central Committee, Khrushchev gave a different answer. In one of his speeches in Leningrad, he declares: "Malenkov, who was one of the most important organizers (*italics mine*. - A. A.) of the so-called "Leningrad case ", was simply afraid to come here to you" ("Pravda", No. 188, 7/7/1957). But some time after this speech, Khrushchev talks with one of the leaders of the British Labor Party, E. Beavan, and tells the latter the circumstances under which Voznesensky was destroyed. Here is Khrushchev's story, as recounted by Beavan: "At the end of the war, members of the Politburo undertook a study of the Soviet economy for future planning purposes. The results of this study convinced them that private initiative should be allowed in many areas. They worked out their plan and sent Voznesensky, head of economic planning , explain it to Stalin. Returning, Voznesensky said that

Stalin attacked him and called him a traitor to socialism. This angered the members of the Politburo, since Voznesensky did only what he was instructed to do. The next day, members of the Politburo came to Stalin and told him that it was their collective plan, not Voznesensky's, that he, Stalin, had been unfair to Voznesensky and should apologize to him. "I can't," said Stalin, "he was shot this morning."<sup>411</sup> Summing up Stalin's crimes, Khrushchev said at the 20th Congress

that no one else, and Beria, pushed Stalin into these crimes, and that at that time it was impossible to expose Beria, since he knew how to use Stalin's confidence and weaknesses. Khrushchev argued: "The question arises why Beria, who liquidated tens of thousands of party and Soviet workers, was not exposed during Stalin's lifetime? He was not exposed earlier because he very cleverly used Stalin's weaknesses: inciting his suspicion, he helped Stalin in everything and acted with his support"<sup>412</sup> (italics mine. - A. A.) Returning to the same question - to the question of the main culprit of Stalin's crimes - after the June plenum of the Central

Committee, Khrushchev speaks, although in almost the same words, but about a different person. Khrushchev asserts: "Occupying <sup>411</sup>" NOD ", 10.1.1958. <sup>412</sup> N. S Khrushchev. "Report at a closed meeting of the XX

Congress of the

CPSU", p. 48. Comrade Malenkov not only did not restrain I.

V "Stalin, but

very cleverly took advantage of Stalin's weaknesses and habits in the last years of his life. In many cases, he pushed him to such actions that deserve severe condemnation" <sup>413</sup> (italics mine. - A. A.). Which of these statements is correct? Probably both are correct, for one does not exclude the other. But the reasons why these two, and not the other members of the Politburo, exercised such power under Stalin are plainly misrepresented. Of course, their personal qualities had their value. However, what they achieved with these qualities both for Stalin and for all other members of the Politburo was even more important: one created and held in his hands the party apparatus (Malenkov), the other improved and held in his hands the police apparatus



(Beria). Not as cunning combinators and refined intriguers, they held on to "weak Stalin" (in this regard, it was generally impossible to "outwit" the teacher), but Stalin himself held on to the harmonious interaction of these two apparatuses and their drivers. If at the same time "tens of thousands of party and Soviet workers" were destroyed, not to mention millions of non-party citizens, then this was also done in the interests of the system, and not just Beria or Malenkov. But from Khrushchev's statement that "Malenkov not only did not restrain, but even pushed Stalin" to commit crimes, another important conclusion follows: Malenkov became the leading force in the entire system, which even Stalin had to reckon with! This was noticed before everyone else by B.I. Nikolaevsky.

Objective facts, which previously were not given much importance, now, in the light of Khrushchev's statement, acquire a new meaning and confirm his own conclusion. These facts are as follows: 1) after the death of Zhdanov and the liquidation of the Zhdanovites, Malenkov becomes the second secretary of the Central Committee after Stalin (1949); 2) shortly after that, he also became Stalin's deputy in the government (1950); 3) at the 19th Congress of the CPSU, the "political report" of the Central Committee of the CPSU is made not by Stalin, but by Malenkov; 4) at the first plenum of the Central Committee after the 19th Congress, instead of the narrow Politburo, an expanded Presidium of the Central Committee of 25 people is created, of which 15 people are direct

students of Malenkov (early 413 N.S. Khrushchev. "For the close connection of literature and life", Kommunist, 1957, No 12, p. 20).

Khrushchev attributed the creation of this Presidium to Stalin's evil intent, but now he cannot attribute the same to Malenkov, since all these "Malenkovites" have now gone over to Khrushchev) 5) at the same plenum, Stalin was relieved of the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee, leaving only one of the secretaries, and Malenkov actually became the first secretary of the Central Committee (see above: "Preparation for a new purge and the mystery of Stalin's

death"). If it must be considered absolutely indisputable that Malenkov became the leading member of the Politburo after Stalin, then it is just as categorically impossible to assert that Malenkov was designated as "heir" by Stalin himself. True, Khrushchev does not directly state this, but he wants to create just such an impression. objective

Again, the facts speak for the fact that Malenkov, after Stalin's death, found himself at the head of the party and the state, not according to Stalin's "testament" (if he managed to draw up one at all), but quite automatically, as the first secretary of the Central Committee. It is true that the Presidium of the Central Committee of the 19th Congress was dispersed and a new narrow Presidium was created consisting of the same old members of the Politburo with minor changes, but the correlation of forces within the Presidium, the place of each member of the Presidium in the general pyramid of power remained almost the same as before Stalin's death. In fact, let's compare these data to make sure of what has been said. It is known that before Stalin's death they did not recognize any alphabet in the representation of the members of the Politburo, if they wanted to indicate the place that this or that member of the Politburo occupies in the pyramid of power. Here we have two documents: the issue of the Pravda newspaper dated December 21, 1949, in which the "jubilee articles" of all members of the Politburo in connection with Stalin's seventieth birthday are printed, and the issue of the same Pravda dated March 7, 1953, in which the list of members of the new Presidium of the Central Committee.

In both cases, the names are printed not in alphabetical order, but in the order of the "cult of personality", that is, in order of importance.  
every name.

List of "Pravda" December 21, 1949: Malenkov

Molotov

Beria

Voroshilov

Mikoyan

Kaganovich

7. Bulganin

8. Andreev

9.

Khrushchev

10. Kosygin List of "Pravda" March 7, 1953:

Malenkov

Beria

Molotov

Voroshilov

Khrushchev

Kaganovich

Bulganin

Mikoyan

Pervukhin

10. Saburov

This comparison shows that after Stalin's death there was a very slight movement of forces in the old Politburo. Malenkov remained in his place, Beria and Molotov "exchanged" places, Khrushchev, who under Stalin occupied the penultimate, ninth place (I must say, a very dangerous place in terms of "purge laws"), moved to fifth place, displacing Mikoyan from there to eighth place. Andreev and Kosygin were expelled at the first plenum of the Central Committee of the 19th Congress. Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Bulganin remained in their places. We have the right to ask Khrushchev why Malenkov and Beria ended up in the same places in the pyramid of power after Stalin's death? Whose "weaknesses" did they use now? Obviously, this time they took advantage of the "weaknesses" of all the other members of the Politburo, who had only well-known names, but no apparatus of power. The situation was so painful for these latter that they did not dare to raise the question of vital importance for them: the question of "collective leadership." The Politburo always had an odd number of members) for the case when controversial issues in the Presidium of the Central Committee have to be decided by a majority of votes.

At that stage, this was not necessary. All power was in the hands of the party apparatus (Malenkov) and the police (Beria). Moreover, the same Beria was appointed the first of Malenkov's "first deputies" in the government. But this stage lasted only exactly one week. On March 14, 1953, Malenkov "asked" to be relieved of his post as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and for the first time spoke of "collective leadership." This was the beginning of the end for both Malenkov and Beria. Khrushchev became acting first secretary and prepared the liquidation of Beria in order to more easily liquidate Malenkov himself. Khrushchev and others probably managed to convince Malenkov that Beria was aiming for his place and wanted to

"put the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the party and the government." Malenkov, who so bluntly lost his own party apparatus from his hands, now equally bluntly sacrificed the police apparatus - he agreed with the liquidation of Beria and his group. He also reported on this case at the July plenum of the Central Committee in 1953. A month later, the September plenum of the Central Committee of 1953 approved Khrushchev as the first secretary of the Central Committee. Then they revised the protocol of "palace etiquette". The public minutes of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee began to be kept in alphabetical order. Almost simultaneously, Malenkov announced his "plan for a steep rise" in the light and food industries (August session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1953). The plan aroused great hopes and even a rise in enthusiasm in the country. Already in 1954, the first results of Malenkov's plan were showing. Goods appear in stores, sometimes thrown here from the reserve funds of the state. Some goods and consumer products are bought even abroad for foreign currency, which Stalin never allowed. Malenkov, who was still considered a soulless temporary worker of Stalin, becomes a popular person among the people. Although the "Malenkov plan" was, in fact, the plan of the entire Presidium of the Central Committee, adopted in the wake of the death of Stalin and the liquidation of Beria, but precisely because the people began to associate it with the name of Malenkov, the members of the Presidium became wary. In January 1955, they instructed the editor-in-chief of Pravda, Shepilov, to criticize this plan as "anti-Leninist and anti-Stalinist" (at that time Khrushchev still needed Stalin's authority). Shepilov's article bore a formidable title familiar from Stalin's times: "The General Line of the Party and the Vulgarizers of Marxism"<sup>414</sup>. Shepilov's main thesis was: "Lenin and Stalin emphasized a thousand times that the development of heavy industry is the foundation of "Soviet economic policy." plenum of the Central Committee, which decided the fate of the "Malenkov plan" and Malenkov himself as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. It was clearly addressed to the members of the plenum as a directive in which these members were warned how to behave during the discussion of the issue of

Malenkov. The plenum opened on January 25 with Khrushchev's report on animal husbandry and continued until January 31. In the introductory part of his report, Khrushchev repeated the main ideas of Shepilov's article in almost the same words and characterized the "policy of light industry" as the "capitulatory" policy of Bukharin and Rykov. It has now become clear that Shepilov's article is not a "literary exercise" of the editor-in-chief, but the directive of the first secretary of the Central Committee. But not one first secretary. It fully corresponded to the program of the founders of this "general line" together with Stalin: the program of Molotov and Kaganovich.

Bypassed in the distribution of the first places in the state after the death of Stalin precisely because of Malenkov and Beria, they saw in the acts against Malenkov the desired chances to take the reins of government into their own hands. Thus a temporary bloc was formed between the Molotov group and the Khrushchev group against Malenkov. This predetermined the future career of Malenkov as head of government. At the same plenum, it was removed, although this was announced only a week later at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In a statement addressed to the session of the Supreme Council, Malenkov emphasized that he considered the predominant development of heavy industry to be the basis of Soviet economic policy, adding that he was also responsible for the collapse of agriculture during his tenure as secretary of the Central Committee. Malenkov explained the shortcomings of his leadership and the desire to give his post to another person by his "lack of experience" in "state" affairs. So wrote a man who was continuously for almost 20 years the head of all personnel of the USSR (1934-1953) and 14 years secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1939-1953). 14

"Pravda", 24.1.1955.

415 Pravda, 3/2/1955. Although Molotov and Kaganovich helped Khrushchev remove Malenkov, they did not achieve their personal goals: Khrushchev offered the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers to his friend in the Moscow region, Bulganin, probably not without the help of the same Malenkov, so that Molotov would not get it. Offering the session of the Supreme Council on behalf of the Central Committee of the party the candidacy of Bulganin, Khrushchev did not spare bright words addressed to Bulganin: "A worthy student of the great Lenin and one of the clos

outstanding party and statesman," Khrushchev declared<sup>416</sup>. Otherwise, there were no changes

in the leadership. Molotov remained in the deputies of his former deputy Bulganin. But the situation was even worse. " , he digs his own grave. For any contender for the "leaders" of the party after Stalin, Molotov was an exceptionally dangerous and uncomfortable person. For almost thirty years, his name was placed in the party next to the name of Stalin. For nine years he was secretary of the Central Committee (1921 -1930 years.), eleven years - the chairman of the government (1930-1941), throughout the war - deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, he was also the only person in the Central Committee who survived from the "old guard" of Lenin. " , he was never in the "oppositions" or in the "deviations". And after Stalin was considered the second theoretician of the party. Under normal circumstances, he would have been Stalin's recognized and legitimate successor.

Removing such a person was a difficult task even for Stalin, although Stalin sought it, as Khrushchev told the 20th Congress. But what Stalin failed or did not have time to do, Khrushchev succeeded. Khrushchev opened the first attack against Molotov at the July 1955 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. At this plenum, issues of the foreign policy of the USSR, which was headed by Molotov, were discussed. In what plane this policy was then discussed, it was not reported in the press. But after the June plenum of the Central Committee in 1957, we learned from its resolution that Molotov was beaten primarily for his anti-Titist policy. The said resolution says: "Comrade Molotov's wrong position on the Yugoslav question

was unanimously condemned by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in July 1955.

At the same plenum, Khrushchev achieved the expansion of the Presidium of the Central Committee, introducing Kirichenko and Suslov there. At the same time, Aristov, Belyaev and Shepilov were introduced into the Secretariat of the Central Committee (Shepilov betrayed not only his old patron Malenkov, but also the new one, Molotov, taking Khrushchev's point of view on the Yugoslav issue, for which Khrushchev thanked him by appointing him Secretary of the Central Committee).

The second attack on Molotov was launched in Pravda (of which Shepilov remained editor-in-chief) because of Molotov's harmless remark at the February 1955 session of the Supreme Soviet that only "the foundations of socialism" had been built in the USSR. This remark was made in passing and was not relevant to the case. Since Molotov spoke in the broadest sense of the word "foundations," there was no mistake from the point of view of party orthodoxy. Under normal conditions, no one would even pay attention to this. But the fact is that for Molotov the conditions were clearly abnormal. Khrushchev was in an intense search for the old and new "falls" of Molotov. Molotov was publicly his mistake. invited to confess Disciplined bureaucrat Molotov succumbed to pressure. In a letter to the the question of building of socialist society he stated: "I consider my wording on USSR, given at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on February 8, 1955, from which it can be concluded that only the foundations of a socialist society have been built in the USSR, theoretically erroneous and politically harmful.

Thus it was proved in the eyes of party fanatics that Molotov was no longer a party theoretician. In a party like the CPSU, this was an important victory for Khrushchev. He also fixed it in the resolution of the 20th Congress on the report of the Central Committee, once again condemning Molotov's mistake. However, all these attacks were only needle pricks compared to what awaited Molotov, and at the same time Kaganovich and Malenkov, at the 20th Party Congress. Having completely mastered the apparatus of the party (the new secretariat of the Central Committee), the police (the new chiefs for the KGB - Serov, for the Ministry of Internal Affairs Dudorov), the army (the new leadership - Zhukov, Sokolovsky, Moskalen

416 "Izvestia", 9.2.1955.

417 "Questions of the history of the CPSU", 1957, No

1, p. 6. 418 "Communist", 1955, No 14, pp.

127-128. ko, Biryuzov, Malinovsky, Bagramyan and others), enlisting the support of members of the Presidium of the Central Committee Mikoyan, Bulganin, Suslov and Kirichenko, Khrushchev delivered his famous speech against Stalin. The blow of the "long-range sight" was by no means directed only at Stalin's coffin - it was simultaneously directed against the future "anti-Party" group of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov.

Khrushchev's special report on the "cult of personality" was also not a document of "collective creativity." It was a well-prepared and convincingly argued in the eyes of the party indictment of the Khrushchev wing in the Presidium. It bore a clear imprint of Khrushchev's personal initiative. The "lyrical" digressions, Khrushchev's personal examples from his own experience, and the speaker's not always orthodox formulations spoke of the same thing. The report named the names of Molotov and Kaganovich in direct connection with the Yezhov purge (telegram from Stalin and Zhdanov from Sochi) and Malenkov in connection with the wrong directives (during the war) of Stalin, Malenkov and Vasilevsky from the headquarters of the Supreme High Command. But all the same, the anti-Molotov edge of Khrushchev's report was still veiled by all sorts of reservations. Nevertheless, the prestige and future careers of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov were dealt an irreparable blow. And this is quite understandable. If individual crimes of Stalin in separate sections were associated with the names of ordinary members of the Politburo, then all the crimes in all sections were associated with the names of these three! Therefore, the main

conclusion of Khrushchev's report - "liquidation of the consequences of the personality cult" - ultimately meant the liquidation of the Molotov group. Hence it is clear why Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov again found a common language and concluded a common bloc against Khrushchev. The platform of the bloc, according to the editor-in-chief of *Kommunist* A. Rumyantsev, consisted in one point: "Back from XX Congress!"<sup>419</sup> Khrushchev explained the motives for concluding the bloc quite correctly: "Why did it happen? Apparently, far from the last role in this matter was played by the fact that all members of this group are especially deeply guilty of those gross mistakes and shortcomings that took place in the past. Shvernik reported that "correcting the violations of revolutionary legality committed by Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov during the period of mass repressions, the Party Control Committee in 1957 considered a large number of personal files of former party members rehabilitated by the judiciary. Most of them were restored by the CPC in the party."<sup>421</sup> But Marshal Zhukov was more specific when he directly called things his



names. In a speech in Leningrad after Khrushchev, he declared: "The anti-party group of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov stubbornly resisted the measures taken by the party to eliminate the consequences of the personality cult, especially in terms of exposing and bringing to justice the main culprits who committed violations of the law. Now it became clear why they were against exposure of committed iniquities. They were afraid of responsibility for exceeding their rights and illegal actions"<sup>422</sup>. This is the conviction that Khrushchev is

talking about the joint crimes of Stalin, Yezhov, Beria plus Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov, and that Khrushchev is least of all interested in the honor or dishonor of the dead Stalin, but aims at them, strives to pave the way for their future liquidation, forced the Molotov group from the cowardly "tactics of self-preservation" to switch to the tactics of a forced offensive. Only now, at the 20th Congress and after it, did they realize what a fatal mistake they made for themselves when they removed Beria and appointed Khrushchev First Secretary of the Central Committee. The history of the same party seemed to repeat itself again.

In order to prevent Trotsky's coming to power after Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev secured Stalin's appointment as General Secretary of the Central Committee. In order to prevent the coming to power of Kamenev and Zinoviev, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky preferred to keep a "gray" man, without a big name and without "ambition", Dzhugashvili-Stalin, as general secretary, even contrary to Lenin's "testament". To forestall Beria's "coup," the Molotovites appointed Khrushchev acting First Secretary of the Central Committee. To prevent the autocracy of the flamboyant Malenkov, they also appointed the "gray" Khrushchev as a permanent first secretary. Khrushchev was still looked upon as a very close-minded person in politics, helpless in 419 *Kommunist*, 1957, No 11, p.

<sup>421</sup>Ibid. <sup>422</sup>"Pravda", 16.7.1957.

intrigues, without  
pretensions

to leadership, which will  
be easy to deal with after Malenkov.

But Khrushchev thought differently, but acted like Stalin. It was important for him to prepare a new party congress, to select its future delegates, to arrange the necessary alignment of forces in the local party apparatus through local conferences and congresses, before revealing his true cards. How thorough the work carried out in this direction was shown by the credentials of the delegates to the 20th Congress: about 37 percent of these delegates were persons who were nominated for leadership after Stalin's death. Others unquestioningly recognized Khrushchev as their new patron. In front of such an audience, Khrushchev could not only expose Stalin, but also "creatively develop further Marxism-Leninism." When the last item on the agenda - the election of members of the Central Committee - was discussed, the congress made it clear that it recognized as its only leader not a fictitious "collective leadership", but Khrushchev alone. This was reflected in the minutes of the congress itself: when their names were announced to the new Central Committee, all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee received only simple "applause" and only Khrushchev received "stormy applause"<sup>423</sup>! Even judging by the resolution of the June plenum of the Central Committee

of 1957, the period after the 20th Congress is a period of permanent clashes, conflicts and intrigues of the Molotov-Kaganovich-Malenkov bloc against Khrushchev. The resolution does not tell the details of all these vicissitudes. She only says that the group organized a "conspiracy" to overthrow the leadership of the party, that is, Khrushchev. Some details were given by the chairman of the Party Control Committee, Shvernik. In the quoted speech in Leningrad, he stated: "... the anti-party group began to recruit supporters by factional methods, to arrange secret meetings behind the back of the Presidium of the Central Committee, to arrange cadres, intending to seize power in the party and the country into their own hands"<sup>424</sup>. But Khrushchev was not inactive either. In July 1956, on the day of Marshal Tito's visit to Moscow, without a plenum of the Central Committee, as a simple clerical routine, he passes through the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Supreme Council the decision to remove Molotov from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. And here Khrushchev is excluded

<sup>423</sup> "XX Congress of the CPSU. Verbatim report", part II, p. 403.

<sup>424</sup> "Pravda", 7.7.1957.

Reading assistance was provided by the Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Commission on Foreign Affairs of the Supreme Soviet, Shepilov, for which Shepilov was rewarded with an appointment to replace Molotov. But then, unexpectedly and stormily, the October events in Poland unfolded first, and then the general uprising of the heroic Hungarian people (October-November 1956). Now, probably, the Molotovites rightfully declared to Khrushchev: these are the

fruits of your exposure of Stalin! These events caused a stir not only in the other satellites in Eastern

Europe, but also in the USSR itself. The Molotovites felt in these events a mortal danger for the entire Soviet Empire. Fear of a joint death reunited both groups. The time was too serious, the danger was too great to immediately settle scores with Khrushchev. History seemed to be repeating itself again, albeit in a different place and on a different scale: when the insurgent General Kornilov moved his troops to Petrograd, and the fate of the Kerensky government hung in the balance, the Bolsheviks, including Molotov, demanded from Lenin - "let's take the opportunity and do away with Kerensky!" Lenin replied to this:

"Kerensky is ours, he will not leave us, and now everything is against

Kornilov!" The Molotovites probably thought the same when, having capitulated in Poland, they, together with Khrushchev, attacked unfortunate Hungary with cruel ruthlessness in order to then deal with Khrushchev at home, because "Khrushchev is ours, he will not leave us!" These calculations turned out to be illusory, although the fate of Khrushchev really hung in the balance these days, not because the pressure of the opposition was great, but because the Khrushchev apparatus itself - the party and the police - was in a deep crisis. If there was still a man in this apparatus who had not lost his head, then that man was Khrushchev himself. With the incredible energy of a young man, with the Stalinist talent of a schemer and with the hidden cunning of a peasant, he translated the old truth of Clausewitz into the language of politics: "the best form of defense is an offensive." And Khrushchev went on the offensive, sharply turning the attention of the party and the people to internal problems. Moreover, he chose such sectors for the offensive and

discussions that were, firstly, vital for the people, secondly, clearly provocative for the opposition, and, thirdly, extremely important for their own popularity.

These problems were as follows: 1) a course towards the elimination of the centralized government bureaucracy (a concession to the "fraternal republics" to strengthen their power and "sovereignty"); 2) exemption of collective-farm households from supplies in kind from their personal farms (a concession to the peasantry); 3) the slogan "in the next two or three years to catch up with America in per capita production of meat, milk and butter" (a concession to the workers, employees and intelligentsia). Instead of summing up the

results of the Polish-Hungarian events, Khrushchev imposes a discussion on these issues on the Molotov group. Of course, on none of these questions can Molotov and Kaganovich agree with Khrushchev's guidelines. They understand that the course towards decentralization is a legal form of a new purge, this time a purge from that huge army of bureaucrats that Molotov and his supporters have been creating for decades and which constituted their social base in the center. As regards the peasantry, they still adhered to Stalin's point of view that any concession to the peasant along the line of his personal economy is a blow to the collective-farm system, a precedent that could lead to the collapse of the entire collective-farm system.

systems.

As for the slogan "catch up with America in 2-3 years" in livestock production, they considered such a slogan a demagogic game of "popularity" of the first secretary without any real data for its implementation. But they did not want to openly discuss these too "explosive" topics with Khrushchev. They preferred discussion in the closed quarters of the Presidium of the Central Committee. And there, of course, they were still strong. But the first secretary, with his characteristic recklessness, brings controversial issues from the Kremlin's recesses to the open all-Union arena. He is going, as the Soviet press puts it, to "consult" with the people. At a series of meetings of collective farmers, workers, employees and party workers, he sets out the main points of his new program and asks the people to express their opinion. Khrushchev, of course, knows this opinion in advance, but it is important for him to make the people the public arbiter of the tacit disputes in the Presidium of the Central Committee. "Here, you see, the people think the way I thought, but you,

Comrades Molotov and Kaganovich, you think differently, it means you have cut yourself off from the people!" the First Secretary would later tell them. studied with Stalin, and Stalin often did this with his opponents. Under these conditions, the Molotovites have no choice but to swallow Khrushchev's bitter pills. But with all the

more tenacity they resist, already in a bloc with Malenkov, against a new, decisive blow for their fate - against the plan to liquidate their Moscow base of the bureaucracy. In this case, the entire "bureaucratic people" of Moscow is on their side, against Khrushchev, who decided to liquidate about forty economic ministries, leaving only one "classical ministries". Khrushchev is trying to carry out this plan already at the December plenum of the Central Committee 1956 (Bulganin's report), but is defeated. The resistance of the leaders of the bureaucracy sitting in the Presidium of the Central Committee of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Pervukhin, Saburov is too great. They do not want, probably, an aggravation of the situation by Bulganin and Voroshilov. Still fresh in my memory are the events in Poland and Hungary, for which Khrushchev is credited with moral responsibility. The plenum makes a compromise decision on partial decentralization, but the Moscow ministries remain. The rights of local ministries are expanding. The State Planning Commission is divided into two independent bodies - the State Planning Committee (long-term planning) and the State Economic Commission (current planning). But the State Economic Commissions are transferring such administrative and operational functions that no government body, except for the Council of Ministers of the USSR itself, had at the center. Pervukhin is appointed head of the State Economic Commission, a kind of economic dictator of the USSR. Partial "decentralization" eventually resulted in absolutist centralism. This is not what Khrushchev wanted. Moreover, he did not think to calm down on this. He removes his "soft-bodied" friend Bulganin from this business and takes on it himself. He travels himself and sends out members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the Bureau of the Central Committee for the RSFSR to places, in regions and republics, in order to process the members of the plenum of the Central Committee in the right direction. The press is instructed to continue writing about "Leninist democratic centralism" and, more than a month later, after the December plenum, convenes a new plenum of the Central Committee (February 1957). On

At this plenum, Khrushchev is already personally reporting on how decentralization should be carried out. Relying on the already trained majority of the rank and file members of the Central Committee, Khrushchev boldly takes revenge: the decisions of the December plenum are actually annulled, Pervukhin's department is liquidated and the Presidium of the Central Committee is instructed to prepare a draft decision on reorganization for approval at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Now, after the June plenum, it became clear that having won at the plenum of the Central Committee, in the Presidium of the Central Committee, Khrushchev again found himself in a position in which the majority, at least 6 members of the Presidium, categorically opposed his "reorganization plan" (Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Saburov, Pervukhin). But Khrushchev does his own thing here too. Over the head of the majority of the Presidium of the Central Committee on March 30, 1957, he publishes in the entire central press "Abstracts of Comrade Khrushchev's report." Even then, such an unusual name of an official document was striking. Why the "theses of Comrade Khrushchev" and not the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, as was done before? After the defeat of the Molotov group, it turned out that they really were "comrade Khrushchev's theses", and not the entire Presidium of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. Khrushchev again "consulted" with the people, invited the people to express their opinion, to make additions and changes to these "theses". The "theses" provided for the liquidation of all central economic ministries, the transfer of many of their rights to local republics and regions through the organization of economic regions with their own independent economic councils, and the liquidation of the State Economic Commission. The people "advised" Khrushchev to turn his "theses" into law. But the struggle of the majority of the Presidium of the Central Committee, that is, the Molotov group, against the "theses" continued. True, its members, as "disciplined" people, did not take part at all "in the nationwide discussion of the theses," but, continuing the struggle against them within the Central Committee, they "saved what could be saved": out of about forty ministries scheduled for liquidation, only twenty-seven were eliminated. On the other hand, Khrushchev gave an ultimatum for the liquidation of these ministries: in a month and a half (by June 1, 1957), the officials of all twenty-seven ministries were to leave the capital, like "persona non grata." Khrushchev even read a parting word to these officials, although by no means

the inspiring word: "There can be no doubt," the introduction to the "theses" said, "that these comrades will correctly understand the measures taken by the Party and the government and will return to lively and organizational activity in production"<sup>425</sup>.

Khrushchev's second victory was also very important. Under the guise of raising the authority and expanding the "sovereign rights" of the union republics, he introduced into the Council of Ministers of the USSR all (fifteen) chairmen of the councils of ministers of the union republics, people selected and appointed by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Now the first deputies - Molotov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Pervukhin - and simply deputy Malenkov were to sit in a government dominated by the Khrushchev majority. If we are to believe the resolution of the June plenum, the Molotov group continued to fight against decentralization even after the "Khrushchev theses" became law, approved by the session of the Supreme Soviet. The resolution says: "They were against the expansion of the rights of the union republics... The anti-party group not only did not understand, but also resisted the party's measures to combat bureaucracy, to reduce the swollen state apparatus... This group stubbornly resisted and tried to disrupt such an important event, as the reorganization of industry management... This group went so far that even after the approval of these measures in the process of nationwide discussion and the subsequent adoption of the Law at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, it continued to fight against the reorganization of industry management"<sup>426</sup>.

In mid-June the fight reached its highest dramatic point. True, our information both about this point and about the denouement itself comes from the source of the winner. Therefore, it is quite natural that the victor paints the course and outcome of the struggle in the light in which it is beneficial to him, especially since the victors are always right! A more or less complete story about the drama that unfolded in the Kremlin from June 18 to June 29, 1957 is placed in the organ of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party "Unita" dated July 8, 1957 in an article by its Moscow correspondent Giuseppe Boff. D. Boff's source is a closed letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU addressed to local party organizations with a report on how and what happened during the discussion of controversial issues in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and how the conviction itse

Molotov's group at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The correspondent of "Unita" says that since the shorthand minutes of the meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the plenum of the Central Committee itself are attached to this letter, he believes that

425 Pravda, 30.3.1957. 426

"Questions of the history of the CPSU", 1957, No 1, pp. 4-5. the official version correctly reproduces the actual picture of events. In this case, it is important for us that

D. Boff's correspondence is itself a semi-official document, since it is printed in the central organ of the Italian Communist Party. Here is what D. Boff tells from the words of his informants from the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Molotov group developed a plan to remove Khrushchev from the post of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Taking

advantage of the absence of three members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, she demanded the convening of a meeting of the Presidium, ostensibly to discuss the text of the speeches of the members of the Presidium, which should be delivered at the celebration of the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Leningrad. However, when the Presidium met on June 18, they immediately demanded a change in the composition of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the government, declaring that Khrushchev's policy was "Trotskyist and opportunistic." The Molotov group submitted a list of the proposed composition of the new leadership and demanded an immediate vote. Khrushchev's name was missing from this list. Some members of the Presidium of the Central Committee opposed this demand, stating that a decision of such importance should be made by the Presidium in its entirety. They managed to delay the vote until the absent members of the Presidium arrived. After the arrival of these members, Khrushchev's supporters declared that only the plenum of the Central Committee was authorized to decide on changing the composition of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the Presidium itself. However, Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov continued to insist on a decision to change the leadership even before the convening of the plenum of the Central Committee and on the immediate publication of this decision in the press, along with a political statement, the text of which was drafted by Shepilov. The discussion on this issue in the Presidium continued for several days.



Informed of these events, members of the Central Committee began to gather in Moscow and demanded the immediate

convocation of a plenum of the Central Committee. On June 22, the plenum opened, at which the Secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Presidium Suslov made an information report on the events in the Presidium of the Central Committee. After Suslov, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov came forward demanding a change in leadership. However, their demand did not receive support from the majority of the members of the Central Committee. Feeling their isolation, they tried to retreat from their positions, but the members of the plenum of the Central Committee were not satisfied with this and demanded the removal of this entire

group from the central organs of the party. The Molotov group was accused of trying to seize power illegally. This is the information "Unita". A Warsaw correspondent of the Associated Press agency from the leading circles of the Polish United Workers' Party also learned about these events some additional but characteristic information. According to this information, the first clash between Khrushchev and Molotov took place at the very first meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee on June 22 on the issue of the agenda of the plenum. Wishing to put an end to the Molotov group, Khrushchev made a proposal to put the question "On the internal situation in the CPSU" as the first item on the agenda. Molotov, on the contrary, suggested discussing first the question "On the international situation in the USSR in connection with the attempts of imperialist putschs in Poznan and Hungary", as well as "on relations with the communist parties in Poland, Italy, Japan and the USA", that is, with those communist parties, whose leadership did not join the official Soviet statements about the imperialist nature of the origin of the uprisings in Poznań and Hungary.

Kirilenko, the secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional party committee, immediately spoke out against Molotov, declaring that "the culprits of the storm of indignation that arose throughout the world against the Soviet Union after the Hungarian events are in our party itself" and that "the conservatism of the Molotov group led to an uprising in Hungary and it is to blame for the fall in the international prestige of the Soviet Union after the suppression of the Hungarian uprising. According to the same Polish circles, at the first meeting, which lasted thirty-five hours uninterruptedly, Khrushchev delivered a three-hour speech in which

pointed out that the anti-party group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov had a center in Moscow and extended its influence through its proteges to the entire party apparatus in the CPSU. Molotov, using the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet diplomatic apparatus abroad, pursued his personal policy. He also sabotaged the reconciliation between the USSR and Yugoslavia, which was planned already in 1954, which was delayed for a whole year due to Molotov's intrigues. Such is the information from Polish circles. Both the correspondence of the Moscow representative of "Unita" and the information of the Warsaw correspondent of the aforementioned American agency are basically confirmed not only by the text of the resolution of the June plenum, but also by the details that were reported by members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU in their speeches in Leningrad on July 6, 1957. Molotov and Kaganovich

became victims of their own school along this line as well. As I told in the first part of this book, it was they, together with Stalin, using the same methods of using the "Moscow asset", who overthrew in October 1928 the leadership of the Moscow Committee headed by Uglanov. Khrushchev's behavior on the scale of the entire Central Committee only testifies to the superiority of a talented, albeit ungrateful, student over his yesterday's teachers. Let's see now, what was the party-political face of that congress that opened

the road to power for Khrushchev? According to the secretary of the Central Committee and chairman of the Credentials Commission of the XX Congress Aristov, 69% of the delegates to the XX Congress were people who joined the party after the establishment of Stalin's one-man dictatorship, that is, after the liquidation of the thinking party. Over 500 delegates received the position of functionaries after Stalin's death. Khrushchev could present any program to such a congress and expose anyone with impunity, if he controlled the apparatus of power. It was this congress that elected the Central Committee that judged and removed from the party scene its yesterday's founders.

One has only to look at the party face of this supreme judges to understand the full depth of the fall of the defendants "evaders".

Malenkov in the CPSU - since 1920

Kaganovich in the CPSU - since 1911

Molotov has been in the CPSU

since 1906. And who are the judges? Here is the Party face of the Central Committee elected at the 20th

Congress: Party  
seniority Number before

October 1917 6 from

1917 to 1920 - 14 from

1921 to 1924 - 7 from

1925 to 1930 - 44 from

1931 to 1937 - 13 from

1938 to 1942 - 28

died and left 7

not

established 14,133 people Total (calculations are made according to mandate data: "XX Congress Verbatim report", part II, Moscow, 1956).

The table shows that out of 130 members of the trial of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, 124 people, including Khrushchev, joined the party after the Bolsheviks came to power, 110 of them - when Molotov, Kaganovich, and then Malenkov were Secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU. But on the other hand, out of a total of 255 members and candidates of this Central Committee, 100 people, or about 40%, were first elected there at the Khrushchev Twentieth Congress. Of the total number of 236 members and candidates of the Central Committee of the Stalin-Malenkov XIX Congress, 90 people were purged (about 38%). It was an object lesson for those who remained from the 19th Congress. That is why they, too, unanimously voted for Khrushchev at the June plenum of the Central Committee. Summing up the results of the June plenum, Kommunist wrote:

"It can be said without exaggeration that the plenum saved unity. The schismatics did not understand that the erroneous situation that existed during the period of the widespread cult of personality and in which the role of the Central Committee was belittled was forever and irrevocably eliminated, when the bodies elected by him turned out to be standing above the Central Committee and took upon themselves the decision of such questions, which are the exclusive competence of the plenum of the Central Committee.

Under the "unity" that was saved by the plenum of the Central Committee, one must, of course, understand the "salvation" of Khrushchev himself. But has the plenum of the Central Committee really become such a supreme body that dictates its

"collective will" and the Secretariat and the Presidium? Kommunist asserts that this is the case. Here is the corresponding passage from the same article: "The decisive defeat of the anti-Party group once again confirmed the unshakable strength of the collective leadership of the Party, the full significance of the fact that not individuals and groups, but an authoritative, collective body elected by the congress, leads the party" 429. However, upon closer examination, it turns out that

such a case

427 Bertram D. Wolfe, in his brilliant analysis of Khrushchev's report in Khrushchev

and Stalin's Ghost, p. 28, gives another figure of 113 people, or 44%, who were

first elected to the Central Committee. He probably thinks

purged and those who were withdrawn from the Central Committee, but remained in

the Central Audit Commission. By the way, 12 Human

out of a total of 37, and 38 new people were introduced (total number members

CRC - now 63 people).

428 Kommunist, 1957, No. 10, p. 8. 429

Ibid., p. 9. The

glorious statement just confirms what it wants to refute. The strength of the Bolshevik leadership has always been in the fact that the so-called legislative body (congress, plenum) constantly serves only as a loud signboard, a useful cover to justify the current practice of the executive bodies. The party, congresses, plenums serve to "vote" for what the given executive power presents them, regardless of who heads it - Lenin, Stalin, Malenkov, Khrushchev, or any other of its future leaders. This is the alpha and omega of Lenin's notorious "democratic centralism". One of Lenin's former associates, S. Dmitrievsky, tells in his memoirs how Lenin taught Stalin at the RSDLP conference in Tammerfors (1905) what "democratic centralism" is and why it should be the guiding principle of the Bolshevik leadership. Before Stalin it

the doctrine clearly did not reach, and therefore he: "... was gloomily silent. He was disgusted by any kind of democracy. What is it for?" he said when Lenin asked about his opinion during a break. - A fighting party should have a permanent composition of leaders, "Nothing can be done. A new situation and new forms must be sought. After all, in essence, nothing changes. It is not those who vote, but those who rule." And it depends on the skill of those who govern that they are always elected ... Stalin was still dissatisfied. Only many years later did he realize that "democratic centralism" is a wonderful thing, if you know how to manage its apparatus "43. "Individuals" (Khrushchev) and "groups" (the Secretariat of the Central Committee) "again and again confirmed the unshakable strength" of this main principle of leadership at the June plenum. The same principle underlies the creation of a new expanded Presidium of the Central Committee. But Khrushchev took a step forward in this matter as well and introduced an "innovation" into the structure of legislative power, which Stalin himself formally did not dare to do. Namely: in the new Presidium of 14 people, which, according to the party charter, is considered the highest legislative power between plenums, the leading majority (11 people!) Has the Secretariat of the Central Committee - that is, executive power, since, in addition to the ten secretaries of the Central Committee, the Prezi

430 S. Dmitrievsky. Stalin. Berlin, 1931. The

Chairman of the Party Control Committee under the same Secretariat also belongs to the

Dium. Thus, Khrushchev, in the person of the new Presidium, created a kind of "small plenum of the Central Committee", which is entirely under the control of the Secretariat. This "innovation", according to which the "legislative power" is not so much "merged" as absorbed by the "executive" power, guarantees against accidents an unforeseen "rebellion" in the Presidium, as it was in the old Presidium, where the executive power had only 11 votes three votes (Khrushchev, Suslov, Kirichenko). No less important is another circumstance. The constant appeal to the plenum of the Central Committee as an arbitrator is not only inconvenient in practice, but also politically dangerous. In such a situation, the plenum of the Central Committee can indeed appropriate to itself "competencies", which, it is true, are assigned to it by the Rules, but which cannot be

Khrushchev wants to avoid the participation of the Molotovs and keep the helm of government in the party and the state in his

own hands. In the personal selection of people, Khrushchev did exactly the same as Stalin did. After all, it was Khrushchev who said: "... the proposal (of Stalin) after the 19th Congress to elect 25 people to the Presidium of the Central Committee was aimed at eliminating all the old members from the Politburo and introducing into it people with less experience who would exalt in every possible way Stalin" 431. After Stalin's death, this Presidium was dispersed, but now Khrushchev, from the "inexperienced" people selected by Stalin, returned 8 people to the members and candidates of the Presidium (Aristov, Korotchenko, Kuusinen, Shvernik, Brezhnev, Ignatov, Kosygin and Suslov, who was returned back in 1955 .), adding to them several other persons, even less "experienced", but, probably, even more devoted to Khrushchev himself. If we consider the membership of the new Presidium from the point of view of representation in it of the highest corporations of Soviet society, then it lacks representatives of those social groups that were

always present under Stalin: the political police, the army, industry leaders, trade unions. The candidate composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee was also selected from almost

some party apparatchiks. It also does not

431 N. S. Khrushchev. "Report at a Closed Meeting of the 20th Congress of the CPSU," p. 58. The

police, the army, the trade union, and the Komsomol were presented. But out of ten candidates, 5 people are directly subordinate to the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The principle of the predominance of the executive over the legislative power is maintained here in the same proportion as in the membership of the Presidium.

After the plenum of the Central Committee throughout the country, at party meetings and at meetings of non-party people, a large propaganda campaign against the "schismatics" took place. Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov were spoken of not only as "conspirators" against the leadership of the Central Committee, but also as people who were deprived of any state abilities.

Baibakov, chairman of the State Planning Committee of the RSFSR, stated: "Claiming for the role of a theoretician in the party, Molotov has long lost touch with the doctrine

Lenin. He did not understand the essence of this or that issue."

Or: "Kaganovich showed himself to be a man incapable of managing the sectors that he was entrusted with. He was so backward and did not understand the technical policy of our country that it sometimes came to jokes"432. The Minister of Agriculture of the USSR Matskevich stated: "Malenkov

hampered the solution of fundamental issues of the development of agricultural production... At the same time, for the purpose of self-promotion and gaining cheap personal popularity, Malenkov tried to take credit for the measures taken by the Central Committee of the CPSU to reduce the agricultural tax..." Or: "Molotov, showing conservatism and inertia, not only did not understand the need for the development of virgin lands, but also stubbornly resisted the

implementation of this most important event ..."

Or: "Kaganovich, having no knowledge of agriculture at all, nevertheless spoke out against the Party's policy on questions of agriculture"433.

This is how yesterday's students write about their teachers, who for decades have been called "outstanding leaders of the CPSU" and "talented organizers of socialist construction" in all the "encyclopedias of the USSR". Khrushchev's people moved with the same propaganda 432

"Pravda", 4/7/1957. 433 "Pravda", 12.7.1957. into "the people". Here the main emphasis was placed on

the fact that Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov were against raising the standard of living of the working people. The reaction has always been the most desirable. One Soviet writer relates a conversation between two collective farmers, which he allegedly overheard on the banks of the Don: "I can't make out one thing," the man in the tunic slowly said, "what

did they achieve, what did they need? Did they know what our brother, the collective farmer, wanted? Did the same Malenkov or, say, Kaganovich go to the collective farms, or did they talk in their own way with the people? They didn't travel, they sat in their offices like gophers in minks.

If they could have been put on a lobo-heater with a pitchfork, they would have learned how people get bread, - the second said gloomily ...

It's not about the lobo-warmer, - the first one interrupted ... - It's a matter, my brother, in that they knew about our life only from pieces of paper, but from the cinema. You can't rub glasses into the people, you won't take them by deceit.

That's it. The people have now become literate."<sup>34</sup>

Khrushchev again returned to condemning the anti-party group of Molotov at the September and December plenums of the Central Committee of 1958. Only then was it reported for the first time that Bulganin also belonged to the anti-party group. Khrushchev was informed that two other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee - Pervukhin and Saburov belonged to the Molotov group. Thus, it turns out that out of 11 members of the Presidium, 6 people firmly voted for the removal of Khrushchev (Bulganin, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Pervukhin, Saburov) ", and this legitimate majority of the Presidium of the Central Committee was quite competent to remove Khrushchev. Moreover, what Voroshilov's position was remains unclear even now. But Khrushchev managed to declare this majority a "minority", and even expel him from the Central Committee of the party. "Contemptible, treacherous, vile, vile group of conspirators" - these are the epithets that were awarded to the Molotov group at the 21st Congress. Moreover, the congress demanded that the members of the Molotov group make penitential speeches, as was done in Stalin's time. This demand was put forward most insistently by Khrushchev's new nominee, First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee 434 "Literaturnaya Gazeta", 25.7.1957, essay by V. Zakrutkin. I. Spiridonov. He declared: "And if until now there has been a severe demand from the members of this group on the part of the Central Committee, then one should no less severely and strictly answer before the highest body of the party - before the congress, especially those who still remain in the Central Committee. All

of you are familiar with Bulganin's speech at the December plenum of the

Central Committee. Remember how he characterizes his accomplices in the anti-party group. Molotov is a man out of touch with life; Kaganovich is a phrase-monger, which in translation into Russian means a talker; Malenkov is an intriguer capable of any abomination. We can believe Bulganin that he had developed these characteristics for a long time, since he worked with these people not for a year or two, but for a good two dozen years. how did Bulganin get into such a family of "friendly guys" . But only Pervukhin spoke at the congress with repentance. Molotov, Kaganovich,



Malenkov and even Saburov, who participated in the work of the congress, refused to speak or submit statements of repentance.

All the delegates with understandable unanimity emphasized the wisdom and personal merits of Khrushchev, "standing at the head of the Party, the Central Committee and its Presidium." Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR D. Ustinov attributed to Khrushchev not only the political successes of the Central Committee, but also the scientific and technical successes of Russian scientists. He declared: "We are primarily indebted to the Presidium of the Central Committee and personally to N. S. Khrushchev for our success in the

creation and launch of artificial earth satellites and space rockets." The inglorious "collective leadership" died just as ingloriously, but the Molotov group will end

either in the Kremlin or in the Lubyanka. What were the motives for the speech of the Molotov group? Khrushchev's leadership in the coverage of official propaganda?

Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Kosygin replied: "The main motive in their anti-Party actions was personal resentment, ambition. They believed that they had little power in their hands"<sup>43</sup>. In other words, it was a naked power struggle between two groups within the same communist oligarchy.

One can only partly agree with this statement. That every political struggle is a struggle for power. 435 Pravda, 30.1.1959. 436

"Pravda", 5.2.1959.

437"Pravda", 4.7.1957.

power is an elementary

truth. But if power is not an end in itself, but a means to implement a certain policy, then Kosygin's statement does not explain anything.

Of course, the Molotov group did not and could not have any other program than Khrushchev's. The competing groups argued not about the program, but about tactics, not about the "general line" in ideology, but about the methods of its implementation, not about reforms, but about the pace and scale of their implementation, not even about Stalin, but about Stalinism.

The Molotov group looked further and deeper into the consequences that flow from Khrushchev's campaign against the Stalinist legacy. They understood too well that the current regime in the USSR could only be maintained as a Stalinist regime.

regime or it will perish altogether. It can and should be corrected and modernized, but its leading methods cannot be revised. If Khrushchev's ideal of government, like Molotov's, remains the old one - the unlimited dictatorship of party-oligarchies - then the Stalinist system of government, regardless of the personal qualities of the late teacher, must be preserved as the most perfect, as the most universal of all hitherto known tyrannical systems. Therefore, any criticism of Stalinism, and even more so of Stalin's methods, is an attempt at suicide. In short, people who, by the very nature of the regime, are obliged to govern in the Stalinist way, cannot condemn Stalin's methods - that is the whole "philosophy" of the Molotov group.

Not just a thirst for power (they had enough of it), but a well-founded fear for the death of the regime - this seems to me the internal motive of the "anti-Party actions" of the Molotov group. In Khrushchev they saw the regime's most faithful grave-digger. Therefore, all their struggle was centered around the personality of the first secretary. For seven days they fought at the plenum to prove the unprovable: the Central Committee does not exist for the secretary, but the secretary for the Central Committee. The members of the Molotov group hoped in this struggle for their moral capital, authority and merits in the past. But these hopes were in vain. The Party, which yesterday debunked its demigod to the whole world, today showed sufficient internal immunity against pangs of conscience, when it was necessary to put an end to his

major apostles.

Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov taught this party not to serve the ideals of social society, but to serve the people of the party apparatus. And she serves. Nothing is not

will be able to lead her astray - neither logical arguments, nor the former merits of the former leaders, nor their formidable warnings about danger.

On top of all this, they also overlooked the colossal psychological upheaval that the new leader made in the minds of the party and the country by debunking Stalin. Even after that they stubbornly clung to the party's yesterday. They did not even notice that in the meantime the first secretary, with an imperious hand, opened a new chapter in the history of the same communist party.

Khrushchev - this "permanent" revolutionary by nature - wants to go down in the history of Russia as her great communist reformer. Stalin promised a satisfying life to his great-grandchildren, Khrushchev wants to feed the Russian people during his lifetime. Now, if he succeeds in this, and he strives for this quite sincerely, then his historical mission will also end: well-fed people will begin to engage in politics. No one has yet expressed this "Marxist truth" better than Khrushchev, when he, in a conversation with Soviet writers, declared: "I know such people who walk in the theorists, but in fact all their theoretical" wisdom "is reduced to juggling about and quoting for no reason from the classics of Marxism-Leninism Pretending to be theoreticians, such unfortunate scientists cannot understand such an important Marxist truth that people must first of all eat, drink, have a home and dress before being able to engage in politics, science and art"

I sincerely wish success in the practical implementation of this truth. I wish because I am convinced that the sage is right: the revolution is not made by hungry people, but by well-fed people who have not been fed for only one day.

438 "Communist", 1957, No 12, p. 17.

Part Four (additional) FROM

KHRUSHCHEV TO BREZHNEV

I. THE OVERTHROW OF

KHRUSHCHEV The people who refused Khrushchev's burial at the Kremlin wall, without exception, were Khrushchev's personal nominees. If not for Khrushchev, we would never have heard the names of the current members of the Politburo and the Secretariat, except perhaps one Kosygin (he was a nominee of Zhdanov). But Khrushchev brought him back from disgrace. Even Suslov was nominated by Khrushchev (in 1929-1930, Suslov was a teacher at the Industrial Academy; Khrushchev, who began his career here, recommended Suslov to the Central Control Commission). What is the reason why just these people refused Khrushchev posthumous honor to be buried in the pantheon of communist apostles? There is only one reason: Khrushchev is the killer of the god of the CPSU, Stalin. Khrushchev physically destroyed the head of the NKVD, he politically destroyed the Stalinist Politburo, he closed the concentration camps, at two party congresses and on behalf of the party he exposed r

criminal system of his rule for three decades. Hence the split in world communism and the beginning of spiritual emancipation in the USSR. For all this he is avenged by his disciples.

But I want to write not about this, but about how the political assassination of Khrushchev on October 14, 1964 was prepared. The events that preceded this best characterize the moral character of the current rulers of the Kremlin.

\* \* \*

Only Fouché and Talleyrand managed to challenge each other's records of adaptability to rapidly changing regimes and the leaders of revolutionary and post-revolutionary France, but the Stalinists broke all their records in conditions when adaptation to the next regime depended not only on the ability to change color and tastes, but also on readiness new, usually skeptical overlord to believe that you are not the same chameleon as he was under his predecessor. Making a career with Lenin was simple: one had only to recognize his supremacy and

possess the talent of a politician and the efficiency of a practical person. Under Stalin, the conditions for making a career change dramatically. Devotion to the regime of Stalin's personal power, the talent of an unreasoning performer, fundamental lack of principle in politics, cruelty, reaching callousness - these were the main requirements. Based on this, Stalin selected the entire hierarchy of party apparatchiks from top to bottom. Khrushchev was among them.

Under Khrushchev, all criteria disappeared. Under him, the party bureaucracy was concerned not with making a career, but with how to stay at the achieved level. At the highest level of the party-state oligarchy, no one succeeded, except for Mikoyan and Suslov. Khrushchev's associates dealt in the

morning with one, at lunchtime with a second, and in the evening with a third Khrushchev. His constant fickleness, his amazing gift as a chaotic improviser, his painful itch to endlessly organize and reorganize, his overbearing recklessness, multiplied by his unluckiness and carelessness, his dangerous talkativeness, his baseless ambition to know everything, to see everything, to do everything himself, his treachery in friendship and self-confidence in politics is only

some features of such a rich, colorful, dynamic character of Khrushchev. These traits made him an exceptionally dangerous dictator to those around him. People who

were excellent at making a career under Stalin himself looked around in confusion and shrugged helplessly under Khrushchev: it was difficult to please Stalin, but the careerists knew exactly how to do it, and even Khrushchev himself did not know how to please Khrushchev. At a chance meeting, he could make a minister of the USSR out of the director of the state farm, and out of the minister, in a fit of anger, a "pensioner." On this, Khrushchev even still earned political capital: "Khrushchev is his boyfriend, a gentle ruler, he only takes pictures, but Stalin would have shot him!" Thus, all the old secretaries of regional committees, regional committees and central committees of the parties of the republics, all ministers of the USSR, heads of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, all secretaries of the Central Committee and all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, except for members of the original "triumvirate" - Mikoyan and Suslov .

Of all the mistakes that led him to disaster, probably the most terrible must be considered what Stalin called "dizziness from success", and his most important omission is what Stalin called the "idiotic disease" carelessness. Khrushchev became so self-confident, he imagined himself so indispensable that he did the same thing for which he criticized Stalin: he began to manage the party and the state, bypassing not only the Presidium of the Central Committee, but, worst of all, over the head of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. A communist dictator may disregard the Presidium

of the Central Committee and not convene plenums of the Central Committee and congresses of the party, and nothing will happen to him as long as he relies on the Secretariat of the Central Committee, but if he began to act through the head of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, he is already dead. The Secretariat of the Central Committee directly controls the party, the political police and the armed forces. The greatness of the power of the first secretary lies in the fact that he is the head of this all-powerful institution. But Khrushchev ignored not only the Secretariat of the Central Committee, but also those who, in fact, made him Khrushchev: Mikoyan and S

Khrushchev was considered a great master of folk humor.

But sometimes Khrushchev's jokes on his colleagues crossed the line. To the author of these lines, one Western diplomat,

who was present at the time of Khrushchev at the next banquet in the Kremlin, told such a case. In the midst of the banquet, with everyone in a great mood, having exhausted all his endless toasts, the first secretary turned to the high audience with the question: do you know why we still keep Mikoyan in the leadership? There is an important reason for this: he is an excellent lezginka dancer! Want to make sure? Of course, the public unanimously wished for this. Then Khrushchev, without thinking twice, forced Brezhnev to put on a women's scarf (a couple dances a lezginka - a young lady and a gentleman) and dance a lezginka with Mikoyan. Here one involuntarily recalls Khrushchev's complaint against Stalin, who forced Khrushchev himself to dance the hopak under completely insulting circumstances. Stalin, a master of reading a person's soul in his eyes, probably sensed a future traitor in Khrushchev and therefore publicly humiliated him. Did Khrushchev, having learned this art from his teacher, also saw future traitors in Brezhnev and Mikoyan, and therefore dealt with them in the Stalinist way? Alas, on the communist Olympus, the one who dances last dances well!

The more carefully this or that event is classified in the Kremlin, the more reason not to believe the official report about it. Hence the many versions of how Khrushchev was overthrown. We do not want to increase the number of these versions, but will try to analyze the objective facts. The details of Khrushchev's overthrow are still shrouded in obscurity. But one thing is absolutely indisputable: if Khrushchev began his rule with the truth - declaring his colleagues from the first "collective leadership" the same criminals as Stalin ("anti-party group" - June 1957), then the new, second "collective leadership" began its government with a completely obvious lie: it reported that on October 14, 1964, "The Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU granted the request of Comrade Khrushchev N. S. to relieve him of his duties as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the age and deterioration in health.

This party lie was formalized by the Supreme Soviet the next day. On October 16, Soviet newspapers published an official report from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It says: "On October 15 of this year, under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council

USSR AI Mikoyan held a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted the request of comrade. Khrushchev on his release from the duties of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR due to his advanced age and deteriorating health.

This official version was so false and so ridiculous that no one believed it, not only abroad, but also in the USSR. The conspirators also knew this in advance. If, nevertheless, they resorted to it, then this must be explained only by the fact that as much as they had the courage to risk a coup, they also lacked the courage to risk the truth. To tell the truth for them would mean, firstly, to sign their own lack of principle in relation to Khrushchev, and secondly, to testify before the whole country and the world that all statements about the restoration of party and state legality in the USSR are fiction. Even six months before Khrushchev's removal, the main conspirators against

him considered his age not "advanced", but "medium", and Khrushchev himself the embodiment of "Lenin's wisdom."

It was April 17, 1964, the day of Khrushchev's seventieth birthday. In the magnificent Catherine's Hall of the Kremlin in the morning, a magnificent ceremony of declaring Khrushchev a "Hero" of the Soviet Union for the fourth time (he was three times "Hero of Socialist Labor") took place, and at 4 pm in the no less fabulous St. George's Hall of the Kremlin, the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers The USSR staged a gala dinner in honor of Khrushchev. The main speakers were: at the first ceremony - Brezhnev, and at the second - Mikoyan. Brezhnev, then Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme

Soviet of the USSR and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, said, among other things, the following: "Dear Nikita Sergeevich! anniversary, a well-deserved award - the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union (loud applause)." From what Brezhnev said further, the following words

deserve attention: "The Soviet people will always be grateful to you for the fact that, having become at the helm of the party, you showed a courageous initiative in exposing the Stalin personality cult ...

the Leninist norms of party and public life, the immortal spirit of Lenin was revived ... " Mikoyan spoke as

follows: "Dear friends! We have gathered here today, within the walls of the ancient Kremlin, to pay tribute to NS Khrushchev on the occasion of his 70th birthday. For strong physical health and a clear mind, we pay tribute to the parents of the hero of the day ... We used to think that 70 years is the age of an old man. The achievements of our revolution have shown that this is wrong. In Russia, the average age of a person was considered 32 years. Naturally, 70 years old was the age of the old man. Now, however, the victory of socialism in our country has raised the well-being of the people to such an extent that the average age in our country is now 70 years. Thus, today we are celebrating the anniversary of a middle-aged man who, as you can see, is in the prime of his strength and abilities... Each of us, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, candidates for members of the Presidium, secretaries of the Central Committee, has equally good, fraternal feelings for a comrade N. S. Khrushchev. Allow me, therefore, to announce our joint word on today's occasion: "Dear Nikita Sergeevich! We, your closest associates, especially

welcome and warmly congratulate you, our close friend and comrade, on your seventieth birthday. We see in your person the most prominent outstanding

Marxist-Leninist

figure

The Communist Party and the Soviet state, the international communist and workers' movement, the courageous fighter against imperialism... Your vigorous political and state activity, vast life experience and wisdom, inexhaustible energy and vital will, steadfastness and unshakable adherence to principles have won deep respect and love for you all communists, all Soviet people. We are happy to work hand in hand with you and take from you the example of the Leninist approach to solving problems of party life and state building ... With all our hearts we wish you good health, many years of life and new successes in your great and wonderful work.

We believe, our dear friend, that you have lived only half of your life. We wish you to live at least as much more" (all italics in these quotations are mine. - A. A.).



There are 25 signatures of members and candidates of the Presidium of the Central Committee and secretaries of the Central Committee, that is, all those who are now

sitting in the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. These same "closest comrades-in-arms and friends", who believed that Khrushchev was "in the prime of his life" and "middle age", a wise and "outstanding Marxist-Leninist", after six months "unanimously" declare him not only an old man of "advanced age", but also a voluntarist, subjectivist, that is, an anti-Leninist. What's the matter, what happened to Khrushchev in six months? Khrushchev reached the apogee of his power at the XXII Party Congress (1961). But just at this congress, Khrushchev demonstrated in the most obvious way how little he considers his colleagues in the Secretariat and the Presidium of the Central Committee. Khrushchev opened the congress, delivered an opening speech, Khrushchev made the first report - on the work of the Central Committee. Khrushchev made a second report - on the new Party Program. Khrushchev closed the congress with a closing speech (however, the current general secretary has fully accepted this "tradition" of Khrushchev). Stalin, whom Khrushchev exposes at this 22nd Congress as a usurper of the party's power, however, in such cases formally acted correctly. One member of the Politburo opened the congress, another member of the Politburo closed the congress. Stalin made his usual report, and other reports at the congress were made by the corresponding members of the Politburo or the Central Committee. After the 22nd Congress, Khrushchev generally ceased to reckon with the Secretariat and

the Presidium of the Central Committee. At all plenums of the Central Committee after the 22nd Congress (except for one, the ideological one in 1963),

only Khrushchev himself was the only speaker. Moreover, he convened plenums not to discuss his proposals, but to demonstrate his greatness and prosecutorial interrogation of members of the plenum, even members of the Presidium of the Central Committee (for example, at one of the plenums of the Central Committee, he publicly insulted a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee Podgorny and even ordered this insult to be published in the press). The plenum of the Central Committee, elected at the 22nd Congress, consisted of about 350 people, and Khrushchev convened up to 6,000 "active" people for a plenum of the Central Committee with the right to vote. Khrushchev's proposals, which probably did not pass through the Presidium of the Central Committee, were

considered himself so knowledgeable not only in big politics, but also in specific issues of technology, industry, agriculture, literature, painting, military art, that he interfered in all branches of the material and spiritual life of the country, gave personal advice that had to be understood as directives .

Stalin was considered the "luminary of all sciences", Khrushchev claimed to be the "luminary of all practices", and the Brezhnevs, Kosygin, Podgornys assured him that it was so. However, since antiquity it has been known: what befits Jupiter does not befit a bull! Stalin really was the "luminary" of one well-known science and one well-known art - science and the art of ruling. Stalin created an apparatus of personal power and placed it above the apparatus of party and state power (the famous "Personal Secretariat of Comrade Stalin" headed by General Poskrebyshev). Through this personal apparatus of power, Stalin not only

controlled the party, the army and the political police, through his universal spy network he followed the every move of his associates. The closer a comrade-in-arms stood to Stalin, the more and more thoroughly he was surrounded by spies. Khrushchev destroyed this apparatus of personal power of the first secretary of the Central Committee without creating any replacement for it. Thus, the fate of Khrushchev was in the hands of the highest apparatus of the Central Committee of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. When in 1957 the Presidium of the Central Committee rebelled against Khrushchev, he, relying on the Secretariat, dispersed this Presidium of the Central Committee. However, now that not only the Presidium of the Central Committee, but also the Secretariat of the Central Committee, rebelled against him, Khrushchev

The fatal decision to overthrow Khrushchev was dictated by Khrushchev himself, although he did not know what he was doing. This happened exactly three months before his overthrow, on July 15, 1964. On this day, at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, N. Khrushchev made the following proposal: "Comrade

deputies! You know that Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev was elected Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party at the plenum of the Central Committee in June 1963. The Central Committee considers it expedient that Comrade Brezhnev concentrate his activity in the Central Committee as Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In this regard, the Central Committee makes a proposal to release Comrade Brezhnev from the duties of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

recommends Comrade Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan. Before voting, I take the liberty of expressing my heartfelt gratitude to Comrade Brezhnev for his fruitful work as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and to Comrade Mikoyan with all my heart I wish him great success in his work as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Now there is no doubt that this decision was taken at the insistence of the conspirators in order to create legal and organizational-technical prerequisites for a future coup. Brezhnev was supposed to "concentrate his activities in the Central Committee" as its second secretary in order to prepare a conspiracy and for this to take under his direct control the apparatus of the Central Committee, the armed forces and the political police, which, in the absence of the first secretary of the Central Committee, are automatically subordinate to the second secretary of the Central Committee. Thus, not only the prerequisites were created, but also a guarantee of the success of the conspiracy. The appointment of Mikoyan as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was intended to legalize the coup d'état on behalf of the nominal supreme legislative body - the Soviet parliament. Since Khrushchev was not only the first secretary of the Central Committee, but also at the same time the chairman of the government and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, to legalize the coup, the signature of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council Mikoyan was required under the decree of the Supreme Council on the release of Khrushchev from his posts. This circumstance alone points to Mikoyan's active role in overthrowing Khrushchev, but Mikoyan, as usual, creates an alibi for himself in case the plot fails: at the end of September he leaves Moscow on vacation with Khrushchev, and together with Khrushchev spends his vacation in Sochi, in the country house next door to him. The latest information about the joint stay of Khrushchev and Mikoyan in Sochi refers to October 12, 1964, when they both spoke by radiotelephone from Khrushchev's office with the crew of the Voskhod spacecraft. During these hours, when the triumphant Khrushchev congratulated the cosmonauts, and Mikoyan, as Khrushchev himself puts it, "literally snatched" the pipe from his hands, in Moscow the conspirators decided his fate. In the light of subsequent events, it can be assumed that Mikoyan was assigned to Khrushchev in order, firstly, to keep him

opportunities in isolation from Moscow, and secondly, to keep the conspirators informed of Khrushchev's behavior and whereabouts. This role would suit Mikoyan quite well. In the event of the failure of the conspirators, he could calmly say: "Nikita Sergeevich, what do you want from me, after all, I was here with you, and not in Moscow."

The classic master of alibis, Mikoyan knew this time too what role to take on. In another respect, the conspirators acted more thoroughly than the Molotovites on June 18, 1957. When the Molotovites, having removed Khrushchev, wanted to publish this decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU in the party press and broadcast it on the Moscow radio, then, in full agreement with the existing subordination, the ideological officials answered: we are not subordinate to the Presidium of the Central Committee, but to the first secretary and his apparatus. Present the order of the First Secretary of the Central Committee on the printing of your communiqué! The conspirators this time, in 1964, did not expect such difficulties: the editor-in-chief of Pravda, Satyukov, and the chairman of the Radio Broadcasting Committee, Kharlamov, were sent on business trips abroad in advance, the editor-in-chief of Izvestia, Adzhubey, and the ideological secretary of the Central Committee, Ilyichev, were sent on internal "business trips". All more or less unreliable members of the Central Committee and marshals were also sent to the provinces to conduct various holidays and campaigns, on the contrary, reliable members of the Central Committee and marshals were summoned to Moscow under various pret

To maintain Khrushchev's sense of complete well-being, most members of the Presidium and Secretariat of the Central Committee were either on official business trips (Brezhnev in East Germany, Podgorny in Moldova) or on vacation (Suslov, Kirilenko, Shvernik). However, on the morning of Monday, October 12, all the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, except for Khrushchev and Mikoyan, by agreement already held, gather in Moscow and open a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee to discuss only one issue: the removal of Khrushchev. The conspirators submit their unanimous decision to remove Khrushchev to the formal approval of the plenum of those members of the Central Committee who had already been recruited in advance or whose critical attitude towards Khrushchev was beyond doubt. On the same day, Mikoyan also arrives in Moscow, whose signature is now needed to formalize the removal of Khrushchev through the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of th

Khrushchev found out not earlier than the morning of October 13th. This is established by the date and time of Khrushchev's reception of French Minister Gaston Palevsky. This reception, scheduled for 11 o'clock, was suddenly rescheduled for an unusual time for diplomatic receptions - at 9:30 o'clock. Palevsky was informed that this was due to the fact that Khrushchev had to fly to Moscow on urgent business. If Khrushchev had known that this was not about an "urgent matter" but about a catastrophe, then he would hardly have started talking to the French minister at all. However, Palevsky noted that Khrushchev, although he was in good health, was in a "nervous and depressed state" unusual for him. Probably already during this conversation, alarm signals from Moscow began to arrive to Khrushchev (official or private is unknown), as he interrupts the conversation half an hour earlier and flies to Moscow. Whether he flew alone and voluntarily is unknown, but it must be assumed that he flew away no longer as the first secretary and chairman of the government. It is also completely unknown whether the formalization of the removal of Khrushchev

took place at a plenum of elected members of the Central Committee in the presence of Khrushchev himself. Prudence and the provision of the maximum guarantee of success should have prompted the conspirators to completely isolate Khrushchev until the country, the party and the world knew that from now on the name of the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was Brezhnev, and the chairman of the Soviet government was Kosygin. All signs point to the fact that the conspirators did just that. The conspirators, taking into account the lesson of the defeat of the Molotovites on June 18, 1957, came to the plenum of elected members of the Central Committee not with the dynamic and explosive first secretary Khrushchev, but with a piece of paper on which Khrushchev's forced or falsified request to relieve him of his posts was entered. The usually well-informed American journalists Stuart Olson and Edmund Stevens wrote in the November issue (1964) of the Saturday Evening Post that a five-hour accusatory report at the plenum was made by the one who delivered an equally long defense report for Khrushchev against the Molotovites at the June plenum The Central Committee of the CPSU in 1957 - Suslov!

Well versed in Soviet affairs, Michel Tatu, a correspondent for the newspaper Le Monde in Moscow, cited the story of one of the members of the Central Committee of the CPSU about how Khrushchev was removed. This story

also confirms that Suslov was the main and only speaker at the plenum of the Central Committee against Khrushchev. According to this story, Khrushchev was at the plenum. Silent and gloomy, he did not sit in the presidium of the plenum of the Central Committee, but to the side, on a separate bench. That was the dock. In the official communique of the plenum of the Central Committee, the absence of the obligatory on-duty phrase "the decision was made unanimously" is striking, but in the communiqué on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet it is emphasized that "the decree on the release of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev from the duties of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted

unanimously." The organizer of the new conspiracy against Khrushchev was the one whom the Molotovites and Malenkovites threw out of the Secretariat and the Presidium of the Central Committee after the death of Stalin, and Khrushchev, after their liquidation, invited back - as his old friend L. Brezhnev. For a long time, Brezhnev was considered precisely a student and friend of Khrushchev. But the newly-appeared Moscow Caesar was not even allowed to shout to Brezhnev

## II. A REGIME IN MOTION A

very popular thesis not only in the West, but also in China, is that in the USSR Marxism-Leninism either suffers erosion, or the Kremlin "revises" it so thoroughly that only one name will soon remain of it. To clarify this issue, we must first clarify the definition: what is the essence of Marxism-Leninism as a general ideology and as a special doctrine of power.

As for ideology, the two leading postulates of Marxism Leninism asserted: 1. The

communist revolution, having nationalized the means of production and eliminated classes, already in the transitional period creates a new harmonious egalitarian society, where the highest official will not receive more remuneration for his work than the average worker. 2. On the basis of this, there will be a gradual

withering away of the communist state itself, that is, the "dictatorship of the proletariat", which will result in an unprecedented flourishing of civil rights and spiritual freedoms in the history of mankind. These are the main principles of communism, refuted by life as utopian, and

it was precisely these that were revised in the classical communist country - in the USSR. However, Marxism-Leninism

considered not only as a system of utopian dogmas that have been revised or bankrupt in practice ("communist ideology"), but also as a system of practical methods for creating, strengthening and expanding the power of a new type of partocracy, the basic principles of which have never been revised, but whose methods constantly subjected to modernization ("communist doctrine"). Indeed, what is Marxism-Leninism as a doctrine of communist domination, and what are its main components?

Marxism-Leninism, like a doctrine of communist domination, there is such a system of views, according to which: 1) in the field of economics - all the wealth of the country, all means of production, including human labor, are nationalized, stateized; 2) in the field of ideology - the whole culture and all spiritual life are imbued with the ideas of "party spirit", atheism and state-owned and monopolized by the communist party in the name of creating new communist people; 3) in the field of politics - the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat" was established (formerly as the "state of the working class", now allegedly as the "state of the whole people"), which, according to Lenin, can be realized only through the dictatorship of one, namely the communist party, which does not divide and cannot share power with other parties. Before the seizure of power, the core of professional revolutionaries leads the party itself, after the seizure of power - the hierarchy of the party apparatchiks.

Such was the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism under Lenin and Stalin. It remained that way even under Khrushchev. But that is how it is today. Neither Khrushchev nor his heirs changed any of the components mentioned above and are not going to change them.

Of course, there are changes, but they do not concern the content of the elements (components) of the system, but their forms, not the replacement of elements, but their displacement, not the change in the substance of the regime, but the

modernization of the methods of its rule. The entire corpus of the regime, based on the exact principles of communist ideology and doctrine, remains intact, as before, but two significant "movements" of elements are introduced: according to Lenin, power serves as an instrument of ideology, according to Stalin and his successors, on the contrary, ideology

serves as an instrument of power. This was precisely the result of the bankruptcy of communism on Russian soil as a form of harmonious stateless social community. The goal went bankrupt, but the means remained - power. This power has become an end in itself. In the apparatus of power, there was also a shift of elements: with Stalin, the political police were placed not only over the state, but also over the party, and terror was of a group preventive nature, among his heirs, the party (party apparatus) was placed over the political police, and terror became individual and applied only for the practical manifestation of disagreement with the regime. The police have ceased to be omnipotent, but the state has not ceased to be a police force. Since both the nature of the regime and its main material and spiritual components, albeit modernized and "relocated" within the same system, remain in force, the possibility of a relapse always remains open.

classical Stalinism.

The state of today's Soviet society is characterized by profound progressive, at times, changes in sociological the structure and culture of Soviet society, on the one hand, and the ever-increasing efforts of the apparatus of power not to let the ongoing processes out of its control, on the other.

More than three-quarters of the new Soviet society, not only in terms of social status, but also physically, is made up of people born and raised under the conditions of the Stalinist regime. Forced industrialization and the urbanization of the population growing on its basis, the forced collectivization of agriculture along with mechanization, systematically killing what Marx called "village idiocy", and Lenin - all-Russian "Oblomovism", were accompanied simultaneously by a broad cultural and technical revolution in the country. This is the second socio-industrial revolution of the communists created a new civil society and a new citizen: according to the passport of the Soviet, but in content - different both from the communist ideal, and from the pre-revolutionary illiterate Russian worker and illiterate Russian peasant. Lenin was absolutely right when he said that an illiterate person stands outside politics. The easier it was for the Bolsheviks to seize power over this pre-revolutionary



an illiterate person, the easier it was for Stalin to manage him, while the illiterate person was still studying. But the Soviet society of the early 50s, and even with its new generation of winners in the last Patriotic War, was a literate, demanding, assertive society. A new, literate person stands with both feet in politics, with obvious claims to complicity in doing politics, if not at the top, then in his own environment and in relation to his own needs. Stalin sensed the danger in time, and the "doctors' conspiracy" was, in fact, a pseudonym for Stalin's conspiracy against the new society and new citizens with real or potential claims. Stalin was preparing a second "Yezhovshchina", but did not have time. Stalin's heirs decided that it was wiser to meet the demands and aspirations of the new society: declaring Stalinism an alien phenomenon in the body of the party ("cult of personality"), condemnation of Stalin's crimes, a course towards raising the standard of living of the people, a course towards "coexistence" with the outside world - all this was far from a voluntary concession by the Kremlin in response to overt and covert pressure from the people. In connection with changes in the social structure of Soviet society (and on

their basis), the social degeneration of the party itself took place. From the party of people of physical labor (according to Lenin), it gradually became the party of people of

intellectual labor. Yesterday's party of the working class has become the party of the bureaucratic elite. From the point of view of ideology, the party lost because of this, but from the point of view of business, it won. The entire politically minded and state-ambitious stratum of Soviet society united in parties. The intellectuals joining the party have only one leading motive to make a career, because your place on the steps of the pyramid of power is directly proportional to the height of your standard of living. But the bureaucratic elite itself, constituting a total of about 6 million, or almost half of the entire Party (the rest are the "people's" facade of the Party in the person of the labor and collective farm aristocracy or the so-called "leaders of production"), is a more or less homogeneous mass only in the social relation, but legally it can be divided into two categories: 1) the leading and commanding bureaucracy - professional party apparatchiks

("party within a party"); 2) the rest of the service, departmental bureaucracy. The service, departmental bureaucracy itself can be divided into a number of "social and business groups": the generals of the army, the economic bureaucracy, the trade union bureaucracy, the scientific class, the technical intelligentsia, the administrative-Soviet bureaucracy, the police corps, the creative intelligentsia. These "new classes" or "socio-business groups", not being alien or hostile to the regime either by origin or by ideology, demand from the "leading and guiding force" - the apparatus of the CPSU - the recognition of their right to complicity in power. Yes, the party, as under Lenin, as under Stalin and Khrushchev, cannot share power with other parties, but the logic of development may put the party apparatus in front of the need to share its power with the party, that is, with "social and business groups" from within itself. parties which - each in its own sphere - are, as it were, "parties" ("parties within a party"). The party apparatus itself created both these groups and this Soviet society, but in its self-confidence regarding the inviolability of its monopoly on power, it did not take into account the danger: the forces it created clearly begin to exceed the possibility of its control and management not only physically, quantitatively, but also spiritually, qualitatively. . Thus, the highest Soviet society itself, represented by "socio-business groups", begins to exert a reverse influence on the "leading and guiding force" - on the party apparatus - to the same extent that life puts forward new situations and new tasks.

All this leads to the fact that the monolith of power is shattered. Faith itself is shaken not only in its infallibility, but also in its legitimacy and exclusivity. Until now, this monolith has been the party apparatus. He was also a monofactor of power. Therefore, now for the first time we are present with a clearly visible (but not yet formalized) phenomenon: a tendency towards the formation of a pluralism of power factors - the party apparatus, on the one hand, and the above-mentioned "social and business groups", on the other. In contrast to Stalin's times, these "social business groups" no longer want to be the objects of politics, but want to be its subjects. More and more boldly they begin, each group in its own area, to encroach on the monopoly of power of the party apparatchiks. Feature of the current stage as

once it lies in the fact that there is a hidden and stubborn struggle between the party apparatus (for protecting their monopoly of power) and these groups (however, very similar, but not identical, with the American "prescher groups") - for the legal right to participate in this power. Already in the Party itself, the quantitative and qualitative correlation between the group of party apparatchiks and these "social business groups" is such that it becomes more and more difficult for the party apparatchiks to withstand their pressure every day: 300,000 party apparatchiks oppose more than six million representatives of intellectual labor from the Party itself. These "social and business groups", in fact, are the party, whose power was usurped by the party apparatchiks. Moreover, it is necessary to point out another important circumstance: the party apparatus itself, although it is recruited from among these same groups, but not from their best representatives, in terms of business qualities, but from political careerists.

The incredibly complicated technology of the power of a gigantic state, which has to solve the problems of big world politics along with countless internal problems - up to the production of needles, now makes such high political and business demands on the party apparatchiks in the field of leadership that they, against their own will, more and more often begin to "consult" not only with the party, but also with the people. This circumstance just strikes at that sacred principle of the party apparatus, according to which the party apparatus claimed not only a monopoly of power, but also a monopoly of wisdom. At the same time, in all the time of its history, Soviet Russia was headed by people with such a limited political fantasy and with such a panicky fear of big political decisions as they are today. At the highest level of leadership, there is not only a group struggle for power (it will always continue until a new dictator appears), but, most importantly, all the signs available to our observation indicate that this time the struggle is not just for power, but for the reorganization of the structure, the mechanism of power, as a direct result of the ever-increasing pressure of the above-mentioned "socio-business groups." Some of these groups played a prominent role in the overthrow of Khrushchev (army), others played an equally prominent role in

rehabilitation of capitalist categories in Soviet industry in the form of the September reforms of 1965 (business executives, technical intelligentsia), still others by organized pressure prevented the rehabilitation of Stalin at the 23rd Congress (academic class, creative intelligentsia), and still others seek even the restoration of Soviet power in the Soviet Union (dissenters). Of course, none of these groups is anti-Soviet. And all their demands serve a dual purpose: firstly, to deprive the party apparatus of its historically established exclusive position of "a party within a party", placing it under the control of the party; secondly, to legalize one's own right to participate both in general policy at the highest level and in sectoral policy in the sphere of action of each of the "socio-business groups".

If the above analysis of the state of the party and Soviet society is at least approximately correct, then what is the conclusion from this? In other words, where is the Soviet Union heading in its internal political development? Many Western experts predict in the field of economics the "convergence" (convergence) of the Soviet industrial society with the Western one at some future stage of development according to a single "industrial model". Can this hypothesis be extended to the political development of the USSR? To be more precise: is the USSR moving towards a deformation of the regime?

Any answer to this question must take into account historical experience: a new form of government, as a rule, appears as a result of a revolution from below, as an exception - as a result of a revolution from above. Administrative and economic reforms only modernize the existing regime, but do not change its nature. The only type of reforms that may turn out to be deadly for a totalitarian regime in the future is the admission of freedom of spiritual creativity. That's just this reform the Kremlin categorically does not want to give the country. However, one thing is the subjective will of the Kremlin ("subjectivism" and "voluntarism"!), but another thing is its objective capabilities and objective conditions. If we take only one given question - the question of spiritual freedoms, then only the Chekist corps from the "social and business groups" supports the party apparatchiks to the end, and the scientific corporation, the technical intelligentsia and the creative intelligentsia achieve these freedoms,

while the position of the groups (the generals, the economic bureaucracy, the Soviet bureaucracy) is more or less neutral. But, as noted above, the problem of Soviet development itself was posed broader than the particular, albeit extremely important question of spiritual freedoms: either to follow the old, tried, and still successful path of the dictatorship of the hierarchy of party apparatchiks, or, taking into account the prevailing objective conditions, to recognize the need and the inevitability of participation in power by representatives of all "social business groups." The

party apparatus that ignores or sabotages such development only provokes the growth of centrifugal pluralistic forces. This is precisely what poses in a new way that fateful problem that was completely absent under personal dictatorship, the problem of relations between the party apparatus and the party, on the one hand, and between the party and the state, on the other. Under personal dictatorship, these relationships are clear and simple. The dictator controls the party apparatus, the party apparatus controls the party, and the party controls the state. The Soviet state was transformed (let's say "to use the terminology of the Communist Manifesto") simply into a technical committee in charge of party affairs. "Social business groups", fighting for their equality with the party bureaucracy in the party and full rights in the sphere of their actions in the state, are fighting the same time for the emancipation of the Soviet state. They want to return the state - the state, the party - the party. The strangeness of the situation lies in the fact that, according to the fundamental law of the CPSU ("Charter of the CPSU"), the party apparatus is only the executive body of the party, in the same way, as according to the basic law of the Soviet state ("The Constitution of the USSR"), the highest legislative power in the USSR belongs not to the party apparatus, not even to the party, but to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, formally elected by all the people. are only caused by socio-political development in the party and the state, but they are also completely legal, since they are based on the existing basic laws.

Among the reasons contributing to the general development in this direction, we must also point out the ongoing structural crisis of top management. After exposing the methods of the "cult

personality" of Stalin and "voluntarism" of Khrushchev, the Kremlin introduced the so-called "Leninist norms" of collectivity in leadership. Being in themselves a very serious gap in the system of omnipotence of the party apparatus, they also mean the first admission of "social business groups" to limited and conditional complicity in power. However, this creates at the very top of the pyramid of power a situation that is completely paradoxical for a dictatorial regime - the anarchy of its executive power. We only state the actual situation if we say: General Secretary Brezhnev, Prime Minister Kosygin and President Podgorny, taken together, have less executive power, than the president in the United States or the prime minister in England. Western constitutions draw clear boundaries between the prerogatives of the legislature and the executive, with precise limits on the rights and duties of heads of state and government. The Soviet constitution and Party Charter speak of the rights and duties of only government bodies, deliberately ignoring the rights and duties of their leaders. Hence the introduction of "Leninist norms"

collectivity in

leadership at the highest level means that Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny, in each individual case, implement only those collective decisions that a meeting of the Politburo makes on each individual issue. The abnormality of the situation and the weakness of the Soviet executive power is clearly visible already from the fact that if, during a vote in the Politburo (15 people), the joint proposal of Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny is rejected by a majority of at least one vote, then the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme The Soviets of the USSR are deprived of the legal opportunity to take any further action on this issue, because a one-vote majority in the Politburo means a veto by the legislative branch, dooming the executive branch to inaction. That is why the current regime bears a clear imprint of the colorless personalities of the "collective leadership", which does not have the initiative to raise large internal and external problems, is unable to make proper decisions on them, and lacks a bright strong-willed leader. The strongest dictatorship in history has the weakest executive

power.

Exit?

Either a new and strong dictator at the pinnacle of power, or the extension of the principle of democracy from the Politburo to the entire party. The party is afraid of the first, the party apparatus does not allow the second. Now the struggle is around the decision of this alternative. If it had been decided in favor of the party, then this could have been a prelude to the democratization of Soviet society and the state.

1967

### III. FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO BREZHNEV: PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES OF COLLECTIVE

LEADERSHIP Both theoretical calculations and the historical experience of the party itself showed that collegiality in leadership under a dictatorship is an unnatural phenomenon, and therefore temporary.

The logic of things suggested that a sole dictator would take the place of the college of dictators. Meanwhile, the collective dictatorship, called collective leadership, exists, and it exists not as a propaganda fiction, but as a reality. This phenomenon has its own specific causes. It is important to note some of them. The collective leadership was formed on the basis of the

denial and condemnation of two, one after the other, regimes of personal dictatorship - Stalin and Khrushchev. Both of these regimes, although to varying degrees, were based on arbitrariness, the victims of which were not only mere mortals, but also the leading representatives of the party apparatchiks themselves. In order to avoid this in the future, the new leadership proclaimed the so-called "Leninist principles of party leadership", according to which the highest executive power of the party (the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the general secretary) implements only those decisions that are adopted by the majority of members of the party legislative power (the Politburo of the Central Committee), even if the heads of the party (Brezhnev), the government (Kosygin), and the state (Podgorny) themselves voted against this decision. Since the Charter of the Party does not know the right of veto of the heads of the executive branch or party arbitration in case of disagreement with the legislature (except for an appeal to a plenum of the Central Committee or a congress, which is tantamount to a split or even a coup), the majorization of executive power with

the side of the ordinary majority of the Politburo not only prevents the arbitrariness of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, but at the same time paralyzes its current work. Instead of the former illegal arbitrariness of the Secretariat, we now have the completely legitimate

arbitrariness of the Politburo. That is one reason. Another reason for the longevity of collective leadership must be sought in its colorlessness. The members of the collective leadership are yesterday's provincial leaders. For decades they thought in terms of the scale of the provinces and the mind of their bosses from the center, and today they found themselves, more or less by accident (there are thousands, if not tens of thousands like them in the CPSU), at the head of a world power with its gigantic problems. They are similar to each other not only in their colorlessness, but also in their lack of ambition. It is quite obvious that the future sole dictator is not in this collective. The third

reason for the longevity of the collective leadership lies in its inaction and, as a result of this, in its barrenness, unparalleled in the history of the regime. Never, perhaps, the USSR faced such a number of complex internal and external problems as today. But collective leadership prolongs its life by not solving them. If it eventually perishes, it will not be through action, but through inaction. Of the foreign policy reasons that

contributed to the stabilization of the collective leadership, at least two must be pointed out. Western policy did not and does not pose any "puzzling" problems for Soviet foreign policy. Rather the opposite. Based on the dubious choice theory of the "lesser evil" (Moscow or Beijing) and the complex premise of an alleged rebirth of Soviet communism, Western politics has put forward a program of appeasement and convergence with the Kremlin. Beijing also helped to consolidate the collective leadership. The Chinese Communist Party's vicious anti-Soviet campaign against the "Khrushchev clique without Khrushchev" sometimes took the form of a clearly anti-Russian, revanchist campaign. Chinese "cultural revolutionaries" on the borders of their former lands from Vladivostok to Alma-Ata rattled not only Mao's "quotes", but also the real



weapons. On the issue of the Chinese danger, the interests of the collective leadership, the party and the country turned

out to be identical. The current collective leadership is not only colorless in politics, lack of initiative in work, indecisive in actions, but it is also physically unpromising. The average age of the Politburo members with whom Lenin made the October Revolution was 35 years old, only Lenin was 47 years old. The members of the Politburo with whom Stalin began his era were, on average, a little over 40 years old, Stalin himself was 50 years old. The average age of members of the current Brezhnev Politburo is 61 years, and Brezhnev himself is 62 years old. People at this age do not make revolutions

and do not perform miracles in politics. One of the most widespread prejudices of our time is the assertion that since the time of Khrushchev, an evolution began in the USSR, a rebirth of the regime. Yes, Khrushchev destroyed Stalin's personality cult, but he did not destroy and did not intend to destroy what was the root cause of all cults - the system of party police power. After all, the cult of Stalin was only an external personification of this permanent system of power. Therefore, through a series of liberal reforms and neo-Stalinist relapses, Khrushchev, by the very nature of power, was forced to return to the same "cult of personality" with the destruction of which he began his new career, this time to his own cult. The difference between the two cults was not in principle, but in methods. The new leadership of Brezhnev-Kosygin, in turn, condemning the cult of Khrushchev's personality in the most original way (total omission of his name), vigorously promotes the cult of collective leadership - the cult of the Politburo. But, unlike Khrushchev, the collective leadership understood well that it was simply unnatural to curse the cult in general and Stalin in particular, being forced to govern precisely in the Stalinist way, although without Stalinist extremes. After all, what is Stalinism as a political doctrine? Stalinism is both a science and an art about permanent principles of government, one-party dictatorship and changing methods of governing the party and the people. The principles of dictatorship are constant, the methods of dictatorship are subject to change - from bloody purges under Stalin to legalized lawlessness under the new collective leadership (trials of dissidents, psycho-prisons).

Thus, in essence, the regime remains inviolable. The Stalinist dictatorship

represented the communist regime, so to speak, in its pure, classical form. Therefore, it was very simple and clear to trace the interconnection and interaction of its main elements. There were two such elements: the leading and guiding force - the political police, the auxiliary force - the party, during mass terror against the eventual enemies of the people.

All Khrushchev's merit before history and the essence of his struggle against Stalin's personality cult consisted in only one thing: he turned this formula of power upside down; the hierarchy of party apparatchiks became the leading force, the political police became an auxiliary force, and terror ceased to be massive. From all this, of course, the Khrushchev regime, like the current one, did not cease to be a policeman, but the police ceased to be omnipotent. However, the psychological gain was colossal - the outside world, in need of an illusion, began to talk about the degeneration of communism. But just the overthrow of Khrushchev showed that the political regime existing in the USSR can exist only as a Stalinist regime, or it will completely perish. Lenin only managed to lay the foundations of the dictatorship, but he still had many Marxist utopian ideas - up to the assertion that the entire period of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" from capitalism to socialism is a period of a slow but rapid process of self-liquidation of the dictatorship and the state in general ("State and Revolution") and that already after the liquidation of the old exploiting classes in Soviet Russia, any restriction of civil rights and political freedoms is automatically lifted ("Program of the Party" of 1919). It was in this cardinal question of the prospects for power, its scope, its breadth and depth, that Stalin openly revised both Marx and Lenin (the January Plenum of the Central Committee in 1933, the 18th Party Congress in 1939). Stalin put forward a "dialectical" thesis, which became the guiding idea of communist totalitarianism, namely: the withering away of the state of the USSR will come not through the weakening of the organs of dictatorship, but through their maximum strengthening. This, in fact, was a new chapter in the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, associated with the name of Stalin. It doesn't take much imagination to imagine what happened.

with the regime if Khrushchev or anyone else decided to abandon the theory and practice of Stalin in this fateful question and return to the theory (withering away of the dictatorship) and to the supposed practice (lifting of restrictions on freedoms) of Lenin.

The objective tendency of Khrushchev's "voluntarism" with his unceremonious reprisal against the name of Stalin threatened to undermine the foundations on which the regime rests. Those around Khrushchev began to think that the logical end of Khrushchev's rule could be the death of the regime. Not hatred for Khrushchev, not love for Stalin, but the instinct of self-preservation prompted the Khrushchevites to revolt against Khrushchev.

The current, second collective leadership is the second, degraded edition of the first, post-Stalinist collective leadership. For the same reasons that the current, second collective leadership rehabilitated the name of Stalin, the first collective leadership resisted Khrushchev's course of exposing Stalin. Of course, the Kremlin knows that after the 20th and 22nd Congresses it is impossible to govern the country in the name of Stalin, but they also know something else: in order to govern in the Stalinist way, one does not need to appeal to

his name.

From the outside, it seems difficult to draw a line between the Khrushchev and post-Khrushchev regimes. Beijing even calls this regime Khrushchev without Khrushchev. However, a closer examination of the practice of collective leadership reveals a rather significant difference. It consists of the following elements of domestic and foreign policy: In domestic policy: the conditional rehabilitation of Stalin; new condemnation of the anti-Stalinist oppositions - Trotskyists, Zinovievites and Bukharinites;

open rehabilitation in the spiritual  
life of Zhdanovism methods; cancellation of  
the decision of the XXII Congress on the introduction of a normalized principle of  
systematic renewal of party  
apparatchiks from top to bottom;

restoration of the Stalinist principle of centralization; restoration of the  
primacy of the development of the military industry and  
funding priority for the armed forces.

In foreign policy:

1) revolutionizing the "coexistence" formula (instead of Khrushchev's one-term formula "peaceful coexistence is the general line of Soviet foreign policy", a "five-term" formula was introduced, in which the elements of the "general line" in foreign policy are declared: a) defense and unity of the socialist camp; b) assistance to the world communist movement; c) assistance to the national liberation movement; d) struggle against imperialism and colonialism; e) peaceful coexistence as an irreconcilable class struggle of ideologies);

escalation of military-material intervention in the countries of wars, uprisings,

revolutions (Vietnam, Cuba, the Middle East) in order to gain political predominance there; forcing an actual split in the world communist movement against Beijing in

order to secure for Moscow the role of the center of world communism; shift in the ideological work of the party from the formula "communism in our

country" to the formula of the world revolution (politburo member V. Grishin: "Our party sacredly fulfills Lenin's order: to achieve the maximum feasible in one country to promote and develop the cause of the world socialist revolution." - Pravda, April 23, 1968). Behind the outer façade of harmony and prosperity in the Kremlin, in fact, there is a struggle between two trends that are clearly

expressed in all Soviet politics: neo-Stalinist, orthodox, and revisionist, reformist. Given the present state of our information, it is, of course, only conditionally possible to attribute one or another member of the collective

leadership to one or another of these tendencies. And yet, guided by a number of criteria and indirect data both from the past career and from the current practice of each of the members of the Politburo, it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that the neo-Stalinist trend is led by Suslov and Brezhnev, and the reformist one by Kosygin and Podgorny. The division of the "Great Four" into party apparatchiks (Suslov, Brezhnev) and state apparatchiks (Kosygin, Podgorny) that is striking here is by no means accidental. Dogmatists and orthodoxies sit in the party apparatus, while reformers and

pragmatists - in the state and economic apparatus. The struggle between these two tendencies is, in fact, the struggle between the orthodox dogmatists from the party apparatus and the pragmatic reformers from the state apparatus. During Stalin's lifetime, such a struggle "for spheres of influence" was ruled out not only by the personal union of party and state power, but also by the imperious nature of Stalin himself. When such a struggle first began under Khrushchev, Khrushchev decided to resort to the Stalinist principle of personal union. The first secretary of the party became head of government. But the struggle continued with varying success for its participants, until the matter ended with a new division of "spheres of influence": after the overthrow of Khrushchev, as well as after the death of Stalin, government power (Chairman of the Council of Ministers) was separated from party power (General Secretary of the Central Committee). This not only prevented the possibility of a one-man dictatorship (this was, of course, the decisive reason), but it was also a step towards those who sought the emancipation of the state apparatus from the party

one. However, these "departmental" disputes do not lie at the heart of the struggle between the two tendencies under consideration. In the broad sense of the word, the representatives of both tendencies are party apparatchiks, and their departmental actions only reflect the specific and permanent contradictions of the two apparatuses.

Yesterday's party apparatchik, having become today a state apparatchik, transfers here his sovereign methods of the party ruler, which leads him into a clash with his junior colleagues who remained in the party apparatus and who, by the nature of the system, must continue to give "guiding instructions" even to him, yesterday old party apparatchik. The struggle between

these two tendencies is a deeper phenomenon, reflecting a qualitatively new stage in the sociological development of Soviet society. A situation is being created where Marx's well-known statement from the preface to "The Critique of Political Economy" may turn out to be prophetic precisely in relation to Soviet society: "At a certain stage of its development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing production relations ... From the form of development of productive forces these relationships turn into their

fetter. Then the epoch of social revolution sets in" (1949, p. 7). It cannot be denied that the Soviet type of production relations in the initial period of the development of Soviet society contributed to the development of the greatest industrial and scientific and technological revolution. But this revolution, passing into a new, higher phase of its development, came into conflict with the production relations that created it (party, plan, control), moreover, it itself has already created new pluralistic forces, new social classes (bureaucracy, technical intelligentsia, scientific corporation, creative elite), which has become only painfully under the old plan and control, but also closely within the framework of the old dogmatic party. Khrushchev wanted to resolve the created contradiction in the

economy by bureaucratic means - hence a whole series of his departmental reorganizations. Practice has shown the futility of all attempts to bring the Soviet economy out of the impasse by bureaucratic measures. Khrushchev's heirs approached to the case from another, more reasonable end. They correctly diagnosed that the disease of the Soviet economy, in which 50% of industrial enterprises operate unprofitably, is a disease of a socio-structural order. Therefore, the treatment must be appropriate. Hence the conditional rehabilitation of value levers (profit) and market categories (price, premiums, credit) in the Soviet economy. Most of the state farms worked at a loss, most of the collective farms were unprofitable. Therefore, the party adopted a number of resolutions, according to which the principles of industrial reform are extended to agriculture.

Since the reforms are not only of a forced nature (Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Baibakov stated: "It is partly possible to agree that the reform is of a forced nature." - TSB Yearbook, 1967, p. 26), but are also half-hearted and inconsistent, they only soften actions rather than eliminate the permanent causes of the structural crisis of the Soviet economy. Centralized bureaucratic planning and the dogmatic postulates of socialist management become fetters for the further successful development of the national economy of the USSR. Of course, it may still be a long way from this state to the "epoch of social revolution", but one thing is certain: the logic of the further development of the structural

crisis, on the one hand, and under the threat of losing the notorious competition between the "two systems", on the other hand, the Kremlin will eventually be faced with a difficult dilemma: either to stay further than the current system and then risk losing the pace of development and further deepening the crisis, or finally release the national economy from dogmatic shackles, having as a result chances of becoming a really serious adversary of the West in the international economic arena.

This dilemma is particularly acute in the area of agricultural development. In the Kremlin, the point of view that the cause of the permanent crisis of underproduction of agricultural products is not of a bureaucratic or even agrotechnical nature, as Khrushchev thought, but of a socio-structural order, is increasingly beginning to take over in the Kremlin.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of May 16, 1966 on agriculture proves this. According to this decree, Lenin's "cooperative plan" begins to take the form of "nationalization of collective farms" with guaranteed cash wages, insurance, pensions, and even the prospect of accepting collective farmers as members of trade unions (see D. Polyansky's article - Kommunist, No 15, 1967) . All this significantly changes the content of the Stalinist collective farms,

leaving their form intact. Unlike the current leaders of the Kremlin, Khrushchev still had the will to make a decision. His "voluntarism" and "subjectivism" manifested themselves precisely in the endless, sometimes contradictory, activities in search of solutions to acute problems. He solved them, but did not allow them. But they were not allowed and the people who overthrew him. Corroded by internal contradictions over the methods and ways of their own economic policy, the members of the collective leadership generally ceased to change anything.

Two trends, perhaps even two points of view - dogmatic and reformist - in the definition and establishment of a long-term economic policy do not find a compromise solution. Hence - the eternal postponing of issues on which they cannot reach unanimity, according to the principle - "do not resolve controversial issues."

If we move from the field of general politics to ideology, then here we see that recently the orthodox neo-Stalinist line in the leadership has clearly gained the upper hand. This is largely due to the fact that Khrushchev, during the purge of the Central Committee of Stalin's comrades-in-arms (the "anti-party group"), left intact the entire Stalinist ideological headquarters of the Central Committee, headed by Suslov. All of its leading cadres, cleverly adapting to Khrushchev's "anti-cult" policy, remained in their posts both in the Central Committee and in the main ideological institutions of the party. Left to take the stage when their time comes. Here it is today. Actually, they themselves organized the arrival of this time. Having set in motion all the ideological levers and taking advantage of the theoretical helplessness of the members of the collective leadership, yesterday's disciples of Stalin from Suslov's headquarters created a new concept about Stalin. According to this concept, it turns out that there was no "period of the personality cult" at all. Stalin was not a criminal at all, but was always a Leninist who committed some violations of Soviet legality. His theoretical works are quite Marxist, and his role in the Second World War is beyond all criticism. The 20th and 22nd Congresses went too far in assessing Stalin because of Khrushchev's "subjectivism". In the light of this new concept, the Soviet press appears to have been instructed to stop criticizing Stalin. From now on, it is allowed to use his works, to quote them in a positive way.

This is how the neo-Stalinist line took shape on the entire ideological front. Individual Soviet writers and intellectuals who opposed neo-Stalinism were persecuted (Academician Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, Yakir, Litvinov), expelled from the party (Prof. Nekrich) or even imprisoned in psychoprisons (General Pyotr Grigorenko, Tarsis, Yesenin-Volpin). The intellectual opposition is no longer spoken to at meetings in the Central Committee of the CPSU, as under Khrushchev, but in the offices of KGB investigators and in the halls of closed courts, staged according to purely Stalinist recipes (Sinyavsky, Daniel, etc.). Nevertheless, there is no reason to consider this dominant neo-Stalinist line as the unanimous line of the entire collective leadership.

Quite unanimous in matters of preserving and strengthening the existing regime, members of the collective leadership can



to have, as often happens in the history of a given party, different opinions about the ways and methods of achieving this goal. This probably explains why the victorious neo-Stalinist line still does not dare to go on a full-scale offensive against the intellectual opposition with the help of mass purges, although the rights won by the intellectual opposition in secret are growing every day. These rights include: the right to disagree with the party, the right not to be recognized at political trials, the right to "samizdat", the right to draw up collective protests criticizing the official line, the right to appeal to foreign countries, the right to listen to foreign radio broadcasts. In Stalin's time, each of these "rights" was considered criminal and punished for their implementation. Of course, the authorities are trying to prevent such actions, but "private rights" are gradually becoming "customary rights" of Soviet citizens. The range of such rights will expand. Their undermining foundations of the regime of action will be formidable. Despite the obvious victory of neo-Stalinism in ideology,

nevertheless, until the April plenum of the Central Committee (1968), the Kremlin's ideological line was not clear, consistent and unified. Here, too, there is a duality. The only question is to what extent this duality reflected the internal state of the collective leadership, whether it was the result of two trends in the field of ideology, or whether we were dealing with a conscious eclectic politics "both yours and ours." Let us explain what has been said with two typical examples from the realm of ideology. On January 27, 1967, Pravda published a well-known editorial entitled: "When they are behind the times." The article was devoted to two journals: the dogmatic "October" and the "liberal" "New World". Pointing to the existing opinion that in art periodicals these two organs represent, as it were, "two poles," Pravda criticized both the dogmatism of October and the "liberalism" of Novy Mir in almost the same words and in the same proportion. "Truth" prescribed the middle line.

Second example. In the same "October" (No 1, 1968) a poem appeared in which the poet extolled the cult of Stalin, praised the film "The Fall of Berlin" (this film was also condemned at the 20th Congress as a vivid manifestation of the cult of Stalin).

The editor-in-chief of October, Kochetov, is an ideological functionary of the Central Committee. And he knows what he is doing by printing such poems. But here is another ideological functionary of the Central Committee - the editor-in-chief of Literaturnaya Gazeta Chakovsky - publishes Sinelnikov's answer to October: "This poem causes bewilderment and protest. Its author, entering into a sharp contradiction with the real course of life, confuses clear questions on which the Party has spoken its persuasive word" (March 20, 1968). Let us note that Kochetov and Chakovsky are not only ideological functionaries of the Central Committee, but both of them are listed as hard-nosed dogmatists. It is this duality in the ideological policy of the party that Brezhnev puts an end to in his speech of

March 29, 1968 at the Moscow City Party Conference. In this speech, Brezhnev essentially declared war on the entire Soviet progressive, politically minded intelligentsia. Brezhnev said: "Bourgeois ideologists hope to somehow influence the worldview of certain groups of Soviet people, to dull their class consciousness ... In their network, people are sometimes greedy for self-promotion, ready to declare themselves as loudly as possible, not disdaining the praises of our ideological opponents ... (Italics mine. - A. A.) And Brezhnev ends his speech with a threat: "... renegades cannot count on impunity" (Pravda, March 30, 1968). Two days later - April 2 - Pravda commented on Brezhnev's speech with the following significant words: "The Party has always resolutely opposed both wholesale distrust and populist ideas about the intelligentsia as the only "salt of the earth"! The meaning of the quotation is perfectly clear. The Soviet intelligentsia, which has been praised up to now (see "Program of the Party"), should henceforth know its place and should not think that it is the "salt of the earth." At the same time, notes of the most serious anxiety can be heard in Pravda's commentary. Pravda says: "In the struggle against socialism, its enemies are making every effort to undermine the main foundation of our society - the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, to quarrel them with the working intelligentsia" (Pravda, April 2, 1968, italics mine. - A.

A.). The culmination of the campaign against the intelligentsia was the April (1968) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Formally, the plenum was devoted to "Actual Problems of the International Situation and the S

for the unity of the world communist movement" (this was the title of L. Brezhnev's report), but in fact he analyzed the internal situation, namely, the situation among the Soviet intelligentsia. The existence of an intellectual opposition in the USSR became such a formidable factor in the eyes of the collective leadership that it forgot about any internal the fate of Novotny and his clique in Czechoslovakia showed the Kremlin what the intelligentsia is capable of if it is not curbed in time. Therefore, the central point of the decision of the plenum of the Central Committee reads: resolute exposure of the intrigues of imperialism, the communist education of members of the CPSU and all working people, the strengthening of the entire ideological activity of the party acquires special significance, is one of the main duties of all party organizations ... To conduct an offensive struggle against bourgeois ideology, actively oppose attempts to smuggle in individual works of literature, art and other works of views "alien to the socialist ideology of Soviet society" (Pravda, April 11, 1968). There is nothing fundamentally new in this decree - it literally repeats a series of ideological decrees by Stalin and Zhdanov after the war. But the situation itself is fundamentally new, the conditions are new, the people with whom the Kremlin is now dealing are

new. What is new is that for the first time since the 1920s, opposition currents appear within the party itself. Finally, what is new is that for the first time in the history of the USSR, the intelligentsia is beginning to become the leading force in Soviet society, clearly opposing itself to the official leading force of the state - the party apparatchiks.

The history of state formations does not know a more perfect machine of tyrannical rule than the Soviet one. Its management is brought in its perfection to the absolute. In it, the Bolsheviks discovered that desired "perpetuum mobile", which works flawlessly even in the conditions of the greatest national crisis (civil war, World War II) or a political crisis among its leaders at the highest level (the opposition under Lenin and Stalin, the "anti-party group" under Khrushchev). Ruthless by

in relation to the people, this machine is also merciless to its own drivers, if they come into conflict with the laws of its movement (Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Beria, Molotov, Malenkov, Khrushchev). It can be upgraded, but it is not capable of deformation and is immunized against evolution. Any suggestions that it can evolve, say, towards liberalism in government, are based either on a complete misunderstanding of its design, or on misinformation of the machine itself. If, nevertheless, processes towards liberalism have taken place and are taking place in Soviet society, then they are taking place not at the will of the machine, but in spite of it. Society is evolving, not the regime. The regime is only being upgraded. Modernizing, he tries to meet society halfway with a number of the

most inevitable reforms, but such reforms do not concern the organization, and even more so the nature of power. The deepest and dominant feature of the development of Soviet society and the state is the growing contradiction between the official leading force of the state, the party apparatchiks, and the unofficial leading force of Soviet society, the Soviet intelligentsia. The objective course of the development of industrial society, the unprecedented Soviet flourishing of science and technology, the revolution in management (automation, cybernetics, electronics), all this put forward precisely the intelligentsia at the head of Soviet society. The formal affiliation of a large part of this intelligentsia to the Party was interpreted earlier as proof of the "leading role" of the Party here, too. But now every day it becomes clear that the party apparatchiks take what they wish for reality. The leading role of the Soviet creative intelligentsia in the field of the spiritual life of Soviet society is growing to the same extent. The Soviet intelligentsia, whether party or non-party, this is just a formality, wants to be what the intelligentsia is in any society - namely, the leading force of the nation, its conscience, its teacher. "Some 'creative figures' claim to be the teachers of the people," the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya complained about this (April 13, 1968). This is where it comes into deep conflict with the party apparatchiks, who really represented the leading force when there was no mass intelligentsia. Brezhnev did not find any arguments against this historical claim of the Soviet intelligentsia, but instead

found another quote from Lenin. Brezhnev said: "The entire experience of our construction has confirmed the validity of the words of V. I. Lenin that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible otherwise than through the Communist Party" (Pravda, March 30, 1968). now "a state of the whole people," but at the same time added meaningfully: "... continuing the cause of the dictatorship of the proletariat." In a word, we have a dictatorship as it was, and there is, and the intelligentsia should not forget this. Only in this conflict between the party and the intelligentsia lies the reason why the collective leadership still does not bother to publish the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR, on which they have been working since the time of Khrushchev.

the new Constitution, in comparison with the old, Stalinist, will be the Constitution of the further democratization of the life of Soviet society. The Politburo clearly refused to fulfill this promise. The reason is clearer than ever: it is psychologically impossible to give the people less than Stalin himself gave, but to give them more -

politically impossible.

In a report on behalf of the Politburo on Lenin's birthday, V. Grishin more or less frankly stated that there were two tendencies in the party: one leading to a belittling of the role of the party, the elimination of the omnipotence of the party, the other, on the contrary, striving to strengthen the bureaucratic centralization of the party. Grishin outlined the Politburo's line on this issue as follows: "Unacceptable as spontaneity, boundless decentralization, reducing the role of the party to the political and educational level of organization, bureaucratic centralization, which means the elimination of intra-party democracy, undermining the collective party leadership" (Pravda, April 23, 1968. ; my italics. - A. A.). Of course, Grishin did not want to be specific; he did not say where these tendencies were represented. Specific was his threat to the intellectual opposition. Here he simply cited Lenin's words: "We are not obliged to go hand in hand with the active promoters of the views rejected by the majority of the Party" (Pravda, April 23, 1968). He added: "The party's indestructible ideological and organizational solidarity is the source of its invincibility" (ibid.; italics

my .- A. A.).

From this, of course, one cannot conclude that the collective leadership is going through a crisis of unity, but another conclusion can and should be drawn: the party is going through a crisis of ideological unity, and the collective leadership is going through a crisis of confidence in its ability to solve the pressing problems of the country. 1968

#### IV. PROBLEMS OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN KREMLIN LEADERSHIP

If no extraordinary events occur, then in the next decade the third generation of Bolshevism will come to power in the highest and middle party apparatus, consisting

mostly from people who joined the party after Stalin's death. To what extent the issue of generational change in the apparatus of the CPSU is already becoming relevant is shown by the following data on the age dynamics of both the party itself and its highest body - the Central Committee of the CPSU - as of 1966-1967:

in the party in the Central Committee in the Politburo Communists over 50 years old,% Communists under 40 years old,%

22.9 77.1 50.6 11.1 100.0 00.0 (Sources: Yearbook of the TSB, 1966, pp. 574- 621; "Partynaya Zhizn", 1967, No.

9, p. 15.) The conclusion from these data is quite obvious: a young party and an

senile Central Committee. Since the party apparatchik, unlike the state official, does not know resignation due to retirement age, the disproportion between the old and the young in their representation in the Central Committee tends to increase in favor of the old. This conclusion applies to the same extent to the leadership of regional committees, regional committees and central committees of the parties of the union republics, where the average age of secretaries is 50-60 years. But in the middle and towards the end of the 70s, by virtue of the natural laws of nature, the named third generation will come to power. This generation will have to give a final answer to the cardinal questions of its time: what path will the further development of the USSR take? To what extent will the continuity of politics, ideology, and power be ensured? Are deviations from the past historical path of the party possible?

Methodologically, it is important to note that speaking about the change of Bolshevik generations and the continuity of communist power, we cannot operate with the usual criteria and laws inherent in an open society and a democratic form of government. The individual qualities of candidates for representatives of power, which play a decisive role in Western democratic parties because of the freedom of competition of talents and the freedom of choice of the party itself, play a subordinate role in the CPSU. The prospect of making a career in the CPSU is only that person who is able to stop being himself in the name of the common party machine, to merge with it in order to later act as a collective person. From here,

Bolshevism developed its own party norms and immutable party principles, which the party apparatus strictly adheres to even with an unusual change of power (Yezhovshchina, Khrushchev's coup in 1957, a coup against Khrushchev in 1964). To understand the specifics of both fixed laws and traditional party norms observed when changing party leadership, one must turn to the history of the issue itself. This will help us to minimize possible errors in the forecast for the future.

The basic principles of the party's organizational structure and the selection of its cadres were formulated by Lenin at the dawn of Bolshevism in his famous work *What Is To Be Done?* (1902). Underlying the work of the party in the conditions of tsarist autocratic Russia, these principles have remained and remain unshakable even when the Bolshevik Party has become the state ruling party. They are: firstly, a party can win, maintain and expand its power only if this party is led by a narrow group of professional party apparatchiks, because "without a dozen talented, experienced, professionally trained and long school trained leaders, excellently mated with each other, it is impossible in modern society, there is a persistent struggle of not a single class ... "(today it is the Politburo); secondly, the dominance of the party "cannot be strong without a stable organization of leaders preserving continuity" (today's personnel policy of the CPSU); thirdly, "the only serious organizing principle for the leaders of our movement should be: the strictest secrecy,

the strictest selection of members, the training of professional revolutionaries" (today this is the principle of the work of the party apparatus and the training of professional party apparatchiks) (V. Lenin, Works, vol. IV, pp. 454, 468-469).

When considering the application of these principles to today's CPSU, one must take into account that there are two leaderships in the party: one is an open, formally elected and replaceable leadership in the person of party committees of the entire party hierarchy - from the primary party committee to the CPSU Central Committee; the other is a closed, appointed, irremovable leadership in the person of a hired but all-powerful party-apparatus bureaucracy. The first leadership is available to our observation, the second remains anonymous, consisting of people completely unknown not only in the country, but also in the party itself. Meanwhile, they constitute that gigantic party machine that governs both the party and the state. When the official elected leadership of the party is changed, this permanent party bureaucracy, as a rule, remains untouched, and the change of the official leadership always takes place with its leading participation (liquidation of intra-party oppositions under Stalin, party coups after Stalin). Therefore, the problems of change and succession of leadership concern not only the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, they are organically linked with the change of the leading party bureaucracy in general. Since the hired party bureaucracy, in terms of age, belongs to the same generation as the elected party bureaucracy, the change here and there will take place almost simultaneously. Who will come to replace? It will be replaced by the communists, who joined the party in the conditions of exposure of Stalin's crimes. Therefore, it is very important to try to determine at least the main features of the political, business and psychological image of this third generation according to those components that lend themselves to our

analysis. We know from the history of the party that the second, Stalinist generation remained faithful to the first, Leninist generation in the main and leading principles of the structure and work of the party machine; what about the third generation? What traits will it inherit from the previous two generations, and what legacy will it dare to abandon? Such a formulation of the question requires that we dwell on the main thing that characterized and differed from each other.



the leading cadres of these generations, especially since each new period in the history of Bolshevism is characterized by its own type of leader-party apparatchik. If we adhere to the scheme of periodization of the history of the party according to its leaders, then we can talk about three types of party

apparatchiks: police repression, was in prison, was exiled, was in exile, actively participated in the revolution and the civil war, showed not only personal courage, but also extreme cruelty to "class enemies", to those classes from which he himself often left. All his actions, as well as his understanding of morality, justice and the duty to serve society, he considered through the prism of proletarian class expediency. A fanatic of the revolution, however, he did not deify the authorities. He looked at his own power as a tool for creating a society without power, and therefore rejected a permanent professional bureaucracy. He thought critically even in relation to his leader - Lenin. In a certain sense, he was an altruist. Stalinist party apparatchik: "little Stalin" in his area. By his education, he is usually a technical specialist, additionally passed through the Higher School under the Central Committee. He did not participate either in the revolution or in the civil war, but actively participated in the "second revolution

from above" - in forced collectivization, as well as in countless purges to turn Lenin's party into Stalin's party. Was in my place

a leading participant in the destruction of "enemies of the people" (Yezhovshchina), including many of his friends or even relatives. This long-term practice of persecution and destruction of people developed callousness, callousness, absolute immunity against emotions in the Stalinist

party apparatchik. A thoughtless cog in the party machine, he knows only one criterion of value: power. Therefore, in the name of power, in the name of a career, he is ready for anything, even for betrayal of his leader and teacher, Stalin (XX Party Congress).

Khrushchev-Brezhnev party apparatchik: "transitional type". By upbringing and by conviction, he is a thoroughbred Stalinist, but a split personality occurred in him when, at the 20th Congress, he was forced, at least outwardly, to renounce Stalin. This refusal took place under the slogan against "Stalin's personality cult" and for a return to "Leninist principles of party leadership." In practice, this meant that Stalinism as a party doctrine of methods of government is rejected and yesterday's authoritarian ruler over the collective - this "little Stalin" - will henceforth act as an elected ruler on behalf of and with the support of the collective ("collective principles in leadership"). This applied and still applies to all levels of the party hierarchy. Khrushchev, the founder of the new doctrine of collective leadership, himself became its first victim. But just the overthrow of Khrushchev showed the extremely unprincipled duplicity of the "transitional type": having come to power by exposing Stalin (XX Congress), and then strengthening himself in power by openly declaring Stalin an enemy of Leninism (XXII Congress), the "transitional type" abruptly changes policy: he rehabilitates not only the name of Stalin, but also his methods (the Moscow, Leningrad and Ukrainian trials of intellectuals, the intervention in Czechoslovakia). Thus, the "transitional type" returned to its primitive state: it is now the same "Stalinist party apparatchik" in ideology, but a "collectivist" in methods of government. A communist by name, a party apparatchik has very limited

knowledge of the history and theory of communism. He studied Marxism-Leninism not from primary sources, but from school textbooks. If he sometimes had to read excerpts from the works of the Marxist classics, then he read them as a believer reads Holy Scripture: inspired by sayings, but without going into their essence. Therefore, the Party apparatchik, although he preaches dialectics, remains a dogmatist to the marrow of his bones. Hence, his theoretical thinking is very primitive (the best examples of this are Khrushchev, Brezhnev and the chief ideologist Suslov himself). There is, however, one science that he was thoroughly taught and which he mastered perfectly - this is the science of governing the people, the state and the party. The party apparatchik is the elite of the party. The usual path of his career is as follows: ten years of high school (where he joins the Komsomol), five years of high school (where he enters

party). Having received the profession of engineer, agronomist or teacher, he begins to show interest in a new, more promising profession - in party work. He was soon appointed secretary of the primary party organization, elected to the district committee, city committee of the party. After 4-5 years, he is transferred to purely party work in the apparatus of the district committee, city committee, and regional party committee. After another 5-6 years, he was sent to the Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the CPSU for 2-4 years. Since then, he has become a nomenclature worker of the Central Committee of the Party, regardless of in which corner of the USSR he works. When he was nominated for party work, they were guided, as required by the "personnel policy" of the party, by two criteria: political devotion and efficiency. With the same political and business qualities, preference is strong, lead And command. given to strong-willed natures who are able to direct Sacrifice, party apparatchiks in work beyond all

praise. Working almost 16 hours a day, they are gradually moving away from personal life (sketchy studies show that due to work overload, premature mortality among party apparatchiks is much higher than among other categories of Soviet officials). The characterization of the party apparatchik would be incomplete if we limited ourselves to pointing out only his political, businesslike, and psychological traits. In addition to this, it must be emphasized that the party apparatchik is a representative of a completely new social class, not only physically, but also spiritually. Lenin's "committee" was a representative of the proletariat, and the party itself was predominantly proletarian, Stalin's party apparatchik was a representative of a new class - the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, and the CPSU was predominantly a bureaucratic intelligentsia party. Both before the revolution and after it, the Leninist committees of the party consisted of nine-tenths of the proletarians and only one-tenth of the representatives of the intelligentsia. With Stalin, the ratio was just the opposite. In the party apparatus under Stalin, there was not, as there is now, not a single proletarian for a very simple reason: in order to be hired in the party apparatus, one must present, along with a party card, a diploma of university education. Under Lenin, it was necessary to present, in addition to the party card, only a work book. Lenin called the Bolshevik Party

the vanguard of the working class and attached exceptional importance to maintaining a high proportion of workers in the party. "For one intellectual who joins the Party, several hundred workers must be hired," said Lenin (Vol. X, p. 19). The VIII Congress of the Party in 1919, at the suggestion of Lenin, decided to intensify the recruitment of workers and peasants into the party, but to accept employees and officials very selectively ("CPSU in resolutions ...", Part 1, p. 441). Stalin abandoned this principle. And, in a way, he was absolutely right. When the utopian idea of building socialism on Russian soil finally failed, Stalin decided to build something more real and weighty: an absolutist totalitarian state. Thus, a bureaucratic state unprecedented in history was created, in which not only the administration, but also all politics, the economy, culture, thought, and feelings are led by the ubiquitous party. This, in turn, required the transformation of the party of socialist dreamers into a party of bureaucrats, into a party of rulers, into a party of masters of power. Of course, such a party could have nothing in common with Lenin's party of "proletarians and cooks" who, according to Lenin, were supposed to govern the state. Therefore, at the 18th Party Congress (1939), Stalin quite reasonably excluded from the Party Rules all Leninist restrictions on admission to the Party for officials and intellectuals. As a result, the social face of the party has changed dramatically, it has changed, it must be said, in favor of the cause. If back in 1932 the percentage of workers in the party was 64.5, and officials only 7.7, then already in 1957 there were 32.0% of workers in the party, and 50.7% of officials. The party of the working class has become a party of bureaucrats, but bureaucrats of a completely new type - political bureaucrats. When the bureaucracy was admitted to the party, preference was given not to the "clerical proletariat" (technical office workers), but to educated leading officials. The change in the social face of the party in favor of the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia is well characterized by the following official data on the educational qualification of communists: 1927% 1967% Number of communists 1,212,505,100.0 12,684,133,100.0 097 055 16.5

unfinished higher - - 325,985 2.6

secondary 104,714 8.6 3,993 119 31.5 %

consists of the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, while in 1927

these groups together accounted for only 9.4% of the entire party. In 1967, there were more than two million people in the party with higher education alone, four times more than the entire party under Lenin (1923). The colossal growth of the party with the predominance of the bureaucracy and intelligentsia in it led to the division of the party into two parts: into the elite and the masses of the party, into the active and the passive of the party. The institution of party activists is officially enshrined in the Party Charter. But the members of the asset are not equal among themselves. The active is also divided in accordance with the hierarchical structure of the party into ranks: "district active", "city active", "regional active", "regional active", "republican active" (see the Charter of the CPSU, 29). On the scale of the entire party, there is no active institution; it is replaced by a plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The asset meets periodically. At its meetings, members of the Central Committee and secretaries of the party report on the current domestic and foreign policy of the party. These meetings are secret and ordinary communists ("passive") are not allowed to attend them. Who exactly

does the "party asset" consist of? This question is answered by the composition of the "committee corps" of the party. This corps includes: 1. Members of bureaus and committees, secretaries and deputies of primary party organizations - 2,650,000 people (including secretaries of primary party organizations alone - 360,000 people).

Members of district committees, city committees and their audit commissions - 325,000 Human.

Members of regional committees, regional committees, central committees of the republics and their audit commissions - 25,000 people.

Members and candidates of the Central Committee and Central Committee of the CPSU - 439 people ("TSB

Yearbook", 1968, p. 34). This three-million-strong asset of the "state of the whole people", "the state of workers and peasants" consists of people who have never known physical labor. Although power in

the USSR is not hereditary, it is quite successive. Representatives of the first and second link of this asset

will lead the party and the state by the end of the seventies. If their fathers were still workers and peasants by origin, and officials by position, then they will already be

hereditary officials.

From the "committee corps" it is necessary to single out separately its leading vanguard, which is, firstly, the "secretary corps", and secondly, the party apparatus. The size of the "secretary corps" is easy to determine by the number of party committees.

As of 1968, the "secretary corps" consists of: Secretaries of district committees - 9,459 people. Secretaries of city committees - 2,241 people.

Secretaries of regional committees - 745 people. (including district committees,

regional committees). Secretaries of the central committees of the Union republics - 70 people. Secretaries

of the Central Committee of the CPSU - 11 people. These 12,526 secretaries of the party, in fact, lead the "committee corps", and, therefore, the party and the state. They carry out this leadership through a small, but very clearly and efficiently operating apparatus - the party apparatus. The number of full-time party officials in the party apparatus is a well-hidden secret of the Central Committee. From the beginning of the thirties, they stopped making any publications on this subject. The key to an approximate calculation of the number of party officials is given by the speech of the Secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine Kazanets at the XXII Congress. He said that 55,000 non-staff party workers were working in Ukraine, and that this was four times more than all the paid workers of the party organs. This means that in Ukraine in 1961 there were about 14,000 paid party officials (for 1,580,000 communists). If this Ukrainian norm is extended to the entire CPSU today, then this gives about 130,000 paid party officials (for 13,180,000 communists as of January 1, 1968). To this we must add the number of non-staff party workers who are candidates for paid officials, of which there were 230,000 in 1961 (XXII Congress of the CPSU. Verbatim report, vol. III, pp. 24, 49; see also the TSB Yearbook, 1968, page 34). Thus, paid and non-paid party apparatchiks together are about 360,000-400,000 people.

The party apparatchik of the third generation will be a representative of those communists who now enter the "committee corps" as secretaries and members of the party; committees of grassroots party organizations. A specialist by education, a party crat by profession, a graduate of the Higher Party School, in his political and business profile he will not differ in any way from his Stalinist predecessor. But the general atmosphere in which he grew up and defined himself as a party official can leave its mark on him. There is reason to believe that he will be free from some of the dogmatic fetters of the Stalinist generation and the political schizophrenia of Khrushchev's heirs. Having grown up and taking shape in the relative conditions of "intra-party democracy", not involved either physically or morally in Stalin's crimes, subject to constant pressure from the humanistic influence of the scientific class and: the creative intelligentsia of the country, not protected by a generation of prejudice from the outside world, the third-party apparatchik may turn out to be more of a statesman than a dogmatic bureaucrat. However, all that has been said does not give reason to think that he will abandon any principles of dictatorship. Nevertheless, he can abandon many of the absurd, dilapidated economic dogmas that hinder the progress of the USSR. Already once, the Soviet system itself proved that an effective economic policy can be carried out while keeping the foundations of dictatorship (NEP) intact. In the social field, the third generation must give an answer to the main statement of the Party Program, which states that by the end of the 70s and by the beginning of the 80s "a communist society will be built in the USSR in the main" (XXII Congress of the CPSU. Verbatim report, vol. III, p. 276). One has only to remember the basic principle of communism ("everyone works according to his ability - everyone receives according to his need") to see that on the way to fulfilling this utopian goal, the third generation will be in the same place from which its predecessors began to build communism. This does not exclude the possibility that the standard of living of the people will rise significantly. However, the social distance between the ruling class and the ruled will remain the same as now, because this is an unwritten, but iron law of Soviet society - the standard of life of the Soviet

of a person is directly proportional to the height of the step at which he is in the hierarchy of society in general, in the hierarchy of power in particular. There is one area where the third generation will remain true to the previous two: in inheriting the principles of organizing monopoly power. This is evidenced not only by historical experience, but also by the entire upbringing of the third generation. This education is based on the latest doctrine from the Party Program (1961) on the Party.

According to this doctrine, the party will remain under communism (which was denied not only by Lenin, but also by Stalin), moreover, in a more universal role than now (due to the transition to it and the functions of the "dying" state). However, this same doctrine can lead to a shift in power within the party itself. Party apparatchiks will be forced to share power with inner-party social and business groups, the generals, the state bureaucracy, the economic bureaucracy, the trade union bureaucracy, the academic community, and the creative intelligentsia. The probable development in this direction may, against the will of the party apparatchiks, lead to the triumph of pluralistic, centrifugal forces in the party, which will threaten the "holy of holies" of the party apparatus: the monopoly of its power. Since a significant part of the intellectual elite of the USSR is in the CPSU,

then the shift of power in the party would mean the victory of the progressive forces over the conservative ones. It would also mean the return of the party's sovereignty over its own apparatus, at least to the extent that it was under Lenin. The restoration of the party's sovereignty over its apparatus will require neither an inner-party revolution, nor even reforms. It will require only the recognition of the party norms fixed in the Charter of the Party as the laws in force and the life of the Party (now they are only declarative rights covering the arbitrariness of the party apparatus). This will require, of course, in turn, the restoration of genuine inner-party democracy with freedom of party speech, criticism, a different opinion, with freedom of party elections. Is such a development likely? This question can be

answered immediately: with a normal change of leadership in the Kremlin, this is impossible. Party apparatchiks of the 70s will just as fanatically defend their monopoly on power as their Stalinist



predecessors. However, the general atmosphere in the country and the growth of the pluralist, centrifugal forces of the inner-party groups mentioned above can lead the supreme leadership of the party to a political crisis with an alternative: either a new Stalin, or the consistent spread to the entire party of that principle of democracy, which now dominates only at the highest level - in the Politburo. . Party apparatchiks will be impressed by the new Stalin, social and business groups - by the expansion of inner-party democracy. It is difficult to foresee the outcome of the struggle around such an alternative. When forecasting the prospects for intra-Party development, one cannot ignore

the influence that the surrounding Soviet society has on the Party as a whole. The intellectual part of this society is 28.8 million people, of which only 6.6 million are in the party. Such a society cannot be permanently patronized by spiritual obscurantists. In the end, it will demand what every thinking person is great for - spiritual freedom. I think that the most cardinal contradiction of the 70s will be the contradiction between the demand for spiritual freedom on the part of Soviet society and the refusal of the party apparatus to provide it. It cannot be removed either by bureaucratic combinations or by administrative repressions.

Let's move on to assessing the possible foreign policy of the third generation of Bolshevism, what will it be - great-power national or revolutionary-international? Before attempting to answer this question, let us recall that infallible predictions in the political sciences are difficult, if not hopeless. It suffices to recall three well-known but classic examples of misprediction: the assumption that it is worth making concessions to Hitler in the Munich Agreement (1938), and Hitler will calm down. Result: the denouement of the Second World War. The assumption that it is worth making concessions in the signing of the Yalta Agreement (1945) - and it will be possible "to re-educate Stalin in a democratic and Christian spirit." Result: a dozen new communist states in Europe and Asia. The assumption that Mao Zedong is just the organizer of the agrarian revolution in China. The result is good

famous.

A new forecast is now being made in the literature regarding the future development of the USSR. The forecast reads: the USSR is following the path of "withering away of ideology" ("de-ideologization") and "convergence" with the Western world. This forecast impresses as an alternative to a thermonuclear challenge. Here I have no opportunity to dwell in detail on the analysis of this forecast. I will only note the following: for all its seductiveness and even some logic in the aspect of the world scientific and technological revolution, the new forecast, in my opinion, lies in the same erroneous plane as all the above-mentioned political forecasts. The reason is not so complicated: communism is a two-faced Janus, it always had and has two faces: a brilliant disguise with a monstrous gut. On the way to their goal, communists act in disguise; when they reach their goal, they drop it. Erroneous forecasts are forecasts based on taking the mask for real face.

What facts speak in favor of "de-ideologization" and "convergence"? Usually reference is made to pragmatic "libermanism" in the field of Soviet economics and to "coexistence" in the field of Soviet foreign policy. But even for Lieberman, the following principles of communist economic management are property, the state plan, "socialist profit". The Soviet "reformers" operate within the framework and on the basis of the party state monopoly on the means of production and distribution, which absolutely excludes axioms: total state private initiative.

The renunciation of the monopoly of economic power would mean for the CPSU the renunciation of the monopoly of political

power. The Soviet theoreticians themselves, knowing this, in countless articles and books resolutely withdraw "convergence" How "counter-revolutionary utopia" of Western "ideological saboteurs". Essentially they are right. The uniformity of the scientific and technological revolution in the West and in the East cannot lead to convergence due to the antagonistic heterogeneity of their socio-political systems. As far as "coexistence" is concerned, here too the picture is not very comforting. First of all, let us note a new phenomenon in world politics, which has historical significance: the relevance of the problem of "coexistence" has already begun to shift for the USSR from

the plane of the two systems inside the communist system itself (China, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia). What is happening is that none of the communist prophets foresaw: wars are possible and inevitable between and may even the communist powers themselves, like imperialist ideological wars. It is difficult to expect communist states, which cannot "coexist" with each other, to "coexist" with democratic countries. Moscow has never concealed the fact that for it "coexistence" is not a goal at all, but a means to an end, it is only a means of infiltration into the rear of the West in order to resolve the competition between the "two systems" on the paths of revolution, without risking a suicidal thermonuclear war. Perhaps new people, new times, new conditions will influence the Soviet policy of the 1970s so that "coexistence" will really turn

from a means into an end? If this happened, then we would really be dealing with a reborn generation of Bolshevism. But building a policy in the hope of doing so would be more than risky. In any case, the forecast of Soviet foreign policy should be based not on the dubious hypothesis of an assumed future, but on an account of the real present. The real situation, however, is that the Party's foreign policy is planned in advance in the current Party Program, at least until 1980. This Program is considered both the Bible and the handbook of the third generation. What does it teach and what does it prescribe? Here are the relevant Program settings:

1. Along the path of "socialist revolution and the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat ... sooner or later all peoples will follow" (Programma KPSS, 1965, pp. 18,

19). "The modern epoch... is the epoch of the struggle between two opposing systems... The epoch of the triumph of socialism and communism on a world scale" (ibid., p. 5).

"The Party regards communist construction in the USSR as a great international task for the Soviet people" (ibid., p. 6). The communist states of

"Europe and Asia are the prototype of the new society, the future of all mankind" (ibid., p. 25).

"The CPSU will continue to direct its efforts towards strengthening the unity and cohesion of the ranks of the great army of communists of all countries" (ibid., p. 44), etc., etc.

It is difficult to admit that people brought up on these ideas reasoned and acted otherwise than the communists. Even more. A communist of the third generation, by all indications, will represent a kind of synthesis between the enthusiast of the world revolution of the Leninist type and the fanatic of the Stalinist type of power. Therefore, there is no need to talk about the "withering away of ideology" or about the "de-ideologization" of this generation. The authors of such a theory lose sight of the fact that ideology in the USSR includes two concepts: the ideal and the material. If the "ideal" is nothing more than a set of ideas and the worldview resulting from them, then the "material" (I would say "materialized ideology") are the forms and methods of government of a new type of power - partocracy. After all, ideology is not only what a person preaches, but also what he does. Therefore, the Soviet ideology is not only Marx and Lenin, but also the CPSU, the secret police, censorship, concentration camps, collective farms, in short: a mono-party dictatorship. If ever in the future the Kremlin had given up on Marx and Lenin, as they had given up on Stalin in their time, this would not have led to the rejection of "materialized ideology" at all. In the light of this problem, the forecast of Milovan Djilas seems very bold to me, who writes: "In 1984 (link to Orwell's book. - A. A.) the Marxist-Leninist ideology in the USSR will die, and the party will cease to exist, or it will be in ruins. The party apparatus and the secret police will be under the control of the army" ("The New York Times Magazine", March 23, 1969, Section 6, p. 135). Today, 17 years after Stalin's death, the

CPSU, like its ideology, is the same as it was under Stalin. The changes that have taken place concern not the substance of the regime, but its form, showing its adaptation to new conditions. It is impossible to imagine that things would continue to be otherwise, except in the event of a military or political coup.

When we raise the question of what dominates the Kremlin's foreign policy, ideology or the great-power-state interests of the USSR, we forget that there is no "either-or" dilemma, but "both-and".

The ideology of the world revolution and world domination not only does not contradict the Soviet great power policy, on the contrary, it is its global and most flexible instrument. Of course, the specific direction, success or failure of the foreign policy of the third generation will be decisively determined not only by the subjective qualities of this generation, but also by the forces and problems that they will face on the world stage. In the 70s, the USSR will have an increasing confrontation simultaneously with both worlds: with the democratic and its own communist world. Three forces will stand at the center of the confrontation: the USSR - China - the USA, each is the enemy of each. For the second time in a generation, history has

made the United States the judge of a deadly struggle between dictatorships - first between communist and fascist dictatorships (USSR and Germany), and now between communist dictatorships themselves (USSR and China). In the first case, the US made the choice of the "lesser evil", but who can define the "lesser evil" in the current conditions? Although the Chinese Communists have declared it their official policy to fight on "two fronts" - against "American imperialism" and Soviet "social imperialism", but today they consider the leadership of the USSR to be Enemy No. 1. This is understandable. There are no state borders or territorial contradictions between the USA and China, while a war between China and the USSR is possible and perhaps even inevitable because of the former Chinese territories (Amur, Ussuri, Mongolia, part of Soviet Turkestan). By the end of the 1970s, China's thermonuclear and missile arsenal would have reached such a replenishment that it would be quite possible for China to start a war with conventional weapons in the Far East without fear of a Soviet retaliatory strike with atomic weapons. Then the history of the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905 may well repeat itself, when the defeat in the Far East unleashed a revolution in Russia that forced the tsar to announce the Manifesto on October 17, 1905 on freedoms. Anticipating the possibility of such a war with China, the Kremlin will seek an alliance with the United States at the cost of concessions in spheres of influence at the expense of China in the Pacific and South Asian regions. Four more issues will gain

increasing urgency:

Growing resistance of Eastern European communist states in the struggle for independence. Growing contradictions between Moscow and Beijing in the struggle for hegemony in world communist movement.

The struggle both against the West and against China for political influence in the countries of the "third world" (especially in the Arab East) and for strategic influence in seas around these countries.

Germany problem. A

particularly important place in the "long-range policy" of the Kremlin will be occupied by the Soviet version of resolving the German problem. Unlike Western governments, which usually think opportunistically from election to election, Bolshevism plans its policy for entire periods and even epochs. He believes that in the future, overseas America and insular England will either leave Germany, leaving only symbolic forces, or will not defend Germany (Berlin), risking an atomic war. And then they will move into the resulting vacuum under the popular slogan "reunification of the division"

Germany" "volunteer East German communists, supported by "international brigades" led by Soviet communists. If the Bundeswehr turns out to be stronger than the "volunteers", then the Soviet Union will come to their aid, which has already prudently announced its right to intervene in Germany in accordance with the article on "enemy states" from the statute of the United Nations. The only obstacle to such "reunification" of Germany would be the possession of atomic weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany, but the Soviet Union again prudently concluded an agreement with America on the non-proliferation of atomic weapons in order to remove this obstacle. The invariable and methodical education of Russian youth in hatred for West Germany as a country of "revanchists, militarists and neo-Nazis" just serves

the goal of creating a psychological "casus belli" of the planned communist reunification of Germany. Moscow perfectly understands that if a new Hitler ever appears in Germany,

it was precisely because of the Soviet policy of perpetuating the division of Germany. Therefore, the Kremlin will try to warn him with the communist reunification of Germany.

An organic flaw in the Western "evolutionary theory" about the Soviet Union is that the West thinks of Bolshevism in rational and utilitarian terms. Bolshevism is attributed properties with which it is not endowed, and intentions with which it does not have. Bolshevism is denied the right to act that is contrary to the common sense of Western people. The inner irrational world of Bolshevism has always been and remains an insoluble mystery. Flashes of clarity and sobering come only when Moscow makes another "irrational" step from the point of view of the West, such as a missile adventure in Cuba or an intervention in Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, it is only in such "flashes" that the true nature of Bolshevism is revealed. But the matter is not limited to flashes. Bolshevism is consciously and systematically preparing the third generation for a common and decisive duel. Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU I. V. Kapitonov spoke about this very well and clearly at a solemn meeting in the Kremlin on April 22, 1969 in the presence of the entire Politburo in a report dedicated to the 99th anniversary of the birth of Lenin. He said: "The subject of the party's special attention is the education of the younger generation, called upon to continue and increase the revolutionary fighting traditions of their fathers and older brothers ... Our party has been and will remain true to Lenin's testament - to do" the maximum feasible in one country for development, support, awakening revolution in all countries (Applause)" (Lenin. Complete works, vol. 37, p. 304), ("Pravda", 23.4.69, p. 2). Thus, in relation to international politics, the third generation will preserve and, as Kapitonov puts it, "he will increase the revolutionary, fighting traditions of his fathers and older brothers."

As I mentioned above, continuity in the leadership and general policy of the Kremlin can only be ensured if there is a normal transfer of power from one hand to another. However, the possibility of other variants of the political development of the USSR in the 70s is not excluded: the appearance of the Russian Dubcek (an evolutionary "revolution"), the appearance of the Russian

Napoleon (military coup) or revolution (political coup). There are arguments for and against each of these options. To analyze them would mean going beyond the scope of this

Topics.

I know that in the eyes of some optimists, my general forecast about the appearance and affairs of the third generation looks rather gloomy. Unfortunately, the history of Bolshevism does not teach optimism. Each time the tragedy occurred not because of an overestimation, but because of an underestimation of the dynamism and scope of the possibilities of Bolshevism. A new tragedy would be the belief in the ability of Bolshevism to regenerate. Even the Kremlin is convinced that a revolution is possible in the USSR rather than a rebirth of Bolshevism. The organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU - the magazine "Communist" - with full consent quotes Lenin's friend and enemy, the old Marxist Potresov: "The hope that Bolshevism can be combed is unfounded. Bolshevism is characteristic in that it never allowed itself to be combed. It is unshakable. It can be broken but can't bend (1967, No 15, p. 86).

The way it is.

1969

V. UNITY AND CONTRADICTIONS IN THE DICTATORIAL TRIANGLE  
(Party, Police,  
Army) 1. The Police  
authorities.

The apparent change in the post-Stalinist regime is not a change in the regime itself, but a change in the relationship between these power groups within the regime. In order to make it clear what the essence, scale and direction of changes are, it is necessary to recall the initial position, namely: what is Stalinism as a doctrine and art of government, and what was the role of each of these power groups in the era of Stalin himself? I don't think it would be a big sin against the author's modesty if I answer this question with a conclusion that I came to exactly 25 years ago, that is, three years before Stalin's death, in the book "Staline au pouvoir" \*, published in Russian in 1950 under



titled "Conquest of the Party" in the weekly "Sowing". Here's what that output says:

"It is not true that in the USSR there is a "dictatorship of the proletariat." Even more. There is no Soviet power in the USSR either. The only truth is that the current regime calls itself "Soviet power" by tradition (...) Such a name only favorably masks the true nature Stalin's regime. There is no dictatorship of the

Communist Party in the USSR, despite its six million members. It is only true that the Bolsheviks themselves call the Communist Party "the vanguard of the working people of the USSR" in order to hide from the people the face of a true "vanguard" (...) It is not true, that in the USSR the party and the military clique share dominance

and power. The generals of the Soviet army are the captive of their political guardian - the institution of political workers. But even these, the latter, are only intermediaries, a bridge to a genuine force that has its own name and its own place. It is not true that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is an omnipotent superpower (...) The Politburo, although bright, is still only one shadow of

the real superpower that stands behind every chair of the Politburo members. The members of the Politburo themselves know this for sure, the Party vaguely guesses, and the people are apathetic towards "high politics." People are taught not

to think. One absolute force thinks, acts and dictates for all.

The name of this force is NKVD - MVD - MGB.

(...) The Stalinist regime is held together not by the organization of the Soviets, not by the ideals of the party, not by the power of the Politburo, not by the personality of Stalin, but by the organization

and technique of the Soviet police \* Alexander Ouralov. *Staline au pouvoir*. Les Iles D'Or, Paris, 1951. the police, in which Stalin himself plays the role of the first policeman. (...)

To say that the NKVD is the state secret police is to say nothing on the merits. The Intelligence Service is also a secret police, but its existence in the eyes of the British is as natural as, say, the existence of the Ministry of Health.

To say that the NKVD is an organ of the mass inquisition means, again, to say nothing on the merits, because the Gestapo was also a mass inquisition, although its chief Himmler would not have been fit to be a sergeant of the State Security.

To say that the NKVD is a "state within a state" is to belittle the significance of the NKVD, for the very formulation of the question admits the existence of two forces: a normal state and a supernormal NKVD; while the force is one universal Chekism. State Chekism, Party Chekism, Collective Chekism, Individual Chekism. Chekism in ideology, Chekism in practice. Chekism from top to bottom. Chekism from the almighty Stalin to an insignificant sexist" ("Posev", No. 41 (228), October 8, 1950, pp. 13-14). Such was classical Stalinism. What has changed since then? The Chekist

substance of the regime described here has not changed one iota, but in its internal structure there was a shift of forces. The role and proportion of power groups among themselves have changed, which creates the outside illusion of a change in the very nature of the post-Stalinist dictatorship. We are accustomed to seeing and stating only the main fact: the tyranny of the regime over the people, but we willingly ignored the relations of groups within the ruling class itself, namely: the tyranny of the Chekists against the party itself and the army. During the crisis around and after the death of Stalin, these two forces united with each other in order to deprive the Chekists of their leading role, placing them under the control of the party, as it was under Lenin. The party could do this only by appealing to the people and exposing the atrocities of the Chekists. But whoever encroached on the Chekists encroached on Stalin himself. The game was complex, difficult and very risky for the fate of the entire regime. It was much easier to declare Beria an international spy than to commit deicide - to declare Stalin the main criminal. With Stalin, his students had everything sacred in ideology, politics, career, friendship. Stalin led them to the

pinnacle of power through the corpses of the very fathers of October. The debt of gratitude and the well-known fact of joint crimes with their teacher seemed to have kept the students from encroaching on Stalin himself. However, politics in general, Bolshevik politics in particular, are as alien to holiness as

historical memories, as well as all sorts of moral and ethical motives such as conscience, honor, duty, gratitude ... The party apparatus, supported by the army, decided to take a calculated risk in order to restore its power and thereby save the entire regime: it declared Stalin a false god. Moreover, he publicly announced that all the crimes of the regime were committed only by the Chekists led by Stalin, and that the country owes all the successes of the regime in peacetime to the party, and in wartime to the party and the army.

This union of the party and the army made possible the total destruction of the leading officials of the Chekist corps, headed by the three ministers of state security Merkulov, Abakumov and Beria, the condemnation of their crimes, as well as the crimes of their inspirer and organizer Stalin at two party congresses - at XX and XXII. However, Stalin's heirs knew well not only what they were doing now, but also to whom the regime itself owed its existence to the Chekist corps in the person of its armed forces and secret police. They well remembered Lenin's words that without the Cheka the communist dictatorship could not exist (Lenin, 3rd ed., vol. XXVII, p. 140). Stalin's heirs therefore fought not against institutions, but against individuals, not against the police essence of the state, but against the police dictatorship over the party. The results are known: the party has changed from being the auxiliary force of the police to the leading force, and the political police has been transformed from the leading force to the auxiliary force of the party. However, the sum did not change due to this shift of the components of the power groups. Only the police ceased to be omnipotent, but the Soviet state itself did not cease to be a police force.

The depth of their fall was reached by the police at the 22nd Congress, when Khrushchev forced the current usurpers of his power to openly condemn at that congress the terrorist practices of the Soviet secret police headed by Stalin. The former legend of the knights of the revolution, the universal glory of the omniscient, omnipotent, never mistaken Chekists, was exposed by the party itself. Now not only the country, but the whole world saw the Soviet police monster in all its disgusting nakedness.

But Khrushchev was mistaken when he thought that it was possible to control the police regime by destroying the police, he was even more mistaken when he underestimated their inexhaustible supply of meanness and dece

even in relation to the supreme authorities of power. He later became a victim of this underestimation himself. With the fall of Khrushchev, a new ascent to power of the political police began, accompanied by the most intensive attempts to rehabilitate the "organs". New legends are being launched, such as the fact that the "organs" never made mistakes, but only certain people (Yezhov and Beria) did, but the organs had immortal heroes, like the convict Dzerzhinsky and the international spy Sorge. Unprecedented even in the era of Yezhovshchina, there were glorifications of the valiant deeds of the Chekists in countless articles, essays, books, films, with the task of creating a positive, pure type of Chekist hero in literature, as if in the cesspool of social scum in general you can find a pure type. Yes, this was not the true goal of the "social order" - the goal was different: to create a psychological climate for the return of the KGB network to the leadership hierarchy of party bodies from the Central Committee to local committees. Recall that the KGB was so discredited and discriminated against that its head, Semi-chastny, until the very overthrow of Khrushchev, was only a candidate member of the Central Committee, and professional Chekists were not included in the Central Committee at all. The official signal for the rehabilitation of the KGB was given by the appointment of Central Committee Secretary Andropov as chairman of the KGB, with the simultaneous election of him first as a candidate, and then as a member of the Politburo, and his three deputies - to the Central Committee. As expected, the same thing happened locally - local KGB chiefs, who under Khrushchev were kept at a respectful distance from party organs, now automatically became members of the bureaus of regional committees, regional committees

and the Central Committee of the republics. We are not talking about the career of individuals, here the institution is being rehabilitated, moreover, the KGB is being transformed from an auxiliary body of the supreme power of the party apparatus under Khrushchev into an accomplice of this supreme power, as one of the corners in the triangle of dictatorship

nature and now are not controlled by the parties in their operational functions and enjoy complete autonomy in this regard, a situation is created when the party apparatus controls the police apparatus only theoretically, while the police apparatus controls practically every party apparatchik from the general secretary to the district secretary. How

the higher the party apparatchik stands, the more and thicker he is surrounded by the KGB network, both legal (security) and illegal (surveillance).

Of course, both in the methods of the KGB and in its personnel major changes have taken place as a result of changing conditions. In a certain sense, one can speak of a new type

security officer. Leninist Chekist was a half-criminal half-revolutionary who fought against the real enemies of Bolshevism, called himself the nickname "the naked sword of the proletariat"; the Stalinist NKVD was a complete criminal and an open cynic who fought against imaginary "enemies of the people", but the modern KGBist is a total hypocrite. He declared himself from the very beginning as a crime prevention specialist and was not averse to dissociating himself from the Stalinist Enka-Vedist ("we are not the same") or impersonating your savior ("we only want to help you"), clearly entangling you in a web of lies, slander and provocation. However, it is worth the defendant to show firmness and catch the KGB officer in a lie, as he immediately betrays his true physiognomy in a flash of anger: "It is your happiness that these are not Stalin's times!" (remember the speech of the literary KGB officer Sholokhov at the XXIV Congress against Sinyavsky and Daniel). And yet he is not that stupid and unintelligent inquisitor of Stalin's times, whose only specialty was physical torture. He is a bureaucrat with a university degree, additionally passed through a special school of spiritual torture specialists. Where the Stalinist Chekist's callousness was organic, and therefore natural, there Brezhnev's KGB men disguise it as feigned good nature. Where the Stalinist Chekist killed the person under investigation with a slow physical death, there the new one, Brezhnev's one, kills spiritually. "If you kill everything in a person that has a human conscience, honor, convictions in him, then he is all in your power, and therefore in your service, therefore there is no need, even harmful to kill him physically," such is the philosophy of the new psychological inquisition. This does not mean, of course, that physical torture has disappeared altogether, but now they are not mass, but individual. Unparalleled in history, one must recognize the great evil that has become almost an everyday phenomenon, the most murderous scourge on the body of the people: the all-embracing, ubiquitous sexism. This is also a child

Stalin. At the height of the Yezhovshchina, on December 20, 1937, on the 20th anniversary of the Cheka, Stalin, through Mikoyan, put forward the slogan: "Every worker of the USSR should become an assistant to the NKVD" (Pravda, December 21, 1937). Of course, even Stalin did not achieve this. But this was and remains today the ideal of the KGB, towards which it strives furiously, consistently and with the help of the most criminal methods. How many professional Chekists are there in the country? How big is the network of freelance secret agents ("sexots") of the KGB? According to Western intelligence data, the KGB employs 420,000 employees, of which 10,000 are in the West, and no intelligence agency other than the KGB itself can know how many freelance, so-called "co-opted" agents make up. But one thing we know for sure: every adult citizen of both sexes of the 250 million Soviet people, covered by the strictest passport system, is in the eye, and even on the account of the KGB and under the constant supervision of its sexist network. This total surveillance, which is absolutely impossible on such a scale in any country with an ordinary fascist system, is easily carried out under the highest type of fascism under a communist dictatorship, since here the nation is made up not of individuals, but of coercive collectives, whose members bear circular responsibility for each other. friend. In each of these collectives, the KGB has its own legal bodies under various names and illegal agents from members of these same collectives. This also applies to the Communist Party itself. Lenin said that every good communist must also be a good Chekist. Therefore, Stalin acted like a consistent Leninist when he allowed the OGPU to organize its agent network within the party as well. Moreover, Stalin additionally organized his personal network of agents for surveillance and espionage over the party activists themselves. At the head of this network was the "Special Sector" of Stalin's personal office. Thus, the party found itself in the tentacles of a double network of espionage - intra-party and national. Khrushchev eliminated espionage against party activists by reorganizing the "Special Sector" and its grassroots network into ordinary secret

"Sectors" under the party committees, as they were before Stalin, but neither Khrushchev, nor even Brezhnev liquidated

agent network of the KGB within the party. Probably, it is now even more expanding.

Who and how gets into the network of sexots? As a rule, the KGB recruits into its network of agents the scum of society, asocial elements, caught and not caught criminals, people with a moral defect, weak-willed people, prostitutes, thieves, bandits, inveterate careerists, just paid agents, as well as "ideological agents" from among party members. , Komsomol members and even pioneers such as the notorious Pavlik Morozov. Stalin's method of recruitment was very simple: a person of interest to the NKVD was summoned to the Secret Political Department and given a choice: to remain in this institution as a prisoner or to go free as its agent. Today the situation has changed. The most effective method of recruitment now is blackmail. The method of material, academic, official (career) privileges created by the KGB for its agents is also used most widely just in the current conditions. The so-called "international détente" was a long-awaited holiday on the streets of the Chekists. The KGB

put forward an unspoken doctrine: there is a functional connection between détente outside and security inside - the wider the détente, the greater the danger of ideological sabotage by the West against the USSR. From here - a self-evident conclusion: to increase the power and staff of the KGB, to expand its agent network, to isolate Soviet citizens from foreigners, to close the flow of information from outside to the USSR, from the USSR outside. In the language of the Chekists, the circulation of free information between the West and the USSR is "ideological sabotage." The unity of the political police and the police ideology of the regime nowhere sticks out so clearly as in matters of detente, but it also demonstrates the deep contradiction between the fundamental interests of the state - to receive loans, equipment and technology from the West through detente - and downright animal fear of the KGB and the party before the inevitable in this case circulation between the USSR and the West of people, ideas and information.,

The Kremlin knows that modern Soviet industrial society is not endowed with immunity against the most dangerous contagion for it - spiritual freedom, while the Soviet state itself

can exist only as a closed state or it will not exist at all, at least in its current form. But if there is anything irreversible

in history, then this is the process of spiritual emancipation of the peoples of the USSR, which began in the 60s with the advent of the Democratic Movement, samizdat, the Chronicle, and the growing army of dissidents. Irreversible because this process is not the result of the actions of mythical saboteurs from outside, not a superficial phenomenon coming from foreign radio stations, but an internal natural process in a country of complete literacy and multimillion-dollar intelligentsia. "There is no freedom of the press in Russia, but who will say that there is no freedom of thought in it either?" - said one dissident (A. Yesenin-Volpin. "Spring Leaf". New York, 1961, p. 170). This will, indestructible by any police in the world, for free thought of both the people and the people's intelligentsia, in contact with the free thought of the West, is fertilized by new ideas, receives new stimuli, new creative impulses. All this taken together threatens the emergence of a spiritual alternative that can become the banner of a broad liberation movement. That is why the Kremlin is determined to make détente a one-way road for the privileged - open to the KGB and the CPSU, but closed to ordinary Soviet citizens. That is why a new theory about the exclusive role of the KGB in the era of détente was born in the Kremlin. Détente pushed the KGB corps to the forefront of infiltration outside and repression inside, thereby increasing its influence in the "triangle of dictatorship." Let's move on to the party. 2. The Party The CPSU membership card bears the words of Lenin: "The Party is the mind, honor and conscience

of our era." If we  
turn to

the genetic origins of this "mind, honor and conscience", a lot becomes clear in the tragedy of a great country and its unfortunate peoples. Lenin called the Russian people a nation of slaves, a nation of Oblomovs, and he staked on the social scum of Russian society for the liberation of slaves and the reforging of the Oblomovs. Into the well-known formula "the proletariat and the poorest peasantry as the driving forces of the revolution," Lenin

included also

the lumpen proletariat and the rural squalor. Lenin wrote:



“Wherever possible, we will strive to organize our own committees, committees of the Social-Democratic Party. This will include peasants, paupers, intellectuals, and prostitutes” (Lenin, Works, 4th ed., vol. 9, p. 214). Lenin foresaw objections on the part of genuine workers to this principle of organizing a workers' party. Therefore, he explained: “The urban and industrial proletariat will inevitably be the main core of our Social

Democratic Party, but we must attract to it ... we must all without exception: handicraftsmen, and paupers, and beggars, and servants, and tramps, and prostitutes. ..” (ibid., pp. 214-215). Such is Lenin's characterization of the social and historical roots of the CPSU. However, the current CPSU lives only spiritually in this ancestral hearth, and outwardly it is a quite decent bourgeois petty-bourgeois party. Let's start with a well-known fact, the whole enormity of which is obscured by the amazing nature of a person to get used to everything: the population of the USSR in relation to their civil rights is divided into two sharply opposite classes: citizens of the first class are members of the CPSU numbering over 14 million people, constituting only 6% of the total population countries, and citizens of the second class - this is 94% of the non-party population. They have become so accustomed to this division of Soviet citizens into "first-class" and "second-class" or into party and non-party members that the population itself does not even notice the deepest legal and consequent material discrimination to which these 94 percent are subjected. The USSR is a unique state of gigantic bureaucracy, in which the entire adult population from the general secretary to the sewer, from the minister to the cleaner, from the scientist to the writer, from the worker to the collective farmer

are his mercenaries, and the rest are dependents.

But only members of the first class can occupy command posts and make any kind of state, economic, academic and even creative career. Whatever outstanding talents he may have, but in the conditions of the USSR, a non-party person cannot be a minister, director, commander, diplomat, chairman of a collective farm, head of a post office. While constituting the highest class in relation to the non-Party people,

the CPSU inside is also heterogeneous. Party members

They are also divided into two classes, which have found their legal consolidation in the Party Rules (29): the first class - the so-called "party activist" - about two million people, the second class - this is the "passive" of the party - this includes all the rest. The road from "passive" to "active" of the party is not littered with roses; here, almost according to Darwin, cruel natural selection takes place, in which the strongest and least picky morally devour their competitors. A party member who thus ends up in the "party asset" is already like a hereditary party nobleman with all the ensuing privileges. He can be moved, punished, he can even be shot, but it is no longer possible to demote him, to exclude him from the nomenclature. The party activist is also divided into two categories - the first category goes vertically - the hierarchy of the party apparatus (from top to bottom from the Central Committee to

the primary party committee) - this is the same army of party apparatchiks, about 300 thousand people, which can rightfully say: "The USSR is us" ; the second category goes horizontally - the hierarchy of departmental bureaucracy (administrative, economic, trade union, Komsomol, cultural and ideological) - about 6,700 thousand people. The "vertical hierarchy" legislates and distributes the social production of the state, while the "horizontal hierarchy" administers and executes. The standard of living and the circle of material privileges of an activist directly depend on the step in the pyramid of power that he occupies. People who are at the very top of the pyramid simply have open accounts in the State Bank. political-psychological and business

What  
is the party

appearance

apparatchik? First, some statistics, which are very important for understanding the social function and business face of the party and party apparatchik. As of January 1, 1973,

there are 14,821,031 communists in total. The CPSU, according to the dogmas of its ideologists, is considered the "party of the working class." Lenin demanded that the ratio between the intelligentsia and the workers in the party should be one hundred workers to one intellectual. Accordingly, severe statutory restrictions were imposed on intellectuals and bureaucrats joining the party.

However, today's "party of Lenin" is a classical party bureaucrats: from the named number of communists so-called workers 40.7%, and bureaucrats - 44.6% (magazine Party Life, 1973, No. 14, pp. 14-15; and further data from this journal). Moreover, the column "workers" also includes the so-called former "workers" like Brezhnev. There are 6,561,000 specialists with higher and secondary specialized education in the party, or 44.3% (p. 17). (It is interesting for comparison: the total number of all specialists in the USSR in 1974 amounted to 21,400,000 people, see Pravda of 07/04/1975.) The intellectual-bureaucratic face of the party is even more clearly visible from the educational qualification of its members - 59.9% of the communists have higher and complete secondary education. In terms of national identity, the party is quite international, although the "saturation factor" of communists in Russian regions is higher than in national ones. More than three-quarters of the members of the CPSU joined the party after the war, of which about 9 million (68.5%) after Stalin's death (pp. 10, 18). Women make up 23.0% of the party. More than two-thirds of the party are people between 20 and 50 years old. (An interesting comparison for the "conflict of generations" - this relatively young party is led by a hierarchy of old people: the secretaries of the regional committees are about 60-65 years old, the Politburo - about 70 years old.) The party elite consists of two corps - a common "committee corps", which, according to the Charter, (but not actually!) leads the party and the state at all levels. It begins with the plenum of the Central Committee and ends with the party bureau, the party committee, or the secretary of the primary organization. This "committee corps" is considered an elected body at the congress, conference and assembly. It is today 1,801,000 people (p. 24). They are the "active party". They are leaders of all branches of life, and as such they are elected to committees. There are only 290,000 professional party apparatchiks in the "committee corps", from the district committee to the Central Committee (16.2%). But they are precisely the core that leads the "committee corps" itself. It can be called a "secretary corps" (Karl Radek joked: "First there was a matriarchy, then a patriarchy, and now a secretariat!"). They are certified bureaucrats, most of whom graduated from technical universities (60%), in addition to higher party schools (50%), and almost all

have a higher education - secretaries of district committees and city committees - 97.7%, regional committees and the Central

Committee of the republics - 99.2% (p. 25). Party apparatchiks claim that they are not party apparatchiks at all, but ideological Marxists and "professional revolutionaries" of the Leninist school. In a certain sense, this is true. They inherited from Marx the social phraseology, from Lenin the technique of the conspirators, from Stalin the mastery of ruling.

Since its appearance on the Russian scene, the type of Bolshevik activist has undergone a radical transformation from an idealist, at the origins of Bolshevism, into an ordinary careerist of our day. Motives and situations also gave birth to corresponding types. the professional revolutionary-rebel Leninsky even the lay in wait in the future for arrest, prison, hard labor, and gallows; if he managed to escape from prison - underground or emigration. People who now join the Party with a university degree and a "dialectical" conscience have a brilliant career ahead of them, privileges, material carelessness, completely dependent on the Party state. If Lenin had to make the October Revolution with the hands of the present CPSU, then it would never

did not take place.

The road to the pinnacle of power, and hence to the material well-being of a Soviet citizen, leads, therefore, only through the CPSU. Hence the attraction to the party. It sounds like an anecdote, but this is a fact that samizdat told us: in Georgia, they give 500 rubles for a party card! The question is often asked: are there

ideologically convinced people at least at the very top? Of course not. Stalin exterminated the last fanatics there before the war. Already from the end of the thirties, it was possible to state a general pattern: the higher you climbed the steps of the party pyramid of power, the less you met ideological communists, and at the very top there were and are absolute cynics who had and still have one ideal: absolute power. The outward seeming "communism" of Soviet society in the form of the nationalization of the means of production with the collectivization of the people themselves is pure fiction, because nationalization was carried out not in favor of society, not even in favor of the state, but in favor of the party, in order to make its dictatorship total

and totalitarian. With this Bolshevization of the Russian national economy, the social and ideological degeneration of the party actually began. Lenin himself foresaw this, but this prophecy of his is never quoted in Moscow. Let's do it we. In December 1919, Lenin said: "The worst elements

adjoin the ruling party simply because this party is the ruling one" (Lenin, 4th ed., vol. 30, p. 164), and in 1920 he added: "We are afraid excessive expansion of the party, because careerists and rogues inevitably strive to cling to the government party, who deserve only to be shot" (3rd ed., vol. XXV, p. 193). (Note that when Lenin wrote this, there were not even half a million people in the party.)

This prophecy about the swelling of the party at the expense of "careerists and rogues" came true on a scale that even Lenin could hardly

have foreseen. One might get the impression that we are blaming Lenin's heirs for abandoning communist ideas. Quite the opposite. The party that drew the correct conclusions from the bankruptcy of the utopian positions of communism, seizing on another idea of Lenin - the idea of the dictatorship of one party over the country and over the whole world, would have to be recognized as a party of sober politicians if it did not continue to pass off bankruptcy as a triumph, a mirage for reality. , a new-class Soviet society for the classless system of "developed socialism". Hence the political schizophrenia of the modern party apparatchik, in whom real politics quite coexists alongside obvious communist delirium. Hence the deep contradiction between the imaginary and real image of the party, between its "advertising" mission and political existence, between its social philosophy and historical practice. From here, after all, the type of party apparatus double-dealer was born: he preaches what he does not think, acts against what he preaches. This is such a widespread phenomenon in the life of the party that just over the last decade the Central Committee of the party in numerous resolutions, and the party press in endless articles demand from party propagandists that they become ideological. How deep must be the ideological fall of a once ideological party if the Central Committee demands from its ideologists that they themselves believe what they preach!

Now we have fully come to the final formulation of the answer to the question posed above - what is the political and psychological image of the party apparatchik? What evolution did he undergo from Lenin through Stalin to Khrushchev and Brezhnev? While Lenin sat out the death of the empire abroad, in Russia they were operating from his name is two

sharply expressed type of party apparatchik-"committee": one "professional revolutionary" (Sverdlov's line), another professional robber-"ex" (Koba-Stalin's line). The ex-robbers were the quartermasters of the revolution. After the Bolshevik revolution, both types, with a certain predominance of the Stalinist line ("rob the loot!"), share the seized power with Lenin. After the death of Lenin, after lengthy intra-party fights, Stalin's "ex" criminals defeated the "professional revolutionaries". This Stalinist party apparatchik, a representative of the second generation of Bolshevism, did not participate either in the revolution or in the civil war, but actively participated in the new Stalinist revolution from above - in forced industrialization, bloody collectivization, and also in countless purges - the physical destruction of not only millions of Soviet citizens, but of the entire Leninist party. This long-term practice of the Inquisition made the Stalinist apparatchik a callous, soulless machine gun in the hands of his driver. Taught by this driver to value only power above all human desires, the Stalinist party apparatchik in the name of power was capable of anything, even betrayal of Stalin himself (XX Congress). Khrushchev-Brezhnev-sky party apparatchik is a "transitional type". Being a thoroughbred Stalinist in upbringing and thinking, the "transitional type" with the unmistakable scent of a partocrat understood the trends of the times - the main positions of Stalinism in the country can be saved only by dissociating themselves from Stalin himself. Thus was born the notorious theory of the "cult of personality" and the doctrine of a return to the Leninist principles of "collective leadership." The founder of the new doctrine of "collective leadership", Khrushchev himself became a victim of his own doctrine. It was the overthrow of Khrushchev by his own associates that showed the extremely unprincipled duplicity of the "transitional type": having come to power through the exposure of Stalin's crimes, the "transitional type", having strengthened himself at the helm

government, rehabilitated not only the name of Stalin, but partially his methods (the trials of dissidents, the persecution of believers, the restoration of concentration camps and the invention of something that even Stalin himself did not think of - political psycho-prisons in which people can be kept for life). Let's

move on to the characteristics of the army. 3.

Army Of the three pillars of the regime - the party apparatus, the police and the army - the first two, together or alternately, ruled the country, and the third pillar - the army - has always been manageable. According to the social position, the party apparatus and the police stood and are infinitely far from the people, and the army was and remains the flesh of the flesh of the people, it actually is the people, only in military uniform. This was precisely the reason why the ruling party-police clique never trusted it (the institute of political commissars used to be, the system of "zampolitov", political departments and political directorates now) and most radically purged its command staff. Of course, Lenin and Stalin knew how to use this army both against the freedom of the Russian people (Kronstadt, Tambov, anti-collective farm uprisings) and against the independence of non-Russian peoples. Unfortunately for her, even Stalin's heirs managed to use her against the freedom of foreign peoples (Hungary, Czechoslovakia). Moreover. Referring to her and relying on the terrible weapon that she wields, the rulers of the Kremlin are constantly blackmailing the free world, openly arming and financing the so-called "liberation wars", revolutionary uprisings and even military coups. And yet the Soviet Army is not what it was under Stalin. Its evolution from an instrument of power under Stalin to a factor of power today, as one of the corners of the triangle of dictatorship, is a historical fact that an attentive observer cannot ignore. This evolution opens up a fateful prospect for the country. Therefore, it is important to trace how this happened.

The evolution that led to the change in the role of the army began with the war. At first it was more of a psychological rather than a structural change. The course and outcome of the war against Germany was decided not by the party and the police, but by the army and its officer corps. Nominal party and police bodies under the commands (members of military councils,

political departments, police troops, special departments, SMERSH) were only auxiliary forces and were fully placed at the service of the army. For the first time in the history of the USSR, all power actually passed to the army. New cadres of military leaders grew up in and out of the war, to

whom the country owed its liberation from the occupiers, and to whom Stalin owed the salvation of his regime. It was precisely this circumstance that caused Stalin the strongest fears. Stalin knew from history that wars give birth not only to revolutions, but also to Bonapartes, not only liberators from a foreign yoke, but also fighters against internal despotism. To prevent this from happening, Stalin decided to appropriate someone else's glory personally - the triumph of the military strategy of the Soviet generals (the legend of "Stalin's ten strikes") and at the same time get rid of potential or imaginary Bonapartes, sending all the leading generals of the past war (Marshals Zhukov, Voronov) into an honorable exile. , Novikov, Vershinin, Bogdanov and others). In the days when

Stalin hopelessly struggled with death, the disgraced marshals led by Zhukov are being rehabilitated, and the struggle for Stalin's inheritance that has begun introduces the army into a political game that is completely unusual for it - into the struggle for this inheritance. She was introduced into this risky game by the one who was close to her, physically connected during the war - Khrushchev. The bet on the army turned out to be successful for Khrushchev's personal career - with the help of the army, Khrushchev removed from the stage one after another his famous and seemingly powerful rivals - Beria (June 1953), Malenkov (February 1955), Molotov and the "collective leadership" (June 1957). It was then that for the first time a professional military man became an accomplice of power at its peak - Marshal Zhukov was made a member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the Central Committee. When Khrushchev, however, felt that the wayward and strong-willed marshal put the interests of the army above the interests of the party clique, he overthrew him too, having previously sent Zhukov on a visit to Tito, realizing that he would hardly be able to overthrow Zhukov if he

was in Moscow. Khrushchev thought that he thereby took the army out of the game. But he was wrong. The mistake became clear when Khrushchev began to infringe on the professional interests of the army (plan to reduce



000 people, a reduction in the military budget, a ban on building an ocean-going navy, the transfer of funds from the military industry to the civilian industry). Khrushchev felt himself so firmly in the saddle of power that he began to mock the demobilized generals, sending them as directors of state farms and chairmen of collective farms. About the Soviet generals themselves, he once, criticizing the free-thinking of the American ones, put it this way: "If our general said something superfluous, then we will "by the ear and into the sun."

Khrushchev, who had quarreled with the political police at the 20th and 22nd Congresses, now quarreled with the army. This is what his associates took advantage of to get rid of the new dictator they did not like according to his own recipe - with the help of the army, they took him "by the ear and exposed him to the sun." When the new leadership of the Central

Committee, taking advantage of the death of Marshal Malinovsky, wanted to once again exclude the army from politics and put a civilian at its head - Secretary of the Central Committee Ustinov, the army, despite more than a week of persuasion, said "no!" and achieved the appointment of Marshal Grechko as her minister. Thus, the army, from an object of politics, as it was under Lenin-Stalin, from an instrument of intra-party fights, as Khrushchev made it, turned under Brezhnev into a subject of politics, into an imperious force, into one of the corners of the triangle of dictatorship. The entry of Marshal Grechko into the Politburo was a legal formalization of the actual situation. Today it can already be considered established that the following issues are within the competence of the army (or it has the right to veto on them): 1) strategic planning and strategic leadership; 2) definition and planning of objects of the military-industrial complex of the Soviet industry; 3) establishing policies in the countries of the Warsaw bloc; 4) setting the course and priorities of the foreign policy of the USSR. There was nothing like this not only under Stalin, but also under Khrushchev. Having taken part in the overthrow of Khrushchev, the police also became once again an accomplice of the authorities and regained full autonomy in domestic and foreign operational

policy. Thus, in the era of Brezhnev, the triune power of the party, the police and the army was formed, the legal consolidation of which was the inclusion in the Politburo of the heads of the army and

police.

However, the army, especially the current army, remains the least reliable component in this triangle, if we exclude the political composition from here. We will see this if we analyze the personnel of the Soviet Army, especially its officer corps. The officer corps in the Soviet Army can be called a completely new social class. In essence, he represents the Soviet "military intelligentsia", which is keenly interested in

questions of history, philosophy, literature, art, being masters of the most complex military equipment of our time. Suffice it to mention that in 1971-72. 45% of the officer positions were occupied by certified engineers and technicians, and 46% of the personnel had higher and completed secondary education (journal, International Life, No 6, 1971, p. 106; Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, December 17, 1972. ). By 1975, almost 100% of the soldiers already had higher, secondary and incomplete secondary education (Marshal Grechko, Krasnaya Zvezda, January 29, 1975). Among the senior and senior command staff, there have long been no dashing, but illiterate Budenovites. 80% of regiment commanders have a higher education, and 82% of officers of the strategic missile forces have a higher specialized military education ("Warrior Calendar", M., 1974, p. 35, "Military Historical Journal" No. 11, 1971, p. 10) . Almost 100% of brigade commanders and above have a higher military education ("Warrior's Calendar", ibid.). In the personnel of the army, only 22% are communists, but 90% of the officers formally wear party or Komsomol tickets (among ensigns and midshipmen, only 20% are party; see "Red Star", January 31, 1973; I. Grudin, "Dialectics and modern military affairs", 1971, p. 89; "Warrior's Calendar", also, p. 34). That is why Marshal A. A. Grechko is quite right when he states that the modern Soviet "armed forces have changed beyond recognition in all respects. These are qualitatively new armed forces" (Pravda, June 4, 1975). This is what leads to the formation of a number of contradictions between the Party and the army.

The age-old internal contradiction of the officer corps was (and is now becoming even more aggravated) the contradiction regarding competence between the command staff and the so-called "political staff", which parasitizes on the body of the army. Party guardianship over the Soviet officer corps is unique and

insultingly. If at the beginning of the creation of the Red Army it was still understandable, because the commanding staff of the Red Army consisted of non-party tsarist officers, who were accounted for by one political <sup>put</sup> communist each (the institution of mistrust of commissars), now, when all the commanders are themselves members of the party, political officers are not only superfluous, but also harmful. Taking advantage of Stalin's panic in the first two years of the war, Marshal Zhukov liquidated

this institution, but the party apparatchiks, feeling that in this way the army could eventually be out of control and leadership of the party, achieved the restoration of the commissars, only renaming them "zampoliti".

In history there was not and is not an army in which there would be such a system of scrupulous political and police supervisory bodies as in the Soviet Army: 1) party organizations with the right to give instructions and denunciations; 2) the system of the Main Political Directorate with political departments and "deputy politicians"; 3) The military councils of the districts, which, in addition to the commander of the district, include, as his overseers, the head of the political department of the district and plus the regional secretary of the party (orders of the commander are not valid if they are not simultaneously signed by members of the military council of the district); 4) a network of "Special Departments" of the KGB in the army; 5) Military councils of the military branches in Moscow with representatives of the Central Committee in their composition; 6) the probable Supreme Military Council of all the Armed Forces of the USSR, which, of course, should include the "Secretary General" himself. (Recently promoted to general of the army with the award of the marshal's star, Brezhnev has obviously

now taken over the post that Khrushchev held on the eve of his overthrow - the post of Supreme Commander.) Thus, the most modern military equipment, highly trained in education, the army is still supervised by barbaric methods of Stalin's times. That's when Marshal Zhukov again wanted to free the army from this system of party police guardianship, Khrushchev overthrew him. By overthrowing Khrushchev himself, the army, however, rehabilitated Zhukov as well. (It is not for nothing that the "anti-party" Marshal Zhukov was buried in Red Square, while the "subjectivist" Khrushchev was denied this honor.) Thus, today's Soviet Army is no longer an instrument of power, it is power itself, without which the political p

one drawback - she does not know that she is the power. Drunk with the ideological fumes of Marxism-Leninism about the "greatness" and "wisdom" of the party, it allows itself to be hypnotized with myths and fictions, and even driven into the police shackles of political departments and special departments. This is where the most paradoxical contradiction in the triangle lies: the actual, substantial power - the army - is controlled by an untalented political clique that depends on it and calls itself a party. This unnatural state cannot continue for long. As soon as the Soviet Army recognizes itself as a civilian army, an army of the people, and

not of the party, a crisis will emerge. When this will happen, no one can say, but that this is the general trend, there is little doubt about it.

#### 4. Contradictions

The formation of a triangle of dictatorship, this kind of "triarchy" at the top of the Kremlin, is an expansion of the social base of the regime, on the one hand, and a forced, and therefore fragile compromise of the balance of power, on the other. "Triple power" is unprecedented in the history of communist Russia and is sharply counter-indicative to the former monolithic nature of the regime. It is the result of the loosening of the monolith of power, corroded by internal contradictions. The official dogma, of course, still maintains that only one party rules in the USSR as the leading and guiding force. But in fact, this party, after a short-term triumph first over the police (the execution of Beria), then over the army (the overthrow of Zhukov), is forced under Brezhnev to admit that now it cannot govern the country otherwise than in alliance with the same police and army. This conspiracy of three forces took place in the deep jungle of the Kremlin, without dramatic upheavals and external effects, and therefore remained outside the field of observation of Sovietologists, especially since the police and the army allow the ideologists of the party to shout as much as they like about their leading role, so long as it does not upset the balance forces. Let us not be deceived

by the prominence of the role of the "general secretary" - he is not a dictator, but a loyal conductor of the compromise course of the "triangle", which artificially makes him the sole leader in order to effectively represent his interests

inside and outside the country. That is why the Pravda newspaper in every editorial, the members of the Politburo in every speech, must quote the "profound statements" of the "Secretary General" composed by them, a man who decides nothing, but through whom everything is decided. Therefore, the baseless fortune-telling of foreigners who will be his successor does not make any sense. It mattered when there really were dictators in the Kremlin (Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev) or when there were outstanding personalities in the Politburo itself. Now a completely different problem is of fundamental importance - how long will the "triarchy" be and to which corner of the triangle of dictatorship will it move, to after all, all power.

Let us now try to analyze this problem in the light of the internal contradictions that exist between the power groups themselves. First of all, let us ask ourselves what unites and what separates the groups of the "triangle"? Despite the apparent simplicity, the question

of what and how to unite the power forces into one union is still quite complicated, especially with regard to one of these forces - the army. Without going into a detailed examination of the entire problem as a whole, a number of a priori truths can be put forward: they are united by a system of ritual dogmas, the identity of the interests of the factions of one ruling class, conviction in the global mission of the October Revolution and determination in its implementation, the instinct of self-preservation as against a possible explosion from within, and against an imaginary warning strike from outside. Of course, organic unity here exists only between the party and the police, for the police are party, and the party is police through and through, while the unity of the army with them is a historical convention. The army in this "triangle" is generally in a rather false position - it believes in Marxist dogmas only on duty and only in the service, but it believes in the world historical mission of Russia and the Russian army from time immemorial ("Moscow is the third Rome"). However, in the history of Russia there has never been and is unlikely to be another such government that would unconditionally place the entire power of the country, even to the detriment of its national interests, at the service of such a global mission as the communist leadership does. This impresses the Soviet Army, as it would impress any other army in the world.

With what has been said, I will confine myself to the unity of the three powers. Let me

turn to their contradictions. During the 20 years of their monopoly domination under Stalin, the police inflicted such gaping wounds on the party apparatus and officer corps that they rarely heal, but are even less often forgiven. Therefore, they physically destroyed the entire Chekist guard of Stalin, headed by three ministers of state security. Tens of thousands of mobilized communists were sent to the police apparatus, including a large group of senior and senior officials of the Soviet Army, and a collective leadership was placed over the police itself in the form of the State Security Committee (KGB), which at every level includes representatives of the party committee. This operation was carried out in the name of the party, but the party apparatus could carry it out only with the support of the army. However, the change in the head of the police did not affect the smooth functioning of the police machine itself, the main cadres of which not only remained completely intact, but were also able to recruit the party controllers themselves into their service over time. Moreover. In recent years, the reverse movement has also begun in the form of a noticeable increase in the infiltration of Chekist cadres into leading party bodies. The party apparatus claiming the right to control the police and the political police fighting for the complete restoration of its historical right to lack of control—such is the first contradiction between the party and the police. This contradiction is not external, but deep. The struggle here takes place, as Stalin would put it, "on the sly" and with the help of methods of sophisticated tricks, provocations and blackmail characteristic of these two institutions. Since in this respect all the advantages are on the side of the KGB, the party apparatus is waging an unequal struggle here. The KGB has another, more decisive advantage in this struggle - if the party apparatus, as an institution, is still outside the police competence of the KGB, then the party apparatchiks themselves, like living people, have been and remain the objects of its constant surveillance. After all, party apparatchiks are ascetics only at party meetings, but in life they, like everyone else, are people with their human weaknesses, and it is precisely these weaknesses that the Chekists systematically enter into their files in order to blackmail them when necessary, or remove them when they have become useless. Theoretically, there is not a single party apparatchik from

district committee to the Central Committee, which could not be discredited by the KGB, while the primary party organizations in the KGB network have neither the right to administrative control over the KGB institutions, nor the right to take an interest in their internal and external operations.

Still, the ideal of the police was and remains its Stalinist status, in which the party apparatus was assigned the subordinate role of the performer of Chekist actions and the ideological mouthpiece for their justification. During the struggle against the "cult of personality" the police were not only deprived of this exclusive position, but a number of legislative acts were also adopted that protected their actions and returned the police to their own professional function: to protect the foundations of the regime. However, since Khrushchev, the initiator of these acts, was overthrown with her participation, the KGB officers openly went on to recovery

lost positions. They conducted this offensive along two lines: 1) along the line of Stalin's rehabilitation through their man in the party apparatus - Suslov; 2) along the line of mass persecution of any manifestation of free thought among the intelligentsia, which understood the debunking of Stalin as the beginning of the

"spring of liberalism." Since even the Brezhnev party apparatus, in its own interests, was not inclined to abolish Khrushchev's criminal procedure laws that limited the rights of the KGB (prohibition of physical torture, expansion of the rights of persons under investigation and defense, liquidation of the "Special Meeting", introduction of a public trial, etc.), then the KGB began to circumvent these laws, recruiting into his network the police, the criminal investigation department, the prosecutor's office, the court. It is through them that the KGB men legitimize their iniquities. These actions of the KGB provoked opposition from the progressive intelligentsia, unprecedented in the history of the USSR: the Democratic Movement, the movement for the defense of human rights, the Emnesty International, the movement of Jews for the right to emigrate, the movement of Crimean Tatars for the right to return to Crimea, samizdat, tamizdat, "Chronicle of Current

Events", revival of religiosity and religious movement. It does not take much insight in understanding the psychology and relationship between the KGB and the CPSU to see that the police blame the party for all this with its revelations of Stalin and the NKVD, and the party apparatus blame

events. All this leads to an aggravation of the second contradiction between the police and the party on the most fundamental question: who should rule whom in a police state - the police by the party or the party by the police! If in the Politburo there is a division of people into groups at all, then it is most likely in the assessment of the role and place of the party and the police in domestic politics. But in foreign policy there is an undoubted harmony between them. Soviet foreign policy is a function and servant of its domestic policy. The material content of the current foreign policy, its priorities, its methods are also determined not by one party apparatus, but by the party apparatus together with the military and police apparatus. The Soviet diplomatic apparatus is also selected not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by the party apparatus, but by the party apparatus, together with the Ministry of State Security, in almost equal proportions of professional diplomats and professional Chekists (the report of the Rockefeller Commission says that the current ratio between diplomats and Chekists in the Soviet diplomatic apparatus in the USA is 60 :40 in favor of diplomats). But the division of Soviet employees abroad into diplomats and Chekists is a very arbitrary matter. Without any reservations: every diplomat is a Chekist, and every Chekist is a first-class diplomat. The notorious "detente" itself is the product of the Chekist brain trust from the KGB, using the methods of scientifically organized disinformation and the creation of a branching network of so-called "agents of influence" from high-ranking officials in Western parliaments, governments, the press, universities, corporations, parties, trade unions, churches. This is the reason why in the internal economic policy of the Kremlin, where the party apparatus rules - stagnation, failures, corruption, and in foreign policy, which is actually led by the KGB, there are more triumphs than defeats. This new phenomenon alien to the regime - the bifurcation of the "general

line of the party", its artificial division into spheres of external and internal predominant influence between the KGB and the CPSU constitutes the third contradiction, which cannot be glossed over by the introduction of the long-time protege of the police Gromyko into the Politburo or by constantly emphasizing the personal merits of the "Secretary General " in foreign policy. The contradictions between the party and the police named here



not departmental, but structural contradictions, because the question of the absolute power of one of these two forces is being decided: the party or the police.

A very important contradiction, which, in the final analysis, will decide the fate of the entire Party, must be considered the fourth, dull, but formidable contradiction in potential - this is the contradiction between the Party and its apparatus.

The CPSU has the same democratic Charter in form as the country has the "most democratic Constitution" in form. According to the Rules, party sovereignty is exercised on a national scale by the CPSU congress, in the republics by republican congresses, in regions, cities and districts by party conferences, and in primary party organizations by their meetings. They select the appropriate party committees by closed (secret) voting. Party committees at all levels are considered, according to the Charter, to be the executive bodies of the party (Charter of the CPSU, 1966, 22, 23, 24). But this is only legally so, but in fact - congresses, conferences, meetings have become deliberative forums, and these executive bodies

turned into legislative bodies over the party. Strictly speaking, not even these committees, but their apparatus placed itself above the party, and secret elections, like elections to the Supreme Soviets, with lists prepared in advance by the apparatus, turned into a parody of elections. This order was established by Stalin. He remained in complete inviolability and with his heirs. But now the party, as we saw above, is becoming different quantitatively and qualitatively.

That old party of nominees from the bench and plow, which Trotsky called Stalin's "voting herd", was killed by Stalin himself, and he created a new one from political castrati alone. Now the situation is different - out of about 15 million communists, more than 2/3 joined the party after Stalin, of which 12,300,000 people have a higher, secondary or incomplete secondary education. Yes, they still vote in a herd, but they have in their hands the Party Charter, which says: "3. A party member has the right: a) to elect and be elected to party bodies; b) to freely discuss at party meetings, conferences, congresses, at meetings of party committees and in the party press, issues of policy and practical activities of the party ... to openly express and defend one's opinion ...; c) to criticize ... any communist, regardless of the position held.

Empty yesterday, tomorrow these words can become effective. For a long time we did not understand, for example, the liberalism of the democrats in the USSR that seemed to us toothless. Gradually it became clear that the initiators of the Democratic Movement in the USSR were and are those brilliant tacticians who groped for the Achilles heel of the regime - in the name of Soviet laws they branded Soviet lawlessness, remaining themselves within the framework of legality, which infuriates the KGB officers who drive them to prisons and psycho-prisons. Where can the party apparatchiks have a guarantee that soon even in the multi-million-strong party there will not appear party dissenters with a completely legal slogan: "Observe the Party Rules!", as the democrats demand: "Observe your Constitution!" This will be a struggle of a legal, completely new, dynamic party opposition against usurpers of party power from the party apparatus for that fundamental law of the party, about which the preamble of the Charter says: "The CPSU builds its work on the basis of ... the comprehensive development of inner-party democracy" (Charter of the CPSU, 1966, p. 1).

We now have this democracy only at the very top of the CPSU - in the Politburo and very conditionally at the plenum of the Central Committee. It seems to me that the time may come when a new opposition movement will unfold within the party itself for the extension of Politburo democracy to the entire party, for the control of the party over its apparatus, for the return to it of the sovereignty usurped by the party apparatus. The restoration of such internal party democracy would be a prelude to the relative democratization of the Soviet state itself.

Of great importance are also intra-Party national contradictions in a country where more than a hundred different peoples live. Today, no one denies that in the USSR both Russian and local nationalism is growing. This is also reflected within the party in the form of growing contradictions between centripetal and centrifugal forces, between the centralist absolutism of Moscow and the autonomous aspirations of the national republics. If hypocrisy is an indispensable attribute of a successful dictator, then the Bolsheviks demonstrated masterpieces of hypocrisy precisely on the national question. According to the "Constitution", the Soviet Union is a voluntary federation of 15 sovereign states, the so-called union republics. What rights do these sovereign republics have?

The "Constitution of the USSR" says: each union republic can freely secede from the USSR, enter into diplomatic relations with foreign states, conclude agreements with them, exchange ambassadors and maintain its own national army (Articles 17, 18a, 18b). Meanwhile, a more or less politically literate person knows that the right to secede from the USSR is the greatest lie introduced into the Constitution, as for sovereignty, then some seedy town in the West has much more internal autonomy than, say, the entire Ukrainian Soviet Union. Republic. National armies and diplomatic relations with foreign countries are also fairy tales. I cite these well-known things for the following reason: the legal framework of the Soviet Constitution is already used today by national dissidents in

their struggle for national autonomy (Chernovol, Moroz, Svetlichny, Mustafa Dzhemilev, etc.)

This process began immediately after the 22nd Congress. Khrushchev was the first to see in the mood of the national intelligentsia a danger to the unity of the communist empire and therefore began to speed up the policy of communist Russification. He even established in Turkestan and the Caucasus something like military general governorships during their conquest by Russia in the 19th century. So the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Transcaucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU were created, the creation of the Baltic Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU was planned. They were headed by Moscow party apparatchiks, who were neither members nor candidates of the Central Committee, but gave orders to members of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the

first secretaries of the central committees of the national republics. After the overthrow of Khrushchev, these institutions, not without pressure from the bottom, were liquidated, but the problem itself was not eliminated. Therefore, in all non-Slavic union republics, an unwritten law operates: the national first secretaries of the Central Committee of the national communist parties are necessarily and without exception assigned as "nannies" second secretaries from Moscow, who are masters of both the first secretaries and the national republics themselves. And this also strengthens the autonomist movement. This party-autonomist movement also had its victims - the first secretaries of the Central Committee: in Turkmenistan - Babaev, in Uzbekistan - Kamalov,

Azerbaijan - Mustafayev, in Dagestan - Daniyalov, in Ukraine - Shelest - were accused either of nationalism or of patronizing it. From the point of

view of internal contradictions, of course, the military corner of the "triangle" must be recognized as a vulnerable point in the established alignment of forces at the pinnacle of the "triarchy". As we have seen, the "triangle" is more of a temporary than a stable combination. The ultimate interests of the party and the police, with all the clashes of their current interests, are completely identical, because none of these forces can exist independently without the other, at a time when both the current and final interests of the army are not necessarily connected with the existence of the party-police regime. The most important and decisive first two forces can exist only under a given regime and have no chance of surviving under a different formation, while not a single future formation can exist without a given army and its officer corps. The army, which in a critical situation of national need will put the interests of the country above the interests of the party, realizes that it is not only the only real force under the communist dictatorship, but also the most important support and any

of the future free state, can eliminate the "triangle" and establish its transitional autocracy without the outbreak of a civil war. There is no need to be afraid of terrible words and bogeymen inherited from historical prejudices or inspired by Western liberal philosophy of law. A "military revolution" against ideocratic tyranny would be the most painless form of the greatest liberation revolution. That is why the possibility is not ruled out that the keys to the arsenals of the Soviet Army in the hands of captains, majors and colonels may turn out to be the keys to the future freedom of the peoples of the USSR\*. 5.

Conclusion What is the general conclusion?

Figuratively speaking, on the tombstone of the Brezhnev era approaching its end, history should have engraved the epitaph: "This regime vegetated in the shadow of Stalin, gaining glory for itself by infamy!" Being ideologically a synthesis between Stalin and Khrushchev, Brezhnevism is the last historical attempt of Stalin's heirs to save Stalinism as a doctrine of dictatorship. At the heart of this

attempts lies the unspoken diagnosis made by the party apparatus itself: it is possible to extend the life of the existing system only by relying on its general designer, not frightening him with his name, but modernizing his skills. This is the reason for the ten-year barrenness of the Brezhnev regime in domestic politics in order to be successful, it lacks political audacity and civic courage for radical reforms, to be purely Stalinist - it lacks the criminal fantasy of its former teacher. But the nostalgia for Stalin of the party ideologists, psychologically quite natural, politically harms the party itself. A situation has arisen where the people do not want to live according to Stalin, but the party does not dare to live against Stalin. It's the contradiction of all contradictions

today's

Note by the author (1976): The appointment of the party apparatchik Ustinov as the Minister of Defense, bypassing the honored military leaders, and the promotion of him and Brezhnev to marshals, and Andropov to the general of the army - is yet another proof of what deep distrust the party apparatus has in the officer corps and how deadly it is afraid of a military revolution.

her Soviet reality. The party and the police are looking for a way out of it through bureaucratic combinations, ideological shamanism, and political repressions. Meanwhile, history did not give a single political party so much time to prove the viability of its experiment as the Soviet communists.

Result? Despite the richest country, talented peoples and absolute power, the communists have proved only one thing in these almost 60 years: communism as a classless community of abundance of material goods, spiritual values and creative freedoms is a complete utopia. This regime has been maintained for such a long time not only by scientifically organized physical and spiritual terror, but also by the entire system of penetrating sacramental lies, solemnly elevated to the state-party program. Examples? To collect all the examples, one would have to write a multi-volume history. I will confine myself to only two examples of party lies, so to speak, of world-historical significance:

1. In the "Program of the Party", written by Lenin and adopted by the VIII Congress (1919), it was said: "Deprivation of political rights and what

whatever restrictions on freedom are necessary solely as temporary measures ... As the objective possibility of the exploitation of man by man disappears, the need for these temporary measures will also disappear, and the party will strive to narrow them down and to completely abolish them " ("CPSU in resolutions", 1953, part 1, p. 414). These "temporary measures"

have been in existence for 56 years! of the current Politburo of the Central Committee, headed by Suslov, Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, Kirilenko and others. After Khrushchev, unlike the Charter, it was not subjected to any changes. This means that it is considered to be the Program still in force. It promised: "In the near future a decade (1961 -1970) the USSR will surpass the USA in per capita production... all will be provided

with material prosperity; all collective farms and state farms will be turned into highly productive and highly profitable farms; in the main, the needs of the Soviet people in well-appointed dwellings will be satisfied; heavy physical labor will disappear. As a result of the second decade (1971-1980), the material and technical basis of communism will be created, providing an abundance of material and cultural benefits for the entire population ... Thus, a communist society will be built in the USSR in the main" (the last words are highlighted in the original.- A. A.) ("XXII Congress of the CPSU. Verbatim report", M., 1962, vol. III, p. 276). Here it is not so much the generosity in lies that surprises, but the carelessness of the rulers of the Kremlin, that time can convict them of this. And time has

revealed: 1) the USSR has not surpassed the USA and will never surpass under the existing system; 2) the material well-being of people in the USSR is at least three times lower than in the USA; 3) "all collective farms and state farms" have not turned into "highly productive and highly profitable economy" (the USSR still buys grain in the USA, Canada, Argentina and even in Australia); 4) comfortable dwellings are still the dream of tens of millions of Soviet people; 5) hard physical labor has not disappeared, but has increased - these are the results of the promises of the first past decade (1961 -1970). Five more years (1976-1980) are left to sum up the results of the second decade. But for these five years in the USSR should

the material and technical base of communism should be created with "an abundance of material and cultural goods" and "a communist society has basically been built", that is, in five years, every Soviet citizen, according to the basic principle of communism, can "basically" work according to his ability and receive according to his needs ! What is the overall result

of the competition between socialism and capitalism over these 14 years? The well-known American magazine "USNews and World Report" gives comparative figures: in 1975, the social output of the United States amounted to 1,516 million dollars, and in the USSR - 750 million dollars; The USA produced 6.7 million cars in the same year, and the USSR - 1.2 million (in the USA there is one car for two people, and in the USSR - for 1000 people); the Americans produced 2 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity in the last year, while the USSR produced half as much; Americans have eight times as many refrigerators, twice as many televisions, and two and a half times as much living space as Soviet citizens; in the USA, only four percent of the working population is employed in agriculture, and in the USSR - 25%, but each collective farmer feeds only 7.5 people, and each American farmer - 48.5 people; The USA produced 23.2 million tons of meat in 1975, and the USSR - 16.7 million; The USA produced 273 million tons of grain in 1975, and the USSR - 154 million. To buy 12 pcs. eggs, an American should work 12 minutes, a Russian 116 minutes; for a pair of nylon socks, an American must work 16 minutes, and a Russian - 144 minutes; for one car, an American works 6.9 months, and a Russian - 37.5 months; for a liter of milk, an American works 7 minutes, and a Russian - 21 minutes; for one suit, an American works 25 hours, and a Russian - 106 hours. (I quote this information from "Welt am Sonntag",

26.09.1976.) Fantast Thomas More prudently called his communism a utopia, while realists from the CPSU call their utopia communism. The only difference is this. Only a political party, absolutely irresponsible to the people and history, can lie like that.

Here it is necessary to say a few words about the external influence on the internal political processes of the Soviet Union. Today it is no longer possible to analyze Soviet politics in abstraction from world politics. For decades, the USSR was hermetically isolated from the outside world. This was its strength as a police state, but

this was also its weakness. The Soviet Union found itself aloof from world civilization. The autarkic economy of socialism, with its extensive industrialization with the help of forced labor, having exhausted all its internal possibilities, found itself in a dead end just in those years when another era had already begun in the West - the era of the second scientific and technological industrial revolution. Its foundations were the unrestricted freedom of the creative genius of scientists and free organizational entrepreneurship. The "Kosygin reforms" and Brezhnev's so-called "agrarian policy" were a belated attempt to get involved in this new industrial revolution in order to solve the problem of the profitability of both industry and the same time. But talent agriculture at

vicious system police officer socialism turned out contraindicated for the development of a new intensive industrial revolution, based not on coercion, but on the creative freedom of the mind and imagination. The attempt failed. Now, before our eyes, a second attempt is being made - to bring the Soviet economy out of the impasse with the help of the West. Hence the now famous détente - inviting Western technology to the USSR and giving back to the West the Soviet technology of the communist revolution.

Left in the current conditions alone with the people, the party certainly runs the risk of unleashing a crisis of its power. But this party, as always in its critical periods, comes to the aid from outside. Sometimes one involuntarily creates the impression that the Western bourgeoisie does not allow Soviet communism to perish in order to forever frighten its own peoples with this communism. In any case, the West does not allow internal problems and contradictions in the USSR to mature and become aggravated before a nationwide crisis. Two illustrative examples: 1) if it were not for Western loans, equipment and technology, then now the Kremlin would be forced either to introduce radical economic reforms such as the NEP, or a significant part of those gigantic sums that are spent on strategic weapons, on subsidizing world communism, for its wars and revolutions, or rush into space, to send to the needs of the people; 2) if it were not for the periodic cheap sale of American bread to the Soviet government, then it would be faced with a dilemma in the current non-Stalinist era: either liquidate the new serf collective farm



system as absolutely unprofitable, or to reckon with the serious danger of grain riots in the cities, which actually began the revolution of 1917. Now it is pointless to argue about the pros

and cons of Helsinki, but it is impossible to put up with the arbitrary right of the Kremlin to choose for itself only those agreements in Helsinki that are imposed by itself, discarding all those agreements on human rights, on the circulation of ideas, people and information, under which he also put his signature. No less persistently should one object to the fact that for consent to the Kremlin's detente, material and technical indemnities are paid at the expense of the vital interests of the freedom of the peoples of the USSR. The Kremlin needs detente more than the West, so it is illogical, even stupid, to pay it a special "tribute" for it, like the winner in the Cold War, which he actually continues, renaming it only "ideological struggle." Not the help of the Western proletariat, but this "tribute" to the profit-hungry Western bourgeoisie and its governments, the Kremlin now owes its salvation from the emerging internal crisis. In 1920, Lenin said words that could become prophetic: "The smartest people of the bourgeoisie

have become confused and cannot but do irreparable stupidities. The bourgeoisie will perish on this. And our people can even do stupid things and nevertheless turn out to be winners in the end" (Lenin, 3rd ed., vol. XXV, p. 221). Until now, the "smartest people" have done "irreparable stupidities" at the expense of foreign peoples. Now they make them at their own expense. This will bring the hour of historical denouement closer.

1975-1976